



Royal Canadian Gendarmerie royale
Mounted Police du Canada

Your file Votre référence
1240200

Our file Notre référence
A-2019-02899

MAY 13 2019

Mr. Kipling WARNER


Dear Mr. WARNER:

This is in response to your request under the *Access to Information Act*, which was received by this office on April 29, 2019, to obtain:

*I would like a copy of the Project Sanction report cited in this article:
<https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/rcmp-study-found-322-incidents-of-corruption-in-mountie-ranks-and-12-cases-involved-organized-crime> The document may be titled Project Sanction, Examining Corruption within the RCMP, Final Report and published in May 2007.*


Enclosed is a copy of all the information relevant to your request, which are disclosed in their entirety.


Please be advised that you are entitled to lodge a complaint with the Information Commissioner concerning the processing of your request within 60 days after the day that you become aware that grounds for a complaint exist. In the event you decide to avail yourself of this right, your notice of complaint should be addressed to:

Office of the Information Commissioner of Canada
30 Victoria Street, 7th Floor
Gatineau, Quebec K1A 1H3

Should you wish to discuss this matter further, you may contact Ms. Crystal Holub at Crystal.Holub@rcmp-grc.gc.ca . Please quote the file number appearing on this letter.

Regards,


Supt. Richard Haye
Access to Information and Privacy Branch
Mailstop #61
73 Leikin Drive
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0R2


S/Sgt Kent Swin

Canada

Re: ATIP File No A-2019-02899

X-Mailer: Novell GroupWise Internet Agent 12.0.4

Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 10:46:39 -0400 (2019-05-19 07:46:39 AM)

From: Crystal Holub <Crystal.Holub@rcmp-grc.gc.ca>

To: Kip Warner [REDACTED]

Good Morning Kip,

Thank you for your email.

Yes, you can redistribute the information.

Regards,

Crystal Holub

>>> Kip Warner [REDACTED] 2019/05/18 8:30 PM >>>
Dear Crystal,

Thank you for your letter of 13 May, 2019, and the responsive records that you enclosed by optical medium at that time.

I am writing to verify that the records you produced are available for public redistribution at my leisure. I note that all of the pages were disclosed in their entirety with no redactions.

Having said that, it does not hurt to ask. Can you please verify my understanding? I would be much obliged.

Yours truly,

--

Kip Warner | Senior Software Engineer
OpenPGP signed/encrypted mail preferred
<https://www.thevertigo.com>



Project **SANCTION**

Examining Corruption within the RCMP
Final Report — May 2007

Criminal Intelligence

This document is the property of the RCMP. It is loaned to your agency/department in confidence and it is not to be reclassified, copied, reproduced, used or further disseminated, in whole or part, without the consent of the originator. It is not to be used in affidavits, court proceedings or subpoenas or for any other legal or judicial purposes. This caveat is an integral part of this document and must accompany any information extracted from it. Non-Canadian citizens shall not be given access to classified information and assets marked "for Canadian Eyes Only" (CEO)





Project **SANCTION**

Examining Corruption within the RCMP

PROJECT SANCTION

Prepared by: Criminal Intelligence + Professional Standards and External Review Directorate
Research expertise in research design and analyses provided by HR Research and Intelligence
© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2007

Executive Summary	iv
I. Introduction	1
II. Nature and Scope	4
III. Definition	6
IV. Theories	8
<i>Individual</i>	8
<i>Organization</i>	9
<i>Society</i>	9
<i>Comprehensive Approach</i>	10
<i>General Application</i>	10
V. Methodology	11
<i>Methodology of the Analysis</i>	14
VI. Analysis	15
<i>Corruption Incidents</i>	15
Individuals/Organizations involved in corrupt incidents	18
Disclosure of police information	19
Fraud	19
Theft	20
Interference with the judicial process	20
Drug Activities	21
Source Involvement	23
Motivation	23
<i>Demographic Data</i>	23
Gender	23
Age at time of first corrupt incident	24
Service at time of first corrupt incident	25
Rank at time of first corrupt incident	28
Location at time of first corrupt incident	30
Clusters	31

<i>Recruiting</i>	32
Recruiting Tests	32
Education	32
Alternative Recruiting Programs	33
Recruiting pressures	35
Recruiting—Non-significant differences	37
<i>Training</i>	38
Depot	38
Field Coaching	40
<i>Staffing</i>	40
Postings	41
High Risk Areas	42
<i>Supervision and other in-service issues</i>	43
Significant Differences	43
Security Clearance Updates	44
<i>Professional Standards</i>	45
Discipline	45
Public Complaints/Internal Investigations	45
VII. Mitigation Strategies	48
<i>Recruiting</i>	48
Age	48
Education	48
Conscientiousness Measure (Six Factor Personality Questionnaire—SFPQ)	49
Recommendations 1-2	50
Alternate Recruiting Process	50
Recommendation 3	50
Prior drug use and offences	50
General disclosure and field investigation	50
Recommendations 4-5	50

<i>Training</i>	51
Depot	51
Recommendation 6	51
Field Coaching	51
Recommendation 7	51
General Ethics Training	51
Recommendations 8-9	52
<i>Staffing</i>	53
Recommendations 10-11	53
Postings	53
Recommendation 12	54
Promotion	54
Recommendation 13	54
<i>Supervision/Management</i>	54
Recommendations 14-16	55
<i>Security</i>	56
Recommendations 17-18	56
<i>Professional Standards</i>	56
Recommendations 19-20	57
<i>General Recommendation 21</i>	57
VIII. Conclusion	58
IX. Bibliography	60
Appendix A	64
Appendix B.	70
Appendix C.	102



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Purpose

The objective of this joint analytical project, between Criminal Intelligence and the Chief Human Resources Officer is to assess the nature of corruption within the RCMP from 1995 to 2005 in order to provide detailed analysis of the nature of corrupt activities, as well as to identify potential trends with a view to making recommendations for an anti-corruption mitigation strategy.

This report contains key findings of the descriptive and comparative analysis pertaining to corruption as it relates to the RCMP regular members within a ten year period. It also consolidates the general observations gleaned from the study and integrates the findings of other similar studies and literature regarding police corruption. The last section of this report contains mitigation strategy recommendations to address corruption within the RCMP which focus on:

- > *recruiting and promotional screening*
- > *training*
- > *performance evaluation processes*
- > *mechanisms to monitor evaluation processes*
- > *alignment of human resources files*
- > *security clearance update process*
- > *creation of an early warning system*

Definition of Corruption

For the purpose of this study—taking into consideration the nature of the RCMP, the fact that it is a national police force and is a member of the Interpol Group of Experts on Corruption (IGEC)—the Project Sanction working group was directed to align the study with the established IGEC corruption criteria. Specifically, the definition was broken down into the following categories:

- > *Solicitation or acceptance directly or indirectly, by a police officer, of any money, article of value, gift, favour, promise, reward or advantage whether for himself/herself or for any person, group or entity, in return for any act or omission already done or omitted to be done or omitted in the future in connection with the performance of any function of or connected with policing.*

- > *Any act or omission in the discharge of duties by a police officer which may improperly expose any person to a charge or conviction for a criminal offence or may improperly assist in a person not being charged with or being acquitted of a criminal offence.*
- > *The unauthorized dissemination of confidential or restricted police information whether for reward or otherwise.*
- > *Any act or omission in the discharge of duties by a police officer for the purpose of obtaining any money, article of value, gift, favour, promise, reward or advantage for himself/herself or any other person, group or entity.*

The identification of the cases with at least one documented, concluded incident that occurred between 1995 and 2005 that met the established study definition of corruption was conducted from three separate sources. Due to the lack of a centralized system, it was necessary to utilize multiple methods to identify the study cases. In order to proceed with a comparative analysis, an equal sized control group was randomly selected to match the corrupt cases (sample group) by service and hiring years, with representation of both genders. Documented information was collected pertaining to recruiting, Depot training, field coaching, staffing, public complaints/internal investigations, anti-corruption investigations and discipline.

It should be noted that this study is limited to the corruption cases that were reported and concluded within the above noted time frame. It does not include cases that occurred during the time frame but were ongoing during the data collection phase. In addition, it does not include other types of misconduct, malfeasance or criminal behaviours outside of the aforementioned definition, or the unreported corruption incidents.

Analysis

There were a total of 204 members that were identified as having been involved in a documented, concluded, corrupt incident between 1995–01–01 and 2005–12–31. In total there were 322 known incidents of corruption.

The most common type of corrupt behaviour was disclosure of police information, which constituted 19.9% of all of the corrupt incidents. The incidents of fraud and misuse of police officer status ranked second and third, representing 16.1% and 14.9% of the incidents, respectively, followed by theft at 14% and interference with the judicial process at 13.4%.

This study also determined that of the 322 incidents of corruption, there were 152 incidents associated with 78 members that involved other individuals or organizations. More specifically, there were 12 incidents involving organized crime and 20 incidents involving known criminals.¹ In total, between 1995 and 2005, there were 17 members whose corrupt incidents involved criminals and/or organized crime groups.

Much of the descriptive demographic analysis is aligned with the current theories and literature with respect to when, how and why an incident of corruption occurs. In regard to service and age at the time of the first corrupt incident, the average length of service was 13 years and the average age was 37.6 years.

The overall findings of this study were a result of general observations gleaned, and the descriptive and comparative analysis. The incidence of corruption is a culmination of a number of issues and the following is a list of the general contributing factors within the RCMP:

- > **Recruiting**—*Statistically, the sample group had a significantly higher number of cases of individuals who were hired through alternative means and who were not required to meet the established screening standards.*
- > **Supervision**—*Although both performance and comportment problems have been identified as being statistically higher among the corruption group in comparison to the control group, the lack of identification of performance/comportment problems by supervisors in many circumstances was apparent. This finding also indicates a need to clearly set out expectations, to select supervisors who exemplify the desired behaviours and the need to effectively monitor and guide subordinates. A large portion of the most common corruption incidents, specifically disclosure of police information, theft and fraud, could have been mitigated through more effective supervision.*
- > **Misalignment of records systems**—*There was a disconcerting disparity between information retained in the various files regarding each case, including the personnel, internal investigation, operational and discipline files. In a number of cases the operational and internal investigation files denoted serious performance problems that were*

¹ For the purposes of this study, the definition of organized crime is consistent with section 467.1(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada defining a criminal organization as:

(a) is composed of three or more persons in or outside Canada; and,

(b) as as one of its main purposes or main activities the facilitation or commission of one or more serious offences, that, if committed, would likely result in the direct or indirect receipt of a material benefit, including a financial benefit, by the group or by any one of the persons who constitute the group.

absent in the personnel files. It is unfathomable that not only are career development resourcing advisors relying on the credibility of the file contents, but so too are the different managers seeking to fill their vacancies with competent members.

- > **Ineffective assessment tools**—*In reference to the project's time frame, and in light of the correlation between performance/comportment problems and the incidence of corruption, it was noted that the evaluations used for the past fifteen years were highly subjective and relatively meaningless, providing very little useful information to members, managers and career development resourcing advisors.*
- > **No existing mechanism to ensure completion of performance evaluations**—*In reference to the project's time frame and given the correlation between performance and the incidence of corruption, the absence of an internal mechanism to track and ensure the completion of performance evaluations has created an information vacuum regarding the documented experiences, development, and acquired knowledge, skills and abilities of the members. For many of the reviewed cases, there were several years that lapsed between evaluations.*
- > **Irregularities within the security file management system**—*A number of security files could not be located for several of the cases that were reviewed for the purposes of this study. Although there was complete cooperation from Departmental Security Branch, the explanations regarding the missing files revealed that files had been purged in some cases and simply could not be located in others. Security files are to be retained for a period of 99 years following retirement.*
- > **Lack of a centralized information system to monitor, track and assess, and to conduct investigations and/or operational investigations**—*The RCMP does not have a centralized system that would allow the Professional Standards and External Review Directorate to identify, monitor and track the status of internal issues, or to make appropriate adjustments and flag members who may be at risk of yet more serious misconduct. The comparative analysis determined that, statistically, there is a significantly higher number of individuals within the corrupt group that had more public complaints/internal investigations prior to their first corrupt incidence. This and other such findings may contribute to the development and implementation of an early warning system.*

Mitigation Strategies

This section is comprised of the recommended strategies emanating from the analysis, a comprehensive literature review, general observations and research of internal RCMP processes. The recommended mitigation strategies include:

- > *recruiting and promotional screening using a conscientiousness measure*
- > *aligned training in ethics from the initial training at Depot through the field coaching program and throughout a member's career*
- > *a more effective performance evaluation system including monitoring mechanisms*
- > *a more effective security update system, including form revision and increased frequency of updates*
- > *alignment of HR records systems*
- > *a centralized information system to monitor, track and identify individuals at risk*

The following strategies include very tangible changes that can affect the occurrence of corruption, and should be considered holistically.

Recommendation 1:

The RCMP begin to make applicant selections using the Six Factor Personality Questionnaire (SFPQ) or other conscientiousness measure at an early stage of the recruiting process.

Recommendation 2:

The RCMP develop a defensible minimum recruitment standard with respect to the SFPQ score or other conscientiousness measure.

Recommendation 3:

The RCMP adhere to the established recruiting standards and selection criteria, which includes the development and implementation of alternate recruitment processes.

Recommendation 4:

The recruiting suitability interviewer review all screening and selection materials, including the field investigation, for a final recommendation of the applicant.

Recommendation 5:

RCMP applicants be automatically given a follow-up interview when there are discrepancies identified during the recruitment process.

Recommendation 6:

Ethics training at Depot be aligned and coordinated with subsequent ethics in-service training.

Recommendation 7:

Ethics training be integrated into the field coaching curriculum as well as incorporated in the training and preparation for field coaches.

Recommendation 8:

All RCMP supervisors, managers and new supervisors be required to successfully complete an RCMP tailored ethics course for supervisors.

Recommendation 9:

All regular members be required to successfully complete an RCMP tailored ethics course. After Depot and the Field Coaching Program, the member should receive in-service progressive ethics training at 3 years of service, 5 years of service and then in 5 year intervals thereafter.

Recommendation 10:

Professional Standards and External Review Directorate develop a mechanism to permit the vetting of evaluations in the event of a successful grievance. In the event that the entire evaluation is grieved, it should be replaced by a new, accurate one.

Recommendation 11:

HR explore a means to associate different files including the personnel, internal investigations, discipline and security files.

Recommendation 12

Regular members serving in their home communities be monitored/assessed by both staffing and supervisors. Training, guidance, assistance and transfers should be considered in addressing members experiencing difficulties.

Recommendation 13:

The RCMP develop a process providing for the integration of the conscientiousness measure into the promotion process.

Recommendation 14:

Develop a mechanism to ensure that performance evaluations are completed within a prescribed time frame.

Recommendation 15:

Develop a new performance evaluation tool that provides consistent, meaningful assessment information, using accepted benchmarks and scoring keys.

Recommendation 16:

The RCMP recognize and reinforce the members who are exemplifying ethical behaviour, including but not limited to daily interactions, performance evaluations and through Honours and Recognition.

Recommendation 17:

Security clearance update forms should be reviewed and enhanced to include information pertaining to vulnerabilities and pressures that RCMP employees may be experiencing. Specific details regarding finances should be captured within this form.

Recommendation 18:

The frequency of the RCMP security clearance updates should be reviewed in order to determine the possibility of increasing them. Employees transferring into high risk areas should undergo a security clearance update prior to the completion of their transfer.

Recommendation 19:

The RCMP implement a centralized information system (Early Warning System) to monitor, track and evaluate the incidents of corruption, misconduct and malfeasance; to identify members at risk of corrupt behaviour; and, to obtain ongoing information for subsequent future analysis.

Recommendation 20:

The RCMP develop and implement a process to assist employees who are identified as being at risk.

Recommendation 21:

The RCMP follow through with the implementation of the aforementioned recommendations, and conduct subsequent periodic evaluations of their effectiveness and make necessary adjustments.

Conclusion

The methodology used in this study encompasses different approaches including general observations, descriptive and comparative analysis, and a literature review. This study determined that there were 322 incidents of known corruption involving 204 regular members that occurred between 1995 and 2005. From the literature review, in comparison to the experiences of other police services that have been spotlighted in the past decade or more, the nature and gravity of the incidents that were found in the RCMP context were relatively moderate. This may be a result of the environment in which the RCMP polices, existing legislation, and internal processes and decisions, deliberate or otherwise. On the other hand, the scope of this study does not consider the cases of corruption that have gone unreported or to which no response was made. Given this reality, it should be noted that the incidents reviewed for this report are but a portion of the total number of incidents.

The RCMP can and should be doing more in terms of a risk reduction strategy. The incidence of corruption within the RCMP impacts all levels, ranging from the organization's overall effectiveness in meeting its policing mandate to the individual police officer's ability to carry out their operational responsibilities. From a broad perspective, the impact is multifaceted, affecting the organization's credibility and the existing and potentially new partnerships both within Canada and internationally. The resulting negative public perception has the potential to further sabotage legitimate efforts. Left unaddressed, corruption can fester and affect the vast majority of honest employees, in that there is a potential for less public cooperation on an operational level. Furthermore, employees may perceive a lack of action as a sign that the corrupt behaviours are not taken seriously by management. It is clear that the risk of not making proactive changes to address the incidence of corruption can have grave consequences.

It was apparent that many of the incidents identified in this study were a result of poor guidance, lack of adequate supervision, or a combination of life pressures that culminated in a desperate decision. The recommendations proposed in this report do not seek to address transgressions, but to identify ways to prevent them in a proactive manner.

The vast majority of the cases within this study could have been mitigated through effective supervision, training, consistent and accurate evaluations, and better collection, coordination and collation of information. Furthermore, it is suggested that the effective use of screening tools currently at the RCMP's disposal will ultimately result in the selection not only of more suitable individuals for the organization, but also for supervisory positions. Lastly, by implementing an early intervention system, the RCMP will be in the position to monitor, track and manage its response to public complaints and internal investigation, and to be proactive in responding to employees at risk.

INTRODUCTION

Purpose

The objective of this joint report between Criminal Intelligence and the Chief Human Resources Officer is to assess the nature of corruption within the RCMP from 1995 to 2005 in order to provide detailed analysis of the nature of corrupt activities, as well as to identify potential trends with a view to making recommendations for an anti-corruption mitigation strategy.

This report contains key findings of the descriptive and comparative analysis pertaining to corruption as it relates to the RCMP regular members within a ten year period. It also consolidates the general observations gleaned from the study and integrates the findings of other similar studies and literature regarding police corruption. The last section of this report contains mitigation strategy recommendations to address corruption within the RCMP.

Over the past twenty-five years there have been numerous studies and commissions of inquiries, including those conducted in the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia. These studies examined the incidences of corruption within police organizations as well as systemic and individual issues that could be potential causal factors. Many of these examinations focussed on the residual impact of police corruption, on the individual police officer, the police community and the general public, as well as on conducting effective policing in the face of corruption. Internationally, police corruption has come to the forefront of public scrutiny. In the Canadian context, an investigation into corruption was undertaken in 2001 involving a group of Drug Squad members of the Toronto Police Service who were implicated in multiple offences, including illegally obtaining search warrants, perjury, fabrication of evidence and trafficking (Ferguson 2004).

It is understood that each new scandal within policing erodes the public's trust in the police organization's ability to effectively meet their obligations, and for the vast majority of dedicated and honest police officers, it impacts their ability to carry out their individual responsibilities. A number of countries, including Australia, the United States and Canada, have conducted investigations, inquiries and/or commissions and have identified a number of circumstances that have contributed to the incidence of corruption. They consequently have also identified a number of recommendations pertaining to their particular circumstances that would contribute to mitigating the risk of corruption within their respective police forces (Gilmartin 1998; Perry 2001). Some of the well



The special place of police officers in our society carries with it a special responsibility. Those who enforce the law must uphold the law in their every word and deed.

**Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani,
New York City, 1995**

known Commissions are Knapp (1970, U.S.), Mollen (1994, U.S.), Christopher (1991, U.S.), Wood (1997, Aust.), and Ferguson (2004, Ca.)

Being incorruptible is possible. Delattre (1996) stipulated:

The only thing that is incorruptible is personal character that refuses to be corrupted. (65)

Unfortunately, this is not the case for everyone. There are a number of factors which make policing in particular a high risk area for corruption. As stipulated by Newburn (1999):

Police officers have considerable freedom to exercise in making decisions about whether to enforce particular laws in particular situations [...]. (16)

Furthermore, police officers have extraordinary authority given that they have the ability to restrict another person's right to freedom, they may enter the home of a private citizen and they can lawfully use force on another person in the scope of their duties, including lethal force if necessary. Another unique aspect to policing is the continuous exposure to an element of society that is generally guided by a different moral compass (Gilmartin 1998). This potentially corrosive circumstance may contribute to an increase in moral cynicism and, in concert with the relatively unchecked or unsupervised reality of policing, can potentially be a recipe leading to corruption in the absence of mitigation mechanisms.

Corruption within law enforcement agencies can have ravaging effects on the police officer, the police organisation, the general public and consequently the efficacy of the policing mandate.

The Wood Commission report (1997) lists many potential consequences of corruption. Regarding the police organization, internal corruption causes its reputation and credibility to be weakened and

negatively impacts the community's trust and that of the government and the judicial system.

Evidence shows that in any police department, there is a small percentage of officers that are mostly responsible for a disproportionate share of citizen complaints (Walker 2001). The public may generalize and may regard corruption as being inherent to the entire organization. Due to the potential for public distrust and skepticism following such scandals, there exists a real potential for reduced assistance from the general public, a reduction in available information provided, and a reduced denunciation of offences (Wood 1997). Inevitably, it may affect the confidence that the general public has in the organization's ability to carry out its responsibilities. Furthermore, in certain cases of corruption involving criminals, there have been incidents of sabotaged investigations and consequently failed attempts at bringing alleged criminals to justice and subsequent wasted resources.

Citizens are acutely aware of the financial cost and the impact on them as taxpayers as a result of the necessary corruption investigations, as well as the residual suspensions, commissions, and resulting civil litigations (Newman 2003; Tully 2000; Wood 1997). However, the public's distrust also extends to partners within the law enforcement community who participate in major projects through joint operations (Wood 1997).

Additionally, the serious yet frequently unaddressed impact of police corruption involves the honest police officers within the police organization. Although in many instances colleagues may not be aware of the corrupt activity, it may be impacting them, as explained by Wood (1997):

[...] exposing them to personal risk, when operations on which they have been working are compromised, either, when corrupt police holds back information or when they come into contact with a criminal who has been stood over, or cheated once too often by a corrupt officer. (36)

A contributing factor commonly associated with corruption in which groups of police officers are involved has been referred to as the either the "code of silence", the "blue curtain" or the "crooked blue line" (Gleick 1995; Newburn 1999). Essentially, this phenomenon speaks to the issue of organizational culture in which the emphasis is placed on loyalty to other police officers over integrity, or loyalty to the public. Without question, such cultures can directly impact on the ability and safety of the individuals to come forward to disclose corruption incidents.

High crime precincts with either a considerably excessive narcotics trade or gang violence as mentioned in both the Rampart Reconsidered Report (2006) and the Mollen Commission Report (1994) contributed to the development of insular groups of police officers. The unwritten code of silence that they adhered to involved a higher loyalty to the group than to the profession, to the public or to their respective organizations (Rampart Reconsidered 2006; Mollen 1994). The honest police officers who were interviewed were reluctant to speak out about their colleagues for fear of direct reprisals. Furthermore, they feared for their own safety during the course of their duties if they broke the code of silence. Many believed that their careers would have been ruined had they come forward with the information (Mollen 1994).

Other overarching contributing components to the incidents of corruption, both directly and indirectly, can include the leadership, management, supervision, as well as the systems and mechanisms utilized by the organization.

As clearly indicated by Wood (1997), the weakened credibility, reputation and the loss of trust in the police organisation can have a major impact on all facets, including the individual police officer, the organization and the general overall law enforcement effectiveness.

Although numerous studies regarding corruption have been conducted, there is limited related information pertaining to the Canadian context. In 2004, as a response to the concerns raised by the Criminal Operations officers, the RCMP made the decision to examine the issue of organized crime and its targeting of Canadian law enforcement personnel. Following the submission of a regional case study, it was also decided that the study should be expanded to review the national picture of the RCMP, to specifically examine the actual magnitude of corruption in the RCMP and to determine its implication with organized crime. Furthermore, understanding the significant corrosive nature of corruption, there was a decision to pursue the identification of potential trends and patterns that may assist in identifying employees at risk and determining areas in which the RCMP can make tangible changes in order to mitigate the instances of corruption.

This report first sets out to explain the nature and scope of the research project. The selected definition of corruption in conjunction with the definitions used by other well known commissions will be explored. Existing relative theories will be examined followed by the analysis of the collected data. This research sought to objectively and systematically assess data relating to recruiting, training, staffing, supervision, public complaints and internal investigations. This report also sets out to examine the RCMP's unique environment in order to tailor mitigation strategies that will make positive impacts on this organization.



NATURE AND SCOPE

In October 2004, the senior RCMP officers attending the Criminal Operations Program-Oriented Work Planning Meeting (CROPS POWPM), identified corruption and intimidation as an area of concern. The Criminal Intelligence Directorate was initially mandated to examine the issue of organized crime targeting Canadian law enforcement personnel for the purposes of corruption and/or intimidation.

Initially, a case study approach was taken involving the review of 53 cases in British Columbia including the RCMP and four other municipal police forces. The key findings of the report were presented to the senior officers of CROPS, and the lines of enquiry identified at that time were as follows:

- > *Criminals enmesh police officers in a gradual process that often exploits vulnerabilities.*
- > *Employees experience pressure from communities, friends, family, and previous peer group to break law or bend the rules.*
- > *Police officers disclose police information in return for some form of reward or recognition.*
- > *Criminals infiltrate the police service via recruits/ancillary staff.*

The Criminal Operations officers directed that the scope of the assessment was to be subsequently broadened due to the findings of the aforementioned report. The objective of the present study is to include a national review of corruption in order to establish its current magnitude within the RCMP; to identify patterns of behaviours/trends; to determine, where feasible, causal factors which may be associated with corrupt behaviour; and, to make recommendations for an anti-corruption mitigation strategy for the RCMP.

The decision to proceed with the study using concluded cases only was as a result of consultation with RCMP Access to Information and Privacy, the Privacy Commissioner's Office and Treasury Board. All known concluded cases between 1995 and 2005 were identified. It should be noted that ongoing cases during that time frame were not included in the study.

The study only includes cases of corruption, the definition of which is discussed later in this report. It does not include malfeasance, criminal behaviour or conduct issues that occurred off the job, nor does it include drug use/abuse that is not associated with the job. This study is limited to known, documented cases only and does not seek to identify corrupt activities not reported, or those that were reported and not documented.



DEFINITION



There are varied definitions of police corruption that have been used in the past in order to examine police behaviours in various police services and for the purposes of commissions of inquiries. For example, Klockars, Carl B. *et al.* defines police corruption as “the abuse of police authority for gain” (2000: 1). The Wood Commission (1997) used a more detailed definition:

Corruption had accordingly been taken to comprise deliberate unlawful conduct (whether by act of omission) on the part of a member of the Police Service, utilizing his or her position, whether on or off duty, and the exercise of police powers in bad faith. [...] In each case, the relevant conduct is considered to be corrupt, whether motivated by an expectation of financial or personal benefit or not, and whether successful or not. (20)

Most of the definitions in the literature seem to agree with the fact that corruption is an abuse of police power/authority. However, defining specific behaviours within the realm of policing responsibilities from an international perspective is challenging due in part to cultural and political differences. Those that are accepted in a given society may not be in another (Acosta 2003; Bolton 2002). In summary, the selected definition depends on the nature of the study, the research objective, the group being examined as well the cultural and political contexts.

For the purpose of this study—taking into consideration the nature of the RCMP, the fact that it is a national police force and is a member of the Interpol Group of Experts on Corruption (IGEC)—the Project Sanction working group was directed to align the study with the established IGEC corruption criteria. Specifically, the definition was broken down into the following categories:

- > *Solicitation or acceptance directly or indirectly, by a police officer, of any money, article of value, gift, favour, promise, reward or advantage whether for himself/herself or for any person, group or entity, in return for any act or omission already done or omitted to be done or omitted in the future in connection with the performance of any function of or connected with policing. (i.e. accepting a bribe)*

- > *Any act or omission in the discharge of duties by a police officer which may improperly expose any person to a charge or conviction for a criminal offence or may improperly assist in a person not being charged with or being acquitted of a criminal offence. (i.e. perjury, interfering with the course of justice, falsifying evidence, interfering with a police investigation)*
- > *The unauthorized dissemination of confidential or restricted police information whether for reward or otherwise. (i.e. disclosure of police information)*
- > *Any act or omission in the discharge of duties by a police officer for the purpose of obtaining any money, article of value, gift, favour, promise, reward or advantage for himself/herself or any other person, group or entity. (i.e. unauthorised use of government equipment, theft, fraud, unauthorised use of police officer status)*

More specifically, the general list of the types of corrupt behaviours that were examined within the scope of this study include the following:

- > *bribery*
- > *extortion*
- > *fraud (expense claims, unauthorised use of government credit cards, other)*
- > *theft (exhibits, government property, other)*
- > *interference with judicial process (during the course of an investigation, interfering with the course of justice, perjury, falsifying evidence)*
- > *misuse of police officer status*
- > *obtaining money, articles or sexual favours*
- > *disclosure of police information*
- > *multiple drug-related activities*
- > *unauthorised use of government equipment*
- > *protection of corrupt activities by other officers or officials*

Regardless of the motivations of the identified corrupt behaviours, be they for personal gain, organizational gain or for noble cause, the selected cases fall within the noted definition.

It is necessary to stipulate that the Project Sanction working group was directed to align the study with the IGEC definition of corruption which does not include excessive use of force. Consequently, excessive use of force was not considered a corrupt behaviour for the purpose of this study. There are a number of commissions of inquiry that have included excessive use of force within the scope of their studies into corruption (Wood 1994). The Mollen Commission report (1994) states:

This commission initially intended to follow that traditional course. Our mandate was corruption; brutality is an entirely different subject we thought. The evidence changed our minds. (44)

Furthermore, the Rampart Reconsidered Report (2006) referred to the variety of abuses that contributed to the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) scandal involving drug crimes, planting and fabricating evidence, perjury and brutality, among others.

Consultation with an IGEC board member who was involved in the development of the current working definition clarified its intent and interpretation. It was explained that the nature of the job frequently requires the use of force. The underlying cause/motivation behind excessive use of force may range from an increase in adrenalin during an altercation to noble cause and personal gain. It is difficult at best to differentiate the cause/motivation or circumstances of the situation. The IGEC definition does not include brutality; consequently, excessive force was not included within this study's working definition.



THEORIES

In order to explain the processes used by the study's project team in terms of its focus, it is important to understand some of the existing underlying general theories that have been developed and explored regarding corruption. A number of these theories are expounded upon in order to reflect the complexity and interrelationships between the individual, the systems and mechanisms within an organization, as well as the environment in which they are operating. Essentially, there are three main concepts that prevail:

[...] police corruption is caused by society at large, by influences within police departments, or by a disposition towards corruption in individuals who become police. (Delattre 1996: 71)

*Whoever fights monsters
should see to it that in the
process he does not become a
monster. And when you look
long into the abyss, the abyss
also looks into you.*

F. Nietzsche

Individual

The concept commonly referred to as the "Rotten-Apple" theory is based on the notion that corruption is a product of individual moral failure (Wood 1997). In the event that corruption implicates multiple individuals or even becomes systemic, the theory refers to the erosion as a contamination of a few bad apples. This notion has also been described as a contagious disease (Punch 2003). This theory alone, although of some merit, is not comprehensive in that it does not recognize other external environmental factors, such as the law enforcement organization itself and its influence on the individual police officers, continual interactions with criminals, legislative realities, or societal norms. For these reasons, the "Rotten-Apple" theory has been largely criticised and furthermore it is often used as a "face saving exercise" where the "bad apple" is eliminated and for all intents and purposes, it appears that the rest of the barrel is now doing well (Wood 1997).

In reference to police officer misconduct and potentially corrupt behaviour, another related theory along a similar line of thought is based on the goal-gradient phenomenon. It implies that the closer a police officer is to his/her career goals, the more likely that he/she will be meeting their job responsibilities. It also implies that, inversely, in the event that a police officer is not meeting his/her career goals, that he/she will not be meeting duty expectations. Issues related to inequitable treatment or perceptions thereof, with respect to promotion and developmental opportunities can potentially result in frustration, built up resentment,

cynicism and boredom, whereby the police officer would be more likely to engage in misconduct and/or corrupt behaviour. This situation would become more significant mid-career, given that at that point police officers would not have the seniority to retire, yet would most likely be penalized if they were to embark on a new career elsewhere. It is theorized that given these circumstances in addition to other extenuating factors and opportunities, an individual may be at a greater risk of exhibiting behaviours associated with misconduct and/or corruption (Perry 2001).

Organization

Contrary to the "Rotten Apple" theory, the "Rotten-Barrel" concept, more commonly known as the "occupational socialization" theory, refers to the police service's culture and systems as a whole. It implies that there may not be significant differences among the police officer and his/her colleagues, that it is the complete "barrel" or organizational culture that moulds the new officers.

The concept and significance of the police organization's culture as a contributing factor of corruption is clearly articulated by Mollen (1994):

It is the multi-faceted problem that has flourished in parts of our City not only because of the opportunity and greed, but because of the police culture that exalts loyalty over integrity; because of the silence of the honest officers who fear the consequences of "ratting" on another cop no matter how grave the crime; because of willfully blind supervisors who fear the consequences of a corruption scandal more than corruption itself; because of the demise of the principle of accountability that makes all commanders responsible for fighting corruption in their commands; because of the hostility and alienation between the police and community in certain precincts which breeds an "Us versus Them" mentality; and because for years the New York City Police Department abandoned its responsibility to insure the integrity of its members. (1)

The concept of new police officers being guided and further "acclimatized" to the policing "methods" from other more seasoned veterans is reflected in the California Law Enforcement Image (2002):

[...] the very structure of policing (exposure to unsavory characters, forgetting what you learned in the academy, clannishness, and overzealous, misguided approaches to crime control) provides plenty of opportunities to learn the entrenched patterns of deviant police conduct that have been passed down thru generations. (3)

Although there is indeed a solid rationale supporting the role of police service's culture as a contributing factor toward an environment tolerating and even encouraging corruption, there are critics who would suggest that this theory alone misses important "roots of corruption" by not considering individual causes (Delattre 1996).

Society

The third main topic related to police corruption considers the impact of the society in general with respect to corruption in policing. Maurice Punch (2003) uses the metaphor "Rotten Orchards" to explain this phenomenon. This theory espouses the notion that corruption may stem from a systemic cause within the society's network, such as the judicial system, corrections system and political system, or the population in general. Wood (1997) indicated the notion of corruption at the highest levels permeating down to the working level. He stipulated the following:

It has been alleged, although it remains unproven, that at earlier times similar political influences were in play in NSW, with some senior police and politicians sharing the spoils of protection, and setting an agenda under which certain laws were not enforced. (26)

Situations such as external government and public pressure to hire significant numbers of police officers quickly has also contributed to the hiring of police

officers who are not adequately screened and are consequently at a higher risk of engaging in corrupt behaviour. Examples of the corruption fallout following such hiring are the police services in Miami and Washington, D.C. (Stana *et al.* 1998).

Other societal considerations include societies with high crime rates and drug trade, significant violent crime and lenient gun control laws which can have an impact on the individuals and organizations who are working within them.

Comprehensive Approach

It is in consideration of all of the above principles and the acknowledgement of their roles and impacts that supports the integration of these theories. According to Gilmartin *et al.* (1998), there are likely no individual factors that cause police corruption. Their theory of "The Continuum of Compromise" refers to a gradual erosion of values, to what they refer to as the relative or situational values. As stipulated by Gilmartin *et al.*, although a thorough selection process may result in the hiring of potentially high-performing police officers, it is by virtue of their continued exposure to criminal elements of society and their subsequent rationale to minor breaches as being relatively harmless in the grand scheme of things, along with their organizational culture, strong over-identification to the policing profession, and overall feelings of entitlement, that gradually changes their perceptions and contributes to the development of their situational values. Some of these factors may commence the gradual decline of behaviours. Gilmartin *et al.* specify:

The change in values-based decisions by police officers can be outlined by a "Continuum of Compromise" ranging from "Acts of Omission" typified by not performing seemingly petty tasks to "Acts of Commission" including the active violation of administrative rules and possibly ultimately criminal violations. (1998: 2)

Gilmartin *et al.* espouse the need for a proactive approach by way of regular meaningful ethics based training, the application of consistent expectations with respect to ethical decision making for all levels within policing organizations, along with positive recognition for outstanding officers, among others, in order to assist police officers in maintaining their core values.

General Application

Giving serious consideration to the above-noted theories, this study included the collection and analysis of data pertaining not only to the individual, but also to the various systems within the RCMP. Furthermore, with the objective of providing meaningful reduction or mitigation strategies, a comprehensive approach to understanding the individuals involved, the organizational realities, as well as the environment in which the policing is being conducted has been collectively considered.

METHODOLOGY

The RCMP consists of three categories of employees: regular members (police officers), civilian members (those providing direct support for policing operations) and public servants. In order to conduct a study of this nature, it was necessary to control, where feasible, the number of possible variables. Due to the diverse processes and approaches to recruiting, training, service and responsibilities of the different employee groups, the determination was made to limit this study to the regular member category.

The identification of the cases that met the established study definition of corruption was made using three separate sources which are as follows:

- > *a centralized list of discipline cases from the Human Resources Management Information System (HRMIS)*
- > *a centralized historical suspension list, including those suspended with and without pay*
- > *corruption cases identified by divisions*

Given that there is no centralized records management information system that consolidates the operational and administrative files relating to misconduct and anti-corruption, it was decided that the most effective method of determining the cases within the RCMP was through the above-mentioned sources. The selected cases met an established set of criteria. They were to have occurred between 1995 and 2005, and they were required to meet the established definition of corruption. It is necessary to keep in mind that the following were not considered for the purpose of this study:

- > *non-corrupt conduct or performance problems on the job*
- > *criminal behaviour not associated with the job*
- > *misconduct not associated with the job*
- > *activities related to drug use/abuse not associated with the job function*

Recognized research procedures were followed with respect to the protection and anonymity of the cases used. Furthermore, following



previously mentioned consultation with the Privacy Commissioner's Office, in order to ensure that the findings would be used for administrative policy or process changes only, the study was limited to concluded cases.

It should be noted that the study was limited to the available documented information that has been systematically captured either in paper form or electronically over the past forty years. Although for each case there was at least one corrupt incident within the given time frame, their employment records from the recruitment stage were accessed. The methods of capturing data and its retention also varies significantly from one division to another.

A total of 203 concluded corruption cases were identified between 1995 and 2005. These cases will be referred to throughout this research as the sample group. Of note, an additional case was discovered during the data collection phase, however it was not included within the three sources. Although the case was included when providing descriptive analysis (204 cases), it was not used in the comparative analysis (203 cases). In order to conduct a comparative analysis, it was necessary to compare the corrupt group (sample group) to a randomly selected control group. Using HRMIS, a randomly selected control group of 203 cases was identified, matching years of service with the sample group. Within the sample and the control group, there were cases of split service or instances where the members took a leave without pay. The aforementioned absences were not calculated as service. A large number of the sample and the control group were matched on gender, however this was not the case for all.² Although the initial parameters regarding the initial random

HRMIS selection stipulated the necessity to match by gender, the control group selection did have a slightly higher percentage of females, consequently the analyses also included gender matching.

With respect to service calculation, a number of the members within the study had a previous employment status with the RCMP before they held the status of a regular member. For the purpose of this study, service was calculated based solely on their service as a regular member and not their prior employment status service.

In order to identify potential trends and patterns, a set of hypotheses were developed (Appendix A) Based on consultation with relevant policy centres, on the potential link with recruiting, training, staffing, personal situations, and on consideration of externally driven studies, a template was developed (Appendix B). It allowed for the consistent capturing of information pertaining to the hypotheses. The template covers general demographic information and details related to the recruiting process, Depot, the initial recruit/cadet training, field coaching and member's service.

The template was initially piloted in order to identify and make the necessary adjustments before the actual data collection commenced. The pilot phase also clarified the content requirements for the creation of a briefing package, which explains the template and was to be used in concert with it (Appendix C).

The data collected was found in a multitude of files, both hard copy and electronic format. The types of files reviewed for each identified case include:

- > **Personnel file**—*There are two personnel files for each member, one retained at National Headquarters and one held at the division in which the member is serving. The personnel files consist of recruiting test scores, interviews, documentation, training scores/information, performance evaluations and personnel interviews.*

² The original intent when developing the research design was to match the group on all designated group statuses, including visible minorities and aboriginals, such that these variables could be controlled in the analyses identifying effective flags for future corrupt behaviours. Unfortunately, researchers were unable to obtain access to the self-disclosed information during the data collection phase of the project. This lack of control for designated group status is a limitation to the study that should be addressed in any follow-up research.

- > **Service file**—*There are also two service files for each member, one retained at National Headquarters and, like the personnel file, the division service file is held in the division in which the member is serving. The service file consists of information relative to postings, locations and promotions.*
- > **Security file**—*The security file is held in the region in which the member is serving. It contains information relative to the security/reliability interview, background investigations and regular security updates.*
- > **Internal investigation files**—*The internal investigation files contain investigations conducted under Part VII (Public Complaints) or Part IV (Code of Conduct) of the RCMP Act, Criminal Code investigations, federal statute investigations, harassment/interpersonal conflict complaints, administrative reviews and enquiries and allegations of improper conduct of a member on or off duty.*
- > **Operational Investigation files**—*The types of operational investigation files that were reviewed include investigations completed by units other than the Internal Investigation Sections, such as the Anti-Corruption Units.*
- > **Discipline files**—*There are two discipline files similar to the personnel and service files. One is retained at National Headquarters and the other is retained in the division in which the member is serving.*
- > **Human Resource Management Information System (HRMIS)**—*This system is an electronic system that has been systematically used to capture human resources information since 1999. More recent information pertaining to recruiting, staffing, training, and discipline was also accessed/verified using HRMIS.*

Upon retirement or resignation, the files are retained at National Headquarters Archives and are held for the established relevant retention periods.

In order to ensure consistent and efficient file reviews, a National Headquarters review team was formed. It was comprised of employees from Criminal Intelligence and Professional Standards and External Review Directorate. All participants were provided with a copy of the template, a briefing package and a briefing session for the purposes of giving consistent direction and guidance with respect to the template completion.

The review process proceeded by region, given that the active security files are retained in only one site within each region. For three of the four regions within the RCMP, a designated regional coordinator was provided with a list of cases (both from the sample group and the control group) within their region. They were responsible for identifying and compiling all of the above-noted files for each case. A similar process was established for the Central Region, however, the reviews were conducted in each of the three divisions separately in the Central Region given that the security files are retained locally.

The regional coordinators ensured the formation of a regional review team comprised of employees familiar with aspects of the files to be reviewed. Typically, they had experience in one of the following: Internal Investigation Sections, Anti-Corruption Units, Staffing or Recruiting. The review teams in the three regions and the three divisional teams were provided with a briefing package and a briefing session. Given the National Headquarters team members' experience, they provided direct guidance to the regional team members during the completion of their first template.

The review process covered a span of four months, requiring the review of thousands of files. The data collection was conducted in the following order:

- > *National Headquarters—Ottawa, Ontario*
- > *Northwest Region—Regina, Saskatchewan*
- > *Central Region, "O" Division—London, Ontario*

- > *Atlantic Region—Halifax, Nova Scotia*
- > *Pacific Region—Vancouver, British Columbia*
- > *Central Region, "C" Division—Montreal, Quebec*
- > *Central Region, "A" Division—Ottawa, Ontario*

SPSS software was the selected tool used to analyse the data. Coding of the SPSS program was completed in order to accurately input information collected on the templates. Each case from the sample group was matched with a case from the control group. Their hire dates were matched within a five year period, with the exception of two sets of pairs, whose hire dates were within 6 years. Their service was also matched within a two year time frame. This was reflected in the SPSS set up. Upon completion of the collection, data was entered into the coded system. To ensure consistent contextual understanding of the data, five of the National Headquarters team members were involved in completing the data entry.

Methodology of the Analysis

(analysis conducted by RCMP HR Research and Intelligence)

The comparative analysis was conducted using the matched sample and control groups, assessing the variable similarities and differences of the two groups.

The tests used for this analysis were as follows:

- > *For continuous variables with non-normal distributions (i.e. # public complaints/internal investigations): Wilcoxon Test*
- > *For binary variables (coded: No=0; Yes=1): McNemar Test*
- > *For variables with more than 2 categories (vulnerabilities and pressures): Marginal Homogeneity Test*

Given that the sample and control groups differed in gender composition, and that gender is a potential confound, correlation analyses were conducted for gender and all other variables of interest. For the variables that indicated gender differences, additional analyses were conducted on samples where there was gender matching with both the sample and control group.

It should be noted that in order to determine if the differences between the two groups was statistically significant, the effect size was considered. While the significance determines whether a difference or relationship exists, the effect size interprets how meaningful the difference is or the strength of the relationship. In a number of instances the effect size was either too small or could not be computed and therefore the analysis could not be interpreted. Cohen, Cohen, West & Aiken (2003) define effect sizes as: "small"=.01; "medium"=.09; and, "large"=.25 ("perfect"=1).

ANALYSIS

Within the analysis section, there are three main topics that will be explored in reference to the actual RCMP findings within the scope of this project, as well as their relevance in conjunction with similar international reviews. Furthermore, a comparison of the RCMP results will be conducted with prior studies in order to better comprehend the similarities and differences of the respective analysis. The RCMP environment in comparison to the other police agencies that were subject to the previous reviews will also be discussed.

The first segment of this section will be dedicated to statistical data in relation to the corrupt incidents that occurred between 1995 and 2005. This will include a detailed breakdown of the different types of corrupt activities, complete with how they were brought to the attention of the RCMP and, where applicable, those involved during the corrupt incident.

The subsequent segment will incorporate a demographic/geographic analysis with respect to the makeup of the members who were involved in the corrupt activities during the established time frame. Details pertaining to age, service, rank and location will be included.

The comparative analysis findings is the third topic that will be addressed. Based on a list of established hypotheses in relation to recruitment, Depot training, field coaching, staffing, conduct issues, and service, a comprehensive comparative analysis was conducted. The unique RCMP environment will be explored in this section and will be compared with other police agencies that were the subject of similar studies. The RCMP realities, including the internal and external factors, contribute to this project's unique findings.

Corruption incidents

There were a total of 204 members that were identified as having been involved in a *documented*, concluded, corrupt incident between 1995–01–01 and 2005–12–31. In total there were 322 known incidents of corruption.

Chart 1 and Table 1 show a breakdown of the frequency of types of corrupt activities between 1995–01–01 and 2005–12–31. It should be noted that there may be multiple incidents of corruption associated with



one member. Consequently, the number of corrupt incidents within the given time frame is greater than the number of members involved in corrupt incidents. Of the 204 members who were involved in corrupt behaviours, 75 of them had multiple incidents, including incidents prior to 1995. It should be further clarified that in instances where a member was involved in clearly different corrupt activities on the same day, these were captured as multiple incidents. There were a total of 62 members who were involved in multiple incidents that did not occur on the same day.

The most common type of corrupt behaviour was disclosure of police information, which constituted 19.9% of all of the corrupt incidents. The incidents of fraud and misuse of police officer status ranked second and third, representing 16.1% and 14.9% of the incidents, respectively, followed by theft at 14% and interference with the judicial process at 13.4%. These specified areas will be examined further in this report.

Chart 1




Table 1—Nature of corrupt activities between 1995 and 2005

Corrupt Activity	Responses	Percentage
Bribery	2	0.6%
Extortion	4	1.2%
Fraud	52	16.1%
Theft	45	14.0%
Interference with judicial process	43	13.4%
Misuse of police officer status	48	14.9%
Obtaining money, articles or sexual favours	9	2.8%
Disclosure of police information	64	19.9%
Drug-related activities	3	0.9%
Unauthorised use of government equipment	41	12.7%
Protection of corrupt activities by other Officers or Officials	1	0.3%
Other	10	3.1%
Total	322	100.0%



Individuals/Organizations involved in corrupt incidents

This study has determined that of the 322 incidents of corruption, there were 152 incidents and 78 cases (members) that involved other individuals or organizations. Table 2 contains a breakdown of the involved individuals with respect to the different corrupt activities. It should be noted that there were

12 specific incidents involving organized crime and 20 incidents involving known criminals. In total, between 1995 and 2005, there were 17 members whose corrupt incidents involved criminals and/or organized crime groups.

Table 2—Types of individuals/organizations involved in the incidents

	Criminals	Criminal organizations	Other RCMP employees	Other police employees	Government employees	Private business	Family/Friends	Community leaders	Other
Disclosure	8	3	5	1	1	3	16	0	3
Drug-related activities	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Theft	5	2	9	4	0	1	4	0	2
Interference with judicial process	1	1	12	0	0	2	4	0	2
Bribery	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Obtaining money, articles or sexual favours	0	2	5	0	2	4	1	0	3
Fraud	1	0	7	0	0	0	7	0	0
Misuse of Police Officer status	0	1	2	0	1	1	4	0	4
Unauthorised use of government equipment	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	0
Protection of corrupt activities by other Officers or Officials	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Extortion	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	1	0	4	0	0	0	1	0	0
Total	20	12	45	7	4	11	39	0	14

Disclosure of police information

The 64 identified cases of disclosure of police information involved a total of 59 members. It is interesting to note that 33 of the 64 (51.6%) disclosure cases involved the misuse of records management systems including Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC), National Crime Data Bank (NCDB) and the Police Information Retrieval System (PIRS). Furthermore, 16 (25%) of the disclosure cases involved family or friends and 11 (17.2%) were related to disclosure to known criminals and/or to organized crime groups (Refer to Table 2).

Fraud

Incidents of fraud within the scope of this study represent 16.1% of all the corruption incidents between 1995 and 2005. As shown in Table 3, of the 52 incidents of fraud, 18 (34.6%) were related to fraudulent expense claims, and 12 (23.1%) involved the fraudulent use of government credit cards. There were a total of 40 members involved in the 52 incidents of fraud.

Due to the frequency of this particular type of corruption, and in light of the particular findings, specific mitigation strategies will be explored later in this document.

Table 3—Breakdown of fraud activity between 1995 and 2005

	Responses	Percentage of Fraud Cases	Percentage of Total Cases (322)
Fraud	22	42.3%	6.8%
Fraud — expense claims	18	34.6%	5.6%
Fraud — unauthorised use of government credit cards	12	23.1%	3.7%
Total	52	100.0%	16.1%

Theft

As depicted in Table 4, there were 45 incidents of theft that occurred between 1995 and 2005 involving 39 members. The vast majority (approximately 64.4%) of the aforementioned incidents involved theft of exhibits. Approximately 11.1% represented theft of

government property and the unspecified cases were captured as theft. Of the identified thefts, 17 (31.1%) involved theft of drugs, money or both; the incidents involved 15 members.

Table 4—Breakdown of theft activity between 1995 and 2005

	Responses	Percentage of Theft Cases	Percentage of Total Cases (322)
Theft	11	24.4%	3.4 %
Theft of exhibits	29	64.4%	9.0 %
Theft of government property	5	11.1%	1.6 %
Total	45	100.0%	14.0 %

Interference with the Judicial Process

This section refers to a compilation of a number of similar interference activities shown in Table 5 which include: interfering with the course of an investigation, interfering with the course of justice (ie. ticket fixing), perjury, falsifying evidence and protection of illegal activities. These collectively accounted for 43 (13.6%) of the total number of incidents between 1995 and 2005.

There were a total of 36 members involved in the 43 incidents. There were 3 members implicated in multiple incidents of interfering with the course of justice, including outside of the date parameters and specifically involving ticket fixing. Upon examination of the 3 cases, it was noted that the identified members were working out of the same detachment and that the incidents took place over a period of approximately 18 months. Of the 14 cases of interfering with the course of justice, 12 (85.7%) were in regard to ticket fixing.

Table 5—Interference with the judicial process

	Responses		Frequency of Noble Cause
	Frequency	Percentage of Cases	
Interference with course of investigation	17	5.3%	2
Interference with course of justice (i.e. ticket fixing)	14	4.3%	2
Perjury	3	0.9%	1
Falsifying evidence	5	1.6%	1
Protection of illegal activities	4	1.2%	0
Total	43	13.4%	6

Drug Activities

In this section, only the corrupt incidents involving drug activities were reviewed. Incidents of recreational drug use or incidents where members were treated for drug addiction not connected to the job were not considered in this segment. As presented in Chart 1 and Table 6, there were 3 incidents of corruption that were captured under drug-related activities. There were however, a total of 13 corrupt incidents involving drugs that occurred between 1995 and 2005. It should be reiterated that the study parameters did not include the investigation of new cases nor did it examine the issues of undetected drug use. This section will provide further breakdown of the associated drug incidents.

In order to ensure that the "drug" corruption incidents were not double scored, they were captured in categories that best described the particular offence, including: theft, theft of exhibits (drugs) and drug-related. There were 3 cases that were captured as drug-related activities that involved a number of corruption offences. They included combinations of either theft of drug exhibits,

trafficking, disclosure of police information related to drug investigations and/or interference with police investigations. The other 10 incidents were captured as thefts, 3 of which involved subsequent trafficking.

It is interesting to note that of the 13 members involved in drug-related incidents, 8 of them were working in general duties in municipal detachments, 3 were actually working in drug units at the time of the corrupt behaviour, and 2 were assigned to administrative positions. Upon examination of the three prior work locations preceding the corrupt behaviour, there were 4 members of the 13 who had worked or were working in a drug unit.

It was also established that of the 13 identified cases, 6 members were involved with either organized crime or with known criminals. Furthermore, 2 of the cases involved source handling. One in which a source was directly involved with a member and another where a source was forced to sign for payment of money not received.

Table 6—Drug corruption activities

	Responses
Theft of seized drugs or drug exhibits	7
Theft of seized drugs or drug exhibits and trafficking	3
Drug-related Activities	
Theft of Seized drugs and Disclosure of Police Information related to drug investigations	1
Disclosure of Police Information relating to drug investigations and interfering with police investigations	1
Theft of seized drugs or drug exhibits, trafficking and interfering with police investigations	1
Total	13

A number of corruption studies and commissions have identified the changing nature of corrupt activities to include complicities among police officers and the involvement in crimes of a more serious nature (Mollen 1994; Newburn, 1999). The Mollen Commission Report on corruption in the New York Police Department described the evolution of their corruption incidents since the Knapp Commission:

Its most prevalent form is not police taking money to accommodate criminals by closing their eyes ... as was the case twenty years ago, but police acting as criminals, especially in connection with the drug trade. (Mollen 1994: 2)

Many of the American studies, including the Mollen Commission Report, the Rampart Reconsidered Report regarding to the Los Angeles Police Department (2006) and the research conducted by Richard Stana and his colleagues of the United States General Accounting Office (1995), have determined that those involved in drug-related corruption, typically were carrying out their criminal activities in groups, rather than in isolation. The studies cited numerous incidents where corrupt officers worked in insular groups with little supervision, providing protection and assistance to one another in their criminal activities. Stana (1995) further clarified that his conclusions were based on a number of large city police forces including Atlanta, Los Angeles, Miami, Chicago, New York, New Orleans, Philadelphia and Cleveland.

Conversely, in 2003, Joel Miller reported on police corruption in England and Wales, explaining that:

[...] internally-networked corruption, according to existing intelligence is relatively rare within the national context but appears more common in the London area. (20)

The RCMP context seems to reflect the experience cited by Miller (2003), and differs from the larger urban city police forces, given the decentralized nature of the RCMP and the posting dynamic that occurs due to the RCMP's broad mandate.

According to the literature, drug-related corruption was predominantly financially motivated (Miller 2003; Mollen 1994; Wood 1997). The Mollen Commission Report (1994) further stated that at the time of the review, drug use by certain police officers and facilitated access by virtue of the job were also precipitating factors of the occurrence of drug-related corruption. At the time of his report, approximately 25% of the suspensions and dismissals of police officers in the NYPD was as a result of drug use. Consequently, the implementation of a drug testing process was one of the many strategies that were recommended.

Offences of drug possession and/or drug use alone, not connected with a corrupt activity, were not included as a part of this corruption study. However, in order to better comprehend the RCMP context of this situation, further information was obtained from the RCMP Professional Standards and External Review Directorate. According to the centralized suspension list, it was determined that of the 533 suspension cases from 1992 to 2006, there were a total of 21 regular member suspensions related to drugs, including the concluded corruption cases within our study. Most of those involved allegations of drug possession and/or drug use. Of the mentioned cases, 5 members were reinstated, 2 were medically discharged, 12 resigned and 2 were discharged. Further consultation with the RCMP Occupational Health and Safety with respect to the number of regular members treated for drug addiction was unsuccessful given that the information could not be isolated from other collected data. Tracking this information would be most useful in assessing intervention needs.

Uncharacteristically, within the RCMP from 1995 to 2005, of the 13 cases of drug-related corruption activities, in all but one case, the members were the sole police officers involved in the corrupt incident. Our study did not reveal any patterns of clusters of drug-related corruption involving groups of police officers, contrary to the noted findings of the specified large city police departments in the United States.

Source Involvement

Of the 204 cases, there were 13 complicit cases (6.4%) that involved sources in a variety of incidents which predominantly included theft and fraud with respect to source payment and disclosure of police information. Because the numbers were relatively small, there are no significant findings that can be drawn from this group.

Motivation

Although the available information demonstrates that the vast majority (79.4%) of the corruption cases were by far committed out of personal gain, there were 13 (6.4%) that were captured as noble cause corruption. Noble cause corruption cases are typically motivated by frustrations experienced by police officers and their difficulties in bringing cases to court with a successful outcome. Some police officers resort to criminal activities in the successful pursuit of criminal charges or related matters. The noble cause corruption cases ranged from documenting false information in reports to perjury. In 8.8% of the cases within this study the motivation could not be determined based on the available documentation.

Demographic Data

This segment will incorporate a demographic/geographic analysis with respect to the members who were involved in corrupt activities during the established time frame of 1995-2005. Specifically, details pertaining to gender, age, service, rank and location will be included. The decision was made to collect demographic information of the members at the time of the first corrupt incident based on the theories espoused by Kevin Gilmartin and John J. Harris in "The Continuum of Compromise" (Gilmartin and Harris 1998). According to Gilmartin and Harris, there exists a potential progression of unethical decisions and behaviours that build on previous behaviours, and if left unaddressed, they have the potential to escalate to acts of commission. Using the theory as a guide for

this project, it was determined that once a member has engaged in a first corrupt behaviour, the member has reached the stage of act of commission and therefore the data collected in relation to issues such as age, years of service, rank, postings and prior public complaints and internal investigations were based on the member's first corrupt incident.

Gender

Of the 204 members involved in corrupt incidents, 93.1% were male and 6.9% were female (Table 7). In order to add context to this information, a significant consideration is the marked increase of representation of female regular members into the organization during the period of the study. In 1995, 10.1% of the RCMP regular member population was female; in 2000, 14.1%; and, in 2005, 18.7%. It appears that with respect to gender, men are over-represented in the corrupt group in comparison to the general RCMP regular member population.

Table 7—Gender of corrupt members

	Frequency	Percentage
Male	190	93.1 %
Female	14	6.9 %
Total	204	100.0%

This finding is consistent with the Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service (Wood 1997) regarding a study of Australian police officers conducted by the National Police Research Unit in regards to attitudes on breaches of ethics. The study findings indicated a plausible explanation of why women appeared to adhere to higher personal ethical standards:


[...] as members of an "out group", women may retain their own perspectives on ethical issues. (34)

Age at time of first corrupt incident

Chart 2 shows a breakdown of age at the time of the first corrupt incident. Note that the largest age group is 41 to 45 years at 21.6%, closely followed by 36 to 40 years, at 19.6%, and 31 to 35 years, at 19.1%. The youngest member was 22 years old at the time of the first corrupt incident and the oldest was 56 years old. This study has determined that the average age of members at the time of the first corrupt incident is 37.6

years. These results are consistent with other studies, including similar research conducted in 1996 by the directors of the Peace Officer Standards and Training Commissions and Councils. Data was collected pertaining to decertified officers between 1990 and 1995 and it determined that the average age for corrupt behaviour was 32 years old (Milazzo 2000).

Chart 2




It should be noted that of the 204 identified cases, 30 had converted from Special Constable (S/Cst) status to regular member status.³ Given this reality, it was apparent that the age of hiring and subsequent age of corrupt behaviour could be skewed due to the significant proportion of S/Cst conversions in this study and their logically older representation.

Chart 3 reflects the age of the regular members within the study at the time of the first corrupt incident, compared to the data that excludes the S/Cst

conversions. The average age of the aforementioned group is 42.6 years. As expected, the largest age group excluding S/Cst conversions is shared by the 31–35 and the 41–45 age group at 21%, followed by the 26–30 and 36–40 age groups at 16.4% each. The average age of the sample group excluding the S/Cst conversions is 35.6 years, which is slightly lower than the entire sample group.

³ RCMP Special Constables (S/Csts.) have been hired for specific functions including protective duties at the airports, embassies, consulates, and performing surveillance among others. The scope of duties of the S/Csts. is narrow and does not include the spectrum of responsibilities associated with the regular member status. In the late 1980's a decision was made to convert the S/Cst. positions to regular member positions, resulting in a significant number of S/Csts. converting to regular member status.

Chart 3




Service at time of first corrupt incident

Many of the more recent studies that have been conducted regarding corruption and other counter-productive behaviours have determined that police officers typically have a minimum of five years of service prior to engaging in corrupt activity. According to Tully (1997; 2000), the majority of police officers found to be corrupt have anywhere from 8 to 15 years of service. Furthermore, he states that those facing serious criminal or internal charges typically have at least 5 years of service. This information is reconfirmed by Milazzo (2000) in the Ethics, Decertification Study, where it was determined that the average length of service was 7.2 years at the time of the corrupt activity. Gilmartin (1998) provides a plausible and credible explanation of the behavioural transgressions indicating that:

[...] the compromised officer started his/her career as an enthusiastic values-based individual, who possibly only after 10 or more years of good service began the transgressions [...]. (3)

The findings of this RCMP study validate the results of the above noted studies with respect to the service of the members at the time of the corrupt activity. As illustrated in Chart 4, there were 50 (24.5%) members who committed their first corrupt incident between 6 and 10 years of service. There were 45 (22.1%) members in the second largest group who had between 0 and 5 years of service, followed by 39 (19.1%) of the members who had between 11 and 15 years of service. The average service at the time of the first corrupt incident was 13 years.

Chart 4




As with the age of the sample group members, the service of the members at the time of the first corrupt incident was also examined excluding the S/Cst conversions. Although the service of the members was calculated from the date that the employees began their employment as regular members (police officers), it should be noted that the S/Cst conversions had prior service in a quasi policing capacity. The need to examine this group separately was as a result of their prior experience and exposure to the RCMP policing responsibilities before their change of status.

If one applies the theory espoused by Gilmartin and Harris (1998) whereby the ethical deterioration develops along a continuum as a result of unrealistic expectations, cynicism and feelings of entitlement, the

possibility exists that this group could have potentially been involved in a first corrupt activity earlier than the remainder of the sample group. A comparison of the length of service at the time of the first corrupt incident for the complete sample group and the group excluding S/Cst conversions is depicted in Chart 5.

The average length of service at the time of the first corrupt incident of the sample group, excluding the S/Cst conversions, is slightly higher than the entire group, at 13.6 years. These results were anticipated given that this group were older at the time of converting to regular member status and that their prior service is recognized when calculating their pension eligibility and subsequent retirement.


Chart 5



Rank at time of first corrupt incident

The ranks of corrupt members involved in the first corrupt activity, as depicted in Chart 6, are comparable to the national force rank composition. Although there seems to be a slightly heavier proportion of constables involved in corrupt activities compared to the national make-up, the difference is not significant.

Chart 6



The results of the comparison between the sample and control groups in terms of the number of years in the non-commissioned officer ranks (corporal, sergeant and staff sergeant), reveal that the control group remains at the NCO ranks for a significantly shorter period of time than the sample group (refer to Table 8). The results remain the same when the groups are matched by gender. Furthermore, based on the study composition, there are fewer members of the sample group who are at the commissioned officer ranks. This finding seems to indicate a difference in the rates of promotion between the corrupt and control groups. These findings may support the theories regarding perceptions of inequitable treatment or frustrations

regarding career advancement and the correlation with the incidence of corruption. A conclusion, however, cannot be drawn with respect to why advancement is slower in the corrupt group given that it could also be connected to individual performance and aptitude. It should be noted that there was no significant difference between the two groups with respect to the number of years at the constable rank.

Table 8—Years at the NCO ranks

	Mean	Std. Deviation
Years in NCO Ranks — Sample	10.1	6.0
Years in NCO Ranks — Control	7.0	3.4

Another related finding of this project is the determination of a significant difference between the two groups and their psychometric test scores during the application process. The group of members who had been involved in corrupt activity had significantly lower psychometric test scores statistically than the control group (refer to Table 9). There exists literature that links the performance on psychometric tests and the prediction of how well an individual would perform on the job (Schmidt and Hunter 1998). One may extrapolate that those performing at a higher level may be more likely to advance more quickly than those

performing at a lower level. Upon examination of the data and in light of the literature, one might speculate that a possible explanation for the higher promotion rate in the control group is linked to the performance of the psychometric test.

Table 9—Psychometric test score of both sample and control group

	Mean	Std. Deviation
Psychometric test score — Sample	66.34	13.139
Psychometric test score — Control	71.81	11.144



Location at time of first corrupt incident

Table 10 depicts the percentage of cases and the division where their first corrupt incident occurred within the date parameters compared to the force distribution. Although in most instances the percentage of cases within the corrupt group matches the divisional representation, there are a few anomalies. "A" Division has a 4.6% higher representation in the corrupt group than the divisional RCMP representation, while "C" Division has a 5.2% difference, "O" Division has a 4.7% difference and "F" Division has a 2.8% difference.

Table 10—Division in which the first corrupt incident occurred between 1995 and 2005⁴

Division	Distribution of Sample Group Members	Percentage of Sample Group Members	Distribution of Sample Group excluding S/Cst Conversions	Percentage of Sample Group excluding S/Cst Conversions	Percentage of Regular Members (2005 statistics)
A	12	5.9%	9	5.2%	1.3%
B	3	1.5%	3	1.7%	2.7%
C	23	11.3%	11	6.3%	6.1%
D	11	5.4%	9	5.2%	5.5%
E	58	28.4%	54	31.0%	32.7%
F	19	9.3%	16	9.2%	6.5%
G	3	1.5%	3	1.7%	1.0%
H	11	5.4%	11	6.3%	5.5%
J	12	5.9%	11	6.3%	5.4%
K	22	10.8%	21	12.1%	12.9%
L	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0.8%
M	1	0.5%	1	0.6%	0.8%
O	23	11.3%	20	11.5%	6.6%
Depot	0	0.0%	0	0%	0.9%
HQ	6	2.9%	5	2.9%	8.4%
Other*					1.7%
Total	204	100.0%	174	100.0%	100.0%

**Includes regional positions for the Pacific, Northwest, Central and Pacific Regions*

⁴ "A", "C" and "O" divisions are non-contract divisions with federal mandates. The assigned members working in these divisions are responsible for enforcing the federal acts and are not contracted to carry out provincial or municipal mandates. Other divisions have multiple mandates including federal, provincial and municipal.

As was previously mentioned, of the 204 cases there were 30 who held a S/Cst status prior to their conversion. This group was recruited using an alternate recruiting process (which will be elaborated on later in this report) and treated differently with respect to training and posting. Many of those who had a prior S/Cst status continued working in the same division and, for the most part, they were working in their city of origin. Therefore, given the irregular posting process for this group and the impact on the location of the first corrupt incident, it was determined that the sample group should be further examined excluding the S/Cst conversions. The vast majority of incidents involving the S/Cst conversions occurred in "A", "C", "E", "F" and "O" Divisions.

It is apparent that by extracting the S/Cst conversions, the difference between the sample group representation in the respective divisions in comparison to the overall divisional RCMP representation is reduced. For example, the first corrupt incidents that occurred in "A" Division were reduced from 5.9% to 5.2%, a total of 3.9% higher than the general RCMP divisional representation. The exclusion of the S/Cst conversions did not significantly change the results for "F" and "O" Divisions.

It is noteworthy that of the 30 corrupt incidents carried out by the S/Cst conversions in this study, 12 occurred in "C" Division. The analysis excluding this group drastically changes the differences in representation in "C" Division. It appears that the percentage of the sample group in "C" Division is on par with the RCMP divisional percentage when the S/Cst conversions are excluded.

Clusters

For the purpose of determining the existence of "clusters" of incidents within a given detachment, a descriptive analysis was conducted: an examination was undertaken to verify if there were common detachments from within the sample group who were involved in incidents within a similar time frame. Although there were 4 main cities identified, due to the expected larger member representation in the 3 larger cities, the results did not identify any areas of concern or patterns of behaviour.

Given the ratio of incidents to the detachment size, there were essentially 2 main detachments where members were involved in coordinated, "sanctioned" corruption activities. Specifically, one detachment "permitted" ticket fixing, having tickets pulled for contacts within the community, while the other detachment was involved in theft of seized exhibits. One common thread between these two scenarios was the involvement of the supervisors in the activities.

General Analyses

This section of the report consists of the descriptive and comparative analysis, and general observations of Project Sanction combined with findings of similar reviews and studies. The specific areas that are explored in this segment pertain to recruiting, training, staffing, supervision, public complaints and internal investigations.

Recruiting

The hypotheses that were explored with respect to the recruiting process and their potential connection to a higher risk of corrupt behaviour included: the RCMP test score results, education levels at hiring, alternative recruiting processes used, the service of the recruiting interviewer, the number of unsuccessful interviews, debt or bankruptcy declared at recruiting, declared prior drug use, prior offences, prior employment with the RCMP, prior employment rejection by other police services and problems identified during the field investigations.

Recruiting Tests

Up until 1991, the RCMP used the "Education Test" and the "Psychometric Test" to screen applicants. The former was a general knowledge test while the latter was a form of aptitude test. In 1991, a new aptitude test, the RCMP Recruit Selection Test (RRST) was developed and implemented and was used until 1999. The RCMP then began to use the RCMP Police Aptitude Test (RPAT), also an aptitude test, to replace the RRST, and it is still being used today.

For the purposes of this study, the RCMP HR Research and Intelligence provided an equivalency in order to convert the RRST scores to RPAT scores. A conversion however could not be made to convert the psychometric scores to the RPAT equivalency. It should be noted that these three tests are all various forms of aptitude tests.

The comparative analysis indicated that the corrupt members had significantly lower "Education Test" scores than the control group. The same findings were

found with respect to the "Psychometric Test" scores. Although the "RRST" and "RPAT" test scores were compiled, given their relative recency and following the general trend of years of service prior to the first corrupt incident, there were insufficient numbers from which to draw any meaningful data pertaining to the specified test scores. It should be noted that these findings and variables were gender-matched. Due to the similarities of factors assessed in the "Psychometric Test", the "RRST" and the "RPAT", it is feasible to extrapolate the findings, applying them to the current aptitude test. However, one cannot necessarily draw the conclusion that lower intelligence is a causal factor or associated with corrupt behaviour. There exists the possibility that those who are more intelligent may simply not get caught.

Education

Data was collected from all of the cases with respect to the education level at the time of hiring. Although a high school diploma was/is required upon engagement, many of the members of this study possessed various levels of education, including: some college education, a college certificate, some university, or a university Bachelor's degree, Master's degree or PhD.

The findings with respect to education are in line with those associated with the aptitude tests. It was determined that the corrupt members were less educated at the time of hiring than the control members. It was also determined that the difference in the level of education between the corrupt and control groups was not due to the difference in gender. Given the results of

the test findings, it may explain why the control group were more likely to seek postsecondary education.

Given the educational differences of the sample and control groups at the recruiting phase, it is not surprising that there was also a significant difference between the additional education achieved during their service. The corrupt members obtained less additional education from the time of hiring to the time of their corrupt incident in comparison with the control group within the same time frame. It should be noted that the effect size of this finding was small to medium.

Alternative Recruiting Programs

There have been a number of alternative recruiting programs that have been used over the years to process and hire specific groups of individuals. This study captured the cases in both the sample and control groups in the following formats: those who were S/Cst conversions or civilian member (CM) conversions, those hired through an amalgamation of another police service using the *Protocol for the Appointment of Entrants of Disbanded Police Departments into the RCMP*, those hired with prior policing service using the *Lateral Entry Protocol* and those hired through the Aboriginal Cadet Development Program (ACDP).

Preceding the late 1980s, the RCMP hired S/Csts for specific functions such as protective duties at airports, embassies and consulates, as well as for performing surveillance. The selection criteria at the time for this group of employees did not require them to meet the minimum test score on the "Education Test" or the "Psychometric Test" as was required for the regular members. It should also be noted that following an assassination incident of a Turkish Ambassador to Canada in 1982, the RCMP hired significant numbers of S/Csts. More specifically, from 1982 to 1986 there were 668 S/Csts hired. A decision was made in the late 1980s to convert the S/Csts. to regular members and to commence a temporary conversion process for

the affected S/Csts. Between 1985 and 1995 there were 1699 S/Csts who converted to regular member status. The conversion requirements consisted of obtaining a supervisor's support, passing a staffing interview and attending a modified training session at Depot. As of December 2006, there are 1011 current serving regular members who were converted through this process.

The *Protocol for the Appointment of Entrants of Disbanded Police Departments* into the RCMP, otherwise referred to as the Amalgamation Protocol, was developed in the mid 1990s in response to the city of Moncton's decision to contract the RCMP and disband the Moncton City Police Service. A number of small police forces have since disbanded and the RCMP has taken over the policing responsibilities. As part of the transition phase, the vast majority of the police officers from the disbanded services have been absorbed into the RCMP. The Amalgamation Protocol does not require the members of the affected municipal police force to meet the established written test standards. They do not compete with the regular applicant pool. They are, however, required to successfully pass the suitability interview and obtain the required security clearances.

The Lateral Entry Protocol, implemented in 2000, was designed to leverage the policing skills of a trained and experienced police officer in an expeditious manner. The screening of applicants with prior policing service includes the successful completion of the written test, the suitability interview and all other components of the recruiting process. These applicants do not compete with the regular applicant pool. It should be noted that through the normal recruiting process, although applicants are able to meet the minimum standards, it is only the applicants with the highest score on the written test that are screened into the subsequent recruiting processes. Once screening has been completed, the Lateral Entry applicants are given a modified training and orientation.

The Aboriginal Cadet Development Program (ACDP) was designed to assist identified aboriginal candidates in meeting the RCMP selection criteria through a developmental program lasting up to two years. Although these applicants must meet the established recruiting standards they, like the Lateral Entry applicants, do not compete with the general applicant pool.

As with the Lateral Entry applicants, civilian member (CM) conversions must meet the established recruiting standards; however, they too are not required to compete with the general applicant pool.

As indicated in Table 11, of the 204 cases, 39 were hired through an alternative recruiting program. Of all of the alternative recruiting processes, the most prevalent within the corrupt group were those hired

through the S/Cst. conversion program. There were a total of 30 S/Cst conversions.

The comparative analysis conducted on the groups determined that there was a significant number of corrupt members hired through alternative recruiting programs. Furthermore, with a subsequent breakdown of the comparative analysis, it was determined that there were more corrupt members hired through the S/Cst conversion than in the control group.

These findings lead one to conclude that there is merit to adhering to the established selection standards. Furthermore, it appears that there are benefits to selecting the strongest applicants within the general applicant pool with respect to the risk of corrupt behaviour.

Table 11—Alternative program used

	Frequency	Percentage of Case
Lateral Entry	3	1.5 %
Amalgamation	1	0.5 %
S/Cst Conversion	30	14.7 %
Aboriginal Cadet Development Program	4	2.0 %
Other	1	0.5 %
Total hired using alternative program	39	19.1 %
Total hired using regular program	165	80.9 %
Total	204	100.0 %

Recruiting pressures

There are a number of reviews and studies that have been conducted in the American context that have identified a problem with retention of established screening standards in light of the pressures of filling a significant number of positions. This was true for the Miami, Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., and New York police services. In the 1980s, the pressure to hire new patrol personnel in Miami resulted in lax pre-employment screening and inadequate training. As a consequence, 75% of the new Miami officers hired during that period were subjects of allegations of wrongdoing (Delattre 1996).

The Mollen Commission Report (1994) also refers to the inadequate background screening of recruits prior to being sent to their academy. In reference to a particular study that was conducted within that review, of the 413 officers who had been dismissed or suspended over a six year period, 88% were sent to the training academy without the completion of their background checks (Mollen 1994).

Stana *et al.* in *Law Enforcement, Information on Drug-Related Police* emphasise the impact of recruiting pressures and the increased risks they entail:

Moreover, rapid recruitment initiatives to meet major, time-critical hiring demands appeared to be associated with episodes of drug-related police corruption in some cities. For example, police departments in Miami and Washington, D.C., went through major hiring initiatives in the mid 1980's and these departments subsequently experienced corruption problems. Academic sources and some federal officials suggested that, for various reasons, including inadequate screening [...] such rapid recruitment initiatives might have permitted the hiring of recruits who might have not been otherwise hired. (Stana et al. 1998: 16)

In light of the findings of other studies, a comparison of the RCMP hires from 1974-2005 and the years of hire of the sample group is compiled in Chart 7.

It is necessary to interpret this information with the understanding that a recruiting process may have commenced in one year based on the recruiting needs, yet due to the processing time (approximately one year) may actually be hired the following year. Furthermore, given that the majority of the first corrupt incidents on average occurred after 5 years of service and that only the concluded cases were considered in this study, there were very few sample group members who were hired in the last 5 years of this study (i.e. 2000-2005). This explains the drop of the number of corrupt members hired in the last five years. The graph clearly depicts a general trend identifying that more of the sample group members were hired at RCMP peak recruiting years. It should be stated that statistically, it would be reasonable to predict this by virtue of the numbers recruited.

It should also be mentioned that this represents only the members who were subjects of this study who had corrupt incidents occurring between 1995 and 2005. There are certainly other cases of corrupt incidents that are not represented that occurred prior to the study parameters.

Chart 7

Regular Member recruiting 1974–2005





Chart 8

Chart 8 reflects the percentage of regular members hired in a given year in comparison to the national RCMP regular member composition and the number of corrupt group members hired in each of the specified years (1974–2005).

Percentage of Regular Members recruited



In light of this information and given the current RCMP's significant human resource needs, it is critical that recruitment standards are maintained and not compromised as a means of meeting those needs. Mistakes are costly to the organization, to its reputation and to its ability to effectively meet its primary mandate.

The comparative analysis determined that there were no significant differences between the sample and control groups in terms of discrepancies between the information gleaned during the selection interviews and the findings in the field investigations. This being said, there were general observations that are worth mentioning. Taking into consideration the fact that the sample group included members of varying lengths of service and different hiring eras, there were a number of cases of non-disclosures of prior offences, poor employment references and discrepancies relating to particular situations. In hindsight, it leaves one pondering the rationale and the final decision to proceed with the hiring of these members.

Similarly, upon review of the police officers who had been suspended or dismissed over a six year period, the Mollen Commission Report (1994) arrived at significant findings regarding the hiring decisions:

Applying a degree of scrutiny absent from many investigations done by the Department, we concluded that approximately 20 percent of the officers suspended or dismissed should never have been admitted into the Department. This is based merely on information available in these officers' personnel files at the time of hiring. (113)

The noted RCMP observations are being raised to sensitize those in the recruiting realm, and will be explored further within the recruiting mitigation strategies.

Recruiting—Non-significant differences

Although a comprehensive approach to the data collection was made with respect to recruiting, there were a number of non-significant findings.

The hypotheses sought to determine if there were any links between information commonly verified at the recruiting phase and the increased likelihood of corrupt behaviour. Some of these factors pertain to issues of integrity, lack of respect for existing laws, inability to organize one's finances, questionable associations, family influence and past employment performance.

Data was also collected pertaining to the types of prior offences of the sample and control groups, as well as the frequency. This included anything from speeding infractions to liquor offences. No significant differences were found. These variables were also gender-matched and the results remained unchanged.

The following is a list of other non-significant differences between the sample and control groups:

- > *If the member had been refused employment with another police service*
- > *If the member had debt or had declared bankruptcy at the time of the security/reliability interview*
- > *If the member had been previously employed with the RCMP*
- > *The suitability interviewer's length of service*
- > *At the recruitment stage, if a family member was involved in criminal activities*
- > *If any issues/problems arose during the field investigation*
- > *The number of interviews conducted in the field investigation*

One of the hypotheses of this study was associated with a member's declared prior drug use before applying to the RCMP. The notion of integrity, the respect for existing laws and engagement of high risk behaviour may lead one to believe that those with prior drug use,

including consideration of the type of drug use and frequency, may be at greater risk of corrupt behaviour. The findings of this study did not determine any significant difference between the sample and control groups. Interestingly enough, the control group's declared prior drug use average was slightly higher than the sample group.

This should not be interpreted to mean that screening with respect to prior drug use is not essential. There have been prior drug use screening standards used in applicant screening over the years in order to assess integrity and respect for existing laws. In this study, the screening, including the prior drug use screening standards of the day, were the same for all pairs (from the control and sample groups) given that they were matched by their years of hire. It should be noted that there have been changes in the prior drug use screening over the past thirty years. Applicants have been assessed based on the type of drug used, the frequency of use, their age at the time, and the manner in which they acquired the drugs. Furthermore, in 1990, as a result of a Canadian Human Rights case, the RCMP committed to assessing prior drug use based on the merits of each individual case. The findings of this analysis simply reveal that there is no significant difference between the sample and control groups with respect to their declared prior drug use.

Training

This section pertains to training and includes that which was received at Depot and during the Recruit Field Training (later referred to as the Cadet Field Coaching Program). A number of hypotheses that were developed pertained to Depot training and the potential association with corrupt behaviour. They include: the age upon arrival at Depot, the length of the training program, performance, conduct and comportment issues identified at Depot, if a member was "back-trooped" or "re-inserted into a later troop", and if a member was identified for close supervision.

The relevant hypotheses that were explored in relation to field coaching included issues pertaining to conduct, performance and field coaches' length of service. It should be noted that the following findings do not take into consideration the specific environment in which the situations occurred or the context in which problems arose.

Depot

Up until 1993, regular members were hired before they were sent for training, which was held at Depot, in Regina, Saskatchewan. In 1993, the Cadet Training Program (CTP) was developed, which required cadets to successfully complete training prior to engagement. The length of training has fluctuated over the years, between 22 and 26 weeks.

With respect to the data collection regarding Depot training, there were limitations to the type of available information. Prior to the implementation of the CTP, the member evaluations were detailed providing specific course marks and progress reports from which distinctions and more meaningful data could be captured. Since the implementation of the CTP, the more recent course assessments indicate only that a cadet either met the course standards or not, or that he/she required improvement.

Initially, one of the findings indicated that it was more likely that the corrupt members received less training (less than 22–26 weeks) than the control group members. A separate analysis was run excluding the S/Cst conversion group. During the conversion process, the S/Csts attended a shortened training session at Depot. As expected, the comparative analysis excluding the S/Cst conversion members within the study changed; however, it was inconclusive given that there was an insufficient effect size.

Information was captured with respect to comportment issues that may have arisen while the members were at Depot. This information was further

broken down to identify the various comportment problems. These included a member's inability to work well with others, a negative attitude towards authority, a lack of maturity, a negative reaction to negative feedback, being disrespectful of rules, a lack of integrity, laziness and being disrespectful of others.

Overall, it was determined that more corrupt members had a comportment issue while at Depot than the control group. Although the effect size was described as small to medium, there is a trend that supports the notion that problematic behaviours early on in a members service may be indicative of future behaviours. Furthermore, in spite of the fact that no effect size was available, there was a potential trend with respect to the corrupt members' inability to work well with others at Depot in comparison to the control group. As mentioned previously, it should be noted that the particular environments at the time of each incident were not examined. There were insufficient numbers involving the other detailed comportment issues in order to arrive at significant findings.

It should be noted that the training periods within the sample group were over an approximately 30 year time frame and that the acceptable comportment parameters and subsequent consequences of the behaviours have evolved over the years.

Although there is an interest in ensuring the success rate at Depot, it is essential that this training segment be regarded as an opportunity to closely monitor those who will potentially be regular members one day. Currently, Depot has a zero tolerance approach to comportment issues. Depot Cadets are held accountable for their actions, and if not addressed, their contracts are terminated. While at Depot, cadets are not yet employees and therefore, for the most part are on their best behaviour. Those who are prepared to risk their careers by way of counterproductive behaviours may be deemed unsuitable for engagement.

With respect to the training itself, although the application of ethical considerations must be incorporated within every aspect of the Cadet Training Program, its importance must be relayed in very deliberate and concrete terms. Mollen(1994) refers to this emphasis in his report:

The number of hours devoted to integrity training at the Police Academy should be increased and integrated in other areas of training so that it is perceived as an important part of the curriculum, rather than a required appendage to "real" police training. (121)

Furthermore, those selected to deliver the training must have the experience and knowledge to convey the importance of the message in a convincing and effective manner. Although Goldstein (1975) made the observation more than 30 years ago, the notion still rings true today:

If recruit training is to have any impact on corruption, it must explore fully and realistically all the dimensions of the problem and include specific examples of corruption known to exist or to have existed in the department [...] The more realistically training deals with corruption as a hazard of police work, the more credibility the staff is likely to have and the greater the probability that the officer will take warnings seriously. (43)

Essentially, this study has determined that there have been significant changes to the training at Depot, including the response to comportment and conduct issues and the recent enhancement of the ethics training that is now woven throughout the Cadet Training Program today.

Depot has indicated that it has made recent changes with respect to ethics training in order to sensitising the cadets about RCMP expectations and pitfalls, teaching the "continuum of compromise", the potential pressure from friends and family, and other dilemmas that they may face in the field. In line with Mollen's (1994) recommendation, ethics is integrated into a number

of modules throughout the Cadet Training Program for the purpose of emphasising its importance. This provides cadets the opportunity to explore situations through role-playing scenarios and develop response strategies before the actual situations occur.

Depot has also recently begun to implement a workshop for families and graduating cadets, typically held the weekend preceding their graduation. This session covers issues related to ethics including the limitations placed on the member regarding work responsibilities. Although family members cannot be compelled to attend this session, there has been full participation.

It is apparent that the issues concerning the incidents of misconduct and the integration of ethics training are already being fully addressed at Depot.

It is interesting to note that there were no significant differences between the sample and the control groups in reference to the age when the members commenced training at Depot. Furthermore, it was determined that there were no disparities between the two groups in regards to performance at Depot. It should be noted that the results did not change when the variables were matched by gender. In line with the above noted findings, there were also no differences between the two groups with respect to whether they were recommended for close supervision or not upon completion of their basic training. No effect size was available to determine if there was a difference between the corrupt and the control groups regarding those that were back-trooped.

Field Coaching

A new member who has successfully completed training at Depot proceeds to the next phase of their learning, commonly referred to as the Field Coaching Program (FCP). A new member is paired up with a more senior member, who provides guidance and assistance for the FCP completion. The FCP is typically

a six-month program; however, it can exceptionally be shorter for those hired under special programs such as Lateral Entry members, Amalgamations and the S/Cst conversions.

From the comparative analysis, it was determined that there was a significant difference that was identified within this category, in that the corrupt members displayed more inappropriate behaviour and or conduct during the FCP than those in the control group. It should be noted that although the effect size of this finding was small to medium, it is consistent with the member's comportment at Depot. It is apparent that not only is there a higher rate of comportment problems at Depot in the corrupt group, but also a higher rate of inappropriate behaviour or conduct in the next training segment. However, this does not mean that the same individuals have problems at both training phases, but it does highlight the need for close scrutiny even at the initial training stages in order for early intervention as a preventative measure. Due to the size of the data set, it was not possible to conduct any further detailed analysis of the types of inappropriate behaviour or conduct.

There were no significant differences between the field coaches' length of service between the sample and control groups. Furthermore, the data size was too small to determine any significant difference regarding the specific breakdown of the inappropriate behaviour or conduct displayed. As well, due to the data size, issues related to performance could not be analysed.

Staffing

One of the most significant general observations made by the data collection team was the misalignment of the different HR records/file management.

There exists numerous cases where the information contained in the personnel file, such as the member's evaluation and their respective performance, was in contradiction with the contents of either the internal

investigation or anti-corruption files. More specifically, upon reviewing a number of the personnel files, a favourable impression was made from the available evaluations, staffing interview reports and other documentation. However, upon examination of the operational or internal investigation files regarding those same members, a totally different conclusion and individual assessment was made. It was apparent in many cases that the internal investigation files reflected serious performance issues, however this was frequently absent in the personnel file. Either the supervisors were not completing evaluations, not accurately evaluating the member's behaviour or the entire evaluations were removed from the files due to grievances. Furthermore there were no indications that there were issues related to internal investigations or to discipline.

This issue is being raised in this segment given that staffing decisions are being made based on information held in personnel files. It is disconcerting to know that not only are staffing personnel relying on the credibility of the file contents, but so too are the different managers seeking to fill their vacancies with competent members. This lack of continuity speaks to the internal mechanisms and systems with respect to information that is permitted in the personnel file, grievance processes, legislation, as well as leadership, courage and the role of supervisors. The need to address this significant information gap cannot be overemphasised. This matter will be explored in more detail later in this report.

Postings

The issue of posting a member to their province and city of origin and the potential for conflict of interest and family pressures has been a continual topic of discussion and review. This study set out to determine if, indeed, there were any significant differences between members who committed corrupt activities in their city of origin and those who were not living in their city of origin. The larger Canadian cities were studied including all of the surrounding cities in their respective areas.

Initially, the comparative analysis of the comprehensive data set seemed to indicate that there appeared to be a significantly higher number of corrupt members who were residing in their city of origin at the time of the corrupt behaviour. It should be noted that the effect size was identified as small to medium. A further analysis was conducted excluding the S/Cst conversions and the former Supernumerary Special Constables, S/S/Csts.⁵ The results of the findings changed, revealing that there are no significant differences regarding a member posted to a city of origin and the risk of corrupt behaviour. The difference in city of residence between the corrupt and control groups appears to be mostly higher due to the higher proportion of S/Cst conversions and former S/S/Csts in the corrupt group.

It is interesting to note that the Mollen Commission Report (1994) also explored the issue of residency from the perspective that police officers not working and living in the same city were more likely to engage in corrupt behaviour. Although the Commission was not examining the close connection between the police officer and the community, there was a notion that those living outside the city were less connected or did not have a vested interest in the policing impact. Mollen concluded that there was no correlation between residency and corruption (128).

It should be clarified at this point that prior to commencing Project Sanction, an examination of corruption in "E" Division using a case study approach was conducted. The findings as stipulated in the report dated May 19, 2005, included:

[...] the emerging theme of conflict created by posting newly-graduated RCMP officers back to their home communities, where they have close friends and relatives who may be involved in illegal activities. (7)

⁵ Supernumerary Special Constables, S/S/Csts, fall within the RCMP Act; however, they are remunerated by other government organizations.

The case study report speaks to the pressures experienced by new members who may not be adequately prepared to deal with conflicting loyalties between their policing responsibilities and pressures exerted by their families, friends, and extended communities. Furthermore, within the limited regional sample, it appeared that the cases reviewed indicated difficulties and subsequent illegal activities by certain members posted to their home communities as a result of their ties to family and friends.

Although the statistical analysis does not demonstrate a correlation between the likelihood of corrupt activity occurring in the members home community, it does indicate that there were significant findings with respect to certain types of vulnerabilities and pressures that the corrupt group faced more than the control group. Although the effect size was small, it does indicate that there were more members of the corrupt group that had an immediate family pressure or vulnerability than the control group.

High Risk Areas

Another hypothesis that was examined within this study involved the premise that there may be a higher rate of corruption when members are working in areas commonly deemed as "high risk". Newburn (1999) mentions:

[...] there are some forms of police work that bring with them greater opportunities for, and therefore greater likelihood of, corruption [...]. (16)

This was further explored by Mollen (1994), Wood (1997), and in the Rampart Reconsidered Report (2006). There was an apparent practice of transferring police officers who were deemed less competent into precincts with high crime rates, rampant drug trade and gang violence, which for all intents and purposes, were considered to be "dumping grounds". The affected police officers frequently felt abandoned and had low morale as they were cognizant of their respective reputations

and the difficulty in transferring out. Similar parallels were made with a number of NYPD precincts, New York Drug Enforcement Task Force (DETF), the LAPD Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums Unit (CRASH) and the Darlinghurst, New South Wales, units. The low morale contributed to the increase in team loyalty above all. This, combined with little supervision and increased opportunity contributed to isolation and protectionism within the working groups and the incidents of corruption. Mollen (1994) refers to this issue:

We have observed and many officers agree, that steady tours intensify the insularity that facilitates corruption. (124)

The "steady tours" referred to by Mollen describe the lack of rotation and transfers among the different precincts and units.

The units frequently referred to as high-risk areas have typically included those investigating drug-related offences. According to Manning and Redlinger (1977), officers working in drug-related areas:

[...] are more often placed upon an invitational edge of corruption [...] These areas of policing also tend to be characterised by the greatest degree of secrecy and invisibility from managerial, administrative or democratic oversight. (27)

This study set out to determine if there exists a general trend or pattern in the RCMP with respect to areas of work and the possibility of increased risk of corrupt behaviour. The type of work conducted at the time of the corrupt incident as well as the two previous areas of work were taken into consideration. Within the limitations of this study, a comparative analysis was completed and there were no significant differences between the sample and control groups with respect to the specific work responsibilities and the incidence of corruption. It should be reiterated that only the known activities, including the drug-related activities that

involved corruption, were examined within this study. The study did not include malfeasance, drug use or drug abuse. Unlike the American studies, this study did not indicate that there is a higher risk of corrupt activity associated with a particular area or unit of work.

Supervision and other in-service issues

There were a number of hypotheses that were tested that could potentially be observed or gleaned by supervisors within the normal daily contact with employees. Determining the factors that may contribute to a member being more at risk of corrupt behaviour may assist supervisors and managers by intervening at earlier stages, before the issues result in more serious dilemmas.

There were a number of factors that were examined which included: general concerns or problems expressed within any of the available materials that were verified, vulnerabilities and pressures, personality and behavioural changes, performance problems and public complaints/internal investigations.

Significant Differences

There were more corrupt members than in the control group who raised a general concern regarding areas such as:

- > *financial problems*
- > *substance abuse*
- > *gambling*
- > *problems with their peers*
- > *medical*
- > *marital problems*

The effect size for this analysis was small to medium.

The findings were further supported when the vulnerabilities and pressures were analysed. The corrupt group prior to the corrupt incident experienced significantly more vulnerabilities and pressures overall than the control group (the effect size of this finding was large). Further breakdown of the analysis indicated that the corrupt group also had more marital vulnerabilities/pressures (medium effect size), immediate family vulnerabilities/pressures (small to medium effect size), medical vulnerabilities/pressures (medium effect size) and work and peer vulnerabilities/pressures (medium effect size) than the control group. It should be stated that the nature of the vulnerabilities and the degree of the problems varied. The concerns were all documented in the files that were reviewed during the study, and were thus known within the organization. These findings are limited to identifying correlations; they do not identify causality. It is not clear if the vulnerabilities and pressures caused the corrupt behaviour or vice versa, however the correlation has been established.

Another supervisory related variable that was verified included changes in personality at the time of the corrupt behaviour. Although there was a small to medium effect size, it was established that more corrupt members displayed a personality change around the time of the corrupt incident than the control group members. The personality changes, as with the concerns, vulnerabilities and pressures, are feasibly monitored by an employee's supervisor. What is important to note, which will be further addressed within the mitigation strategies, is the importance of the supervisor's role and responsibilities, and the need for proper training and courses of action.

As was mentioned earlier under the heading of Staffing, there was a very conspicuous difference between the profiles of a number of members within the sample group in relation to their performance evaluations and the realities that were being addressed through the Internal Investigation or Anti-Corruption Sections. There were within this study, however, a few

instances of corrupt members who were held in high regard as a result of their work. These few individuals were considered as high performers and recognized internally and externally for their superior performance. These were not in the majority. Numerous evaluations did not reflect the obvious performance issues that were being identified by way of complaints both internally and by the public. The issue of grieving an evaluation and the subsequent removal from the personnel file may be one of the explanations in the event that the evaluations were not found. This, however, does not account for all of the situations.

A similar finding was identified by Mollen (1994) with respect to the performance evaluations:

Indeed, in our supervision project, supervisors admitted that performance evaluations were typically boilerplate, and not intended to flag problem officers, for the Department or their superiors. Indeed, we found that performance evaluations often covered suspected corruption problems. (81)

This being said, the lack of existing documented performance problems was not the case for all. Based on the available information, the corrupt members had a significantly larger number of performance problems than the control group (small to medium effect size). The problems that were captured included:

- > *problems with organization and planning*
- > *poor attitude*
- > *laziness*
- > *interpersonal problems*
- > *lack of motivation*
- > *tardiness*

The types of performance problems were further broken down by attitude-related problems that included poor attitude, laziness, interpersonal problems, lack of motivation and tardiness. The comparative analysis

finding was that the corrupt group had a significantly higher number of attitude-related problems than the control group. The effect size was medium. There were no other significant differences with respect to the various performance problems.

The importance of supervision is further demonstrated through the actual types of incidents of corruption. As previously indicated, there were approximately 6% of the total incidents within this study that involved fraud related to expense claims. Also, as was mentioned earlier, there were frauds and thefts related to source payment. Although policy clearly stipulates the procedures for approval of expense claims and source payments, it is clearly within the supervisors responsibility to ensure that policies and procedures are strictly followed.

Security Clearance Updates

Another general observation made by the data collection team was in regard to the security files and the security clearance updates. There was a significant number of security files that could not be located both at National Headquarters and in the regions. Although security files are to be retained for 99 years, in some instances the project team was advised that certain files had been purged. In other instances, it appeared that the files had been misplaced due to inter-divisional transfers. Essentially, a serious problem was identified regarding the management and tracking of the security files. Consequently, numerous security files could not be consulted for this study.

Employees must undergo a comprehensive screening during the hiring phase and the security clearances must be updated within prescribed intervals. They are conducted every 5 years for Top Secret Clearance or 10 years for Secret Clearance. Note that in relation to this area, the scope of the project only included capturing information typically held in the security file.

Upon reviewing the security files, it became apparent that the security update forms do not capture adequate

information from which to draw defensible conclusions. Very limited significant information could be gleaned from the form, because employees are asked general and subjective information such as those related to their financial obligations and their perceived abilities to meet them. There is little meaningful information that is provided by the employees that could provide insight about those who may be experiencing vulnerabilities in any number of areas. Furthermore, there is no opportunity to inquire and determine if employees are experiencing a standard of living beyond their current revenue range.

Professional Standards

Discipline

Although this study did not seek to analyse information pertaining to discipline, a general observation was made by the project team with respect to the hard copy discipline files and the electronic ones. The amount and type of information that is captured in either format, varies significantly from one division to another. There appears to be no established national standard regarding what information should be retained within the discipline file. Furthermore, the HRMIS module pertaining to discipline also captures varying levels of detail, from a two line description with a brief decision to multiple paragraphs. Very little information can be gleaned from the discipline files, nor context relayed in the absence of a standard.

Public Complaints/Internal Investigations

Considering the theory of Gilmartin and Harris (1998) with respect to the continuum of compromise, one of the hypotheses that this study set out to determine was in regard to a correlation between behavioural problems and misconduct, the general erosion of the moral compass and the eventual occurrence of corrupt behaviour. For the purposes of this section, the public complaints and internal investigations were considered

together. The actual relationship between the complaints and investigations and corrupt behaviour will be examined following the analysis of how the RCMP learned of the corrupt incidents.

The manner in which the 322 corrupt incidents were brought to the attention of the RCMP is reflected in Table 12. It should be noted that 28.6% were initiated through public complaints and that 43.5% were identified by RCMP employees, including subordinates, supervisors and other employees. Once again it should be stipulated that this is in reference to the concluded, reported cases and does not refer to the cases that went unreported.

It is interesting that the Mollen Commission Report (1994) surfaced a serious problem with respect to employees coming forward to report corrupt activities.

It is a multi-faceted problem that has flourished in parts of our City not only because of opportunity and greed, but because of a police culture that exalts loyalty over integrity; because of the silence of honest officers who fear the consequences of "ratting" on another cop no matter how grave the crime [...] (1)

The "code of silence" among police officers is a common theme throughout the literature (Mollen 1994; Stana *et al.* 1998; Wood 1997). Furthermore, it begs the question about the RCMP results. It is apparent that incidents are being reported internally. This being said, it is not possible within the purview of this study to determine the rate of unreported incidents.

Table 12—Manner in which corrupt incidents were identified

	Frequency	Percent
Public complaint	92	28.6 %
Supervisor	41	12.8 %
Subordinate	77	23.9 %
Other RCMP employee	22	6.8 %
Other police department	4	1.2 %
Administrative review	17	5.3 %
Government official	10	3.1 %
Source information	22	6.8 %
More than one	11	3.4 %
Unknown	26	8.1 %
Total	322	100.0 %

For the purpose of the following analysis, the results of the public complaints/internal investigations were classified as follows:

- > *founded or informal resolution; or,*
- > *unfounded (unsubstantiated) or withdrawn.*

The rationale for considering complaints that were classified as unfounded or withdrawn includes the possibility of insufficient evidence to support a disciplinary action, although the incident may have occurred. Although there may not be evidence to substantiate a misconduct, there may be a pattern of unrelated complaints/behaviours that could indicate a problem.

The following is a list of the main types of public complaints/internal investigations that were captured:

- > *neglect of duty*
- > *harassment*
- > *abuse of authority*
- > *excessive use of force*

- > *abusive language*
- > *misuse of police information*
- > *intimidation*
- > *anger management problem*
- > *inappropriate conduct off duty*
- > *substance abuse problems*
- > *disobeying an order*

A comparative analysis, including all complaints founded and unfounded, determined that the corrupt group had a significantly greater number of public complaints/internal investigations than the control group. The effect size for this analysis was large. Furthermore, the comparative analysis of just the founded complaints also revealed that the corrupt group had a significantly greater number of founded public complaints/internal investigations. The effect size for this analysis was also large. The analysis regarding the unfounded complaints was consistent with the others; however, the effect size was small to medium.

The types of public complaints/internal investigations were broken down into categories in order to determine if there were specific types that were more prevalent within the corrupt group. The number of founded and unfounded complaints pertaining to neglect of duty was significantly higher among the corrupt group than the control group (small to medium effect size). The number of founded public complaints/internal investigations of abusive behaviour was again larger in the corrupt group (small to medium effect size) and with a similar finding with the unfounded complaints (effect size was small). The only other notable difference between the two groups was the number of founded complaints of inappropriate conduct, which was higher among the corrupt group (small to medium effect size).

There is literature that supports the correlation between excessive use of force and the incidence of corruption (Mollen 1994; Stana *et al.* 1998; Tully

2000). Interestingly enough, regarding the link between brutality and corruption, the Mollen Commission Report (1994) stipulated the following:

There are other important links between corruption and brutality that we uncovered. First we found that officers who are corrupt are more likely to be brutal-both in connection with carrying out acts of corruption and otherwise [...] This conclusion is based on several sources both testimonial and empirical [...] The data showed that the corruption-prone officers were more than five times as likely to have five or more unnecessary force allegations filed against them than the officers from the random sample group. (46)

Given the results of the other studies, possible correlations between different types of abusive behaviour, including excessive use of force, were examined. The abusive behaviours included complaints of harassment, abuse of authority, excessive use of force, abusive language, assault, intimidation and anger management problems. The sample group had a significantly higher number of complaints regarding abusive behaviours than the control group. This supports the studies in this regard.

The general findings mentioned within this section are important as potential identifiers of members at risk of corrupt behaviour. It would be appropriate to track and monitor all cases closely in order to assess the need for intervention.





MITIGATION STRATEGIES

This section is comprised of the recommended strategies emanating from the analysis, and general observations in conjunction with the literature review. Furthermore, the differences in the RCMP findings in comparison to other studies will be explored when identifying the approaches. The proposed strategies include very tangible changes that can affect the occurrence of corruption, and should be considered holistically. This section is divided into 6 main fields: recruiting, training, staffing, supervision/management, security and professional standards.

Recruiting

Age

Many of the recommendations made to address corruption and counterproductive behaviour begin by suggesting that the hiring age be raised from 21 to 23 (Mollen 1994; Newburn 1999; Stana *et al.* 1998; Wood 1997). The rationale associated with this recommendation includes maturity level and life experience in order to increase confidence levels, ability to cope with the issues that new police officers will be facing and having a prior developed ethical conviction. It is interesting to note that the relatively young age at hiring is not the RCMP experience. Although the minimum required age to join the RCMP is set at 19 years, the average hiring age for the past 10 years has ranged between 25 and 28 years. Presently the average age is approximately 25 years.

Education

Raising education standards at the recruiting stage is yet another consistent recommendation that is suggested in the literature (Ferguson 2003; Mollen 1994; Newburn 1999; Stana *et al.* 1998; Wood 1997). The RCMP's minimum educational standard is a high school diploma. Yet, in 2002, over 60% of the graduates at Depot had some postsecondary education, which is a continuing trend today. Postsecondary education is logically linked to a persons academic aptitude, which is assessed during the recruiting process. The results of the comparative analysis of this study determined that those members who have a lower aptitude and lower education were more likely to become corrupt than those with a higher aptitude and education. As was mentioned previously, this finding cannot explain causality nor can the actual causes of the relationship be

explained. Furthermore, there exists the possibility that those with a higher aptitude simply do not get caught. Consequently, it may be difficult to defend a mitigation strategy that recommends raising the minimum educational requirements.

Conscientiousness Measure

The RCMP began to use a new selection tool referred to as the Six Factor Personality Questionnaire (SFPQ). The SFPQ measures a personality construct from which a conscientiousness score is determined. The rationale for the RCMP to proceed with using the SFPQ as a recruiting tool was its usefulness in classifying officers who would be less likely to be engaged in counterproductive behaviours (those with higher conscientiousness scores) versus those who would be more likely to be involved in formal disciplinary actions (those with lower conscientiousness scores) (Rannie 2003). As explained by Sarchione *et al.* (1998) pertaining to their study:

In general, the overall pattern of results provided support for the theory that conscientiousness is predictive of dysfunctional job behaviours. (909)

Other similar research pertaining to personality constructs, and the link between conscientiousness and counterproductive behaviours, is consistent with the above (Cullen *et al.* 2001). According to Claussen-Rogers *et al.* (2005):

Officers with higher levels of conscientiousness are not likely to have elevated levels of antisocial traits. Thus, these are job candidates who likely will not engage in acts of corruption. Officers with higher levels of antisocial personality features are not likely to have elevated levels of conscientiousness. Thus, these are job candidates who likely will engage in acts of corruption. (28)

Since 2003, RCMP regular member applicants have been required to write the SFPQ and, in 2004, recruiting offices were making initial applicant selections based on

an aggregate score. That score consisted of 60% of the aptitude score and 40% of the SFPQ. Those with the highest combined score were processed further.

Currently, however, all applicants meeting the minimum RPAT standard are being processed. Furthermore, although applicants are writing the SFPQ, the score is only being considered once they have been processed. Although the merits of the SFPQ have been established, due to recruiting demands the score of the SFPQ is not being used to make selections.

If it is the intention to address the incidence of corruption, the RCMP already possesses an important tool. Its merit with respect to performance and identifying those who are more likely to engage in counterproductive behaviour has been established. Consequently, the SFPQ or another conscientiousness measure should be used in a meaningful way with respect to applicant selections. Although the SFPQ can be used to rank and screen in applicants, there is no minimum standard currently set within the RCMP. Ideally it would be even more effective if a cut off could be established which could be used to screen out the unsuitable applicants.

The RCMP is currently recruiting at a consistently high rate and is planning to hire over 1900 new members in the 2007-2008 fiscal year alone. Based on vacancy patterns, members retiring and new contracts, it is apparent that this recruiting need will exist for the next several years. The subsequent impact is the existence of significant pressure to process the necessary number of applicants in order to meet the human resource needs. It is critical that the RCMP does not change its recruiting standards as a response to these increased demands.

Recommendation 1:

The RCMP begin to make applicant selections using the Six Factor Personality Questionnaire (SFPQ) or other conscientiousness measure at an early stage of the recruiting process.

Recommendation 2:

The RCMP develop a defensible minimum recruitment standard with respect to the SFPQ score or other conscientiousness measure.

Alternate Recruiting Processes

Another significant finding was with respect to the disproportionate number of those in the sample group who were hired through an alternate recruiting process. Of those, 30 were S/Cst conversions who were not required to meet the established recruiting standards at the time. Although for many of the alternate recruiting processes today applicants are required to meet the minimum standards, there are still instances where these do not completely apply. This study has determined that there is a potential risk in changing the established standards and selection criteria for a select group. Particularly at a time when the recruiting needs are so great, there may indeed be pressures to deviate from the established standards and selection criteria. Regardless of the recruiting method, all RCMP regular member applicants should meet the established recruitment standards.

Recommendation 3:

The RCMP adhere to the established recruiting standards and selection criteria, which includes the development and implementation of alternate recruitment processes.

Prior drug use and offences

Within the limits of this study, there were no apparent differences between the sample and control groups with

respect to declared prior drug use and declared prior offences before their application. Nevertheless, this should not be interpreted to mean that the screening for prior drug use and prior offences is immaterial. It does mean that by virtue of the prior drug use screening standards, over the hiring span of this study, there is no difference between the two groups. Furthermore, if the standards were to be more lax, the results would likely be different.

General disclosure and field investigation

Although there were no significant differences found in the comparative analysis regarding the applicant disclosures and the field investigations, there were relevant general observations that were made. In a number of cases, there were discrepancies between what the member disclosed at the interview stage and the field investigation, non-disclosures of significant information, poor employment records and negative recommendations for hiring.

Although the recruiting process has evolved, the regular member applicants are still required to undergo a suitability interview (Regular Member Selection Interview Guide, RMSIG), a pre-employment polygraph and a field investigation. In order to understand the full context of the field investigations findings, it would be most effective for the suitability interviewer to conduct the final review of all materials for a final recommendation. In the instance of discrepancies, the applicant should be given a follow up interview.

Recommendation 4:

The recruiting suitability interviewer review all screening and selection materials, including the field investigation, for a final recommendation of the applicant.

Recommendation 5:

RCMP applicants be automatically given a follow-up interview when there are discrepancies identified during the recruitment process.

Training**Depot**

The recent changes to the Depot curriculum which include ethics training is absolutely essential in order to establish and clearly articulate organizational expectations and to provide the necessary tools to assist new members in working through ethical dilemmas. The ethics training provided at Depot should be aligned and coordinated with the proposed subsequent training throughout the members' career.

Recommendation 6:

Ethics training at Depot be aligned and coordinated with subsequent ethics in-service training.

Field Coaching

Similar to Depot training findings, the comparative analysis found that the sample group displayed more inappropriate behaviour and/or misconduct than the control group during the field coaching portion of the training. It should be noted that new regular members are under a two year probationary period and, consequently, the opportunity to reassess employment firmly exists within this window. Problems related to conduct or inappropriate behaviour cannot be overlooked.

By integrating ethics training into the field coaching curriculum, the RCMP would be reinforcing a consistent message to the new members. Furthermore, the field coaches should also undergo ethics training geared specifically to provide the essential guidance to the new members.

As was suggested within the Mollen Commission Report (1994), ethics training should be a significant component during field coaching in order to reinforce the basic training.

Recommendation 7:

Ethics training be integrated into the field coaching curriculum as well as incorporated in the training and preparation for field coaches.

General Ethics Training

This study's findings were consistent with other research with respect to the length of service of a police officer when a corrupt incident occurs. Typically, police officers have more than 5 years of service and on average between 8 and 15 years of service when misconduct of this type occurs. Within the RCMP, it appears that the most significant grouping regarding the length of service at the time of the first corrupt incident is between 6 and 10 years. The actual average length of service of those in the sample group was almost 13 years. Consistent with Gilmartin's (1994) theory regarding the "Continuum of Compromise", it appears that many of those in the sample group could have benefited from a reinforcement of expectations, clear guidance and assistance in the deliberation of ethical dilemmas that they may have been facing.

The spectrum of the types of activities found in the study was broad indeed. In a number of cases it was clear that the members had not considered the impact of their actions and in some cases they were not clear about what is and is not permitted. One can only surmise that in these cases the confusion is as a result of mixed messages throughout the member's service. The importance of providing consistent messaging is key to a better understanding of expectations and reduces the incidence of corruption.

Supervisors have an obvious responsibility, as does the organization, in regard to the clarity of direction

and strong guidance. The notion of effective, ongoing training is a constant message repeated in various sources (Goldstein 1975; Mollen 1994; Wood 1997; Newburn 1999). It is with this in mind, in conjunction with the study findings, that contributed to the identification of the need for ongoing ethics training throughout a member's career, commencing at Depot, reinforced during the field coaching program, and throughout the member's service within pre-established intervals.

More specifically, the training should reiterate and clarify in concrete terms organisational expectations, complete with what is acceptable and what is not. The consequences to the individual, other members, to the organization and to the profession must also be explored. Essentially the effectiveness of the entire police service can be impacted by acts of corruption. In order for the information to resonate with members, real organisational examples should be used. This notion was similarly incorporated in the Mollen Commission Report (1994):

Police Academy and In-Service Integrity Training should include instruction on real-life profiles of both corrupt and honest officers to demonstrate how officers should and should not behave when presented with opportunities for corruption. (122)

Finally, and most importantly, the training should incorporate the implementation of a deliberation model from which members can draw from when facing difficult, ethical dilemmas. As with the initial training received at Depot, it is essential that those selected to deliver such training are credible in the eyes of the membership.

As was mentioned earlier, the supervisors' role is pivotal in the day-to-day guidance and assistance provided to their respective subordinates. Their ability to reinforce the organisational expectations with respect to ethics, as well as to model the desired behaviour, speaks to the urgent need for the above-noted training. On another note, such training should provide the supervisors

with insight into identifying signs of members at risk, such as those experiencing vulnerabilities or pressures, those displaying a personality change, or those with significant performance problems. The potential exists to prevent and intercede before a serious issue arises, and to provide mechanisms to address the issues. All current and new supervisors should be required to undergo ethics training. The importance of general supervisory training is emphasised by Tully (2000), as follows:

To think that an individual can assume the position of sergeant without a period of extensive training is both foolish and a disservice to those we ask to hold the position. The training of sergeants is far more important than any other training program in law enforcement-including recruit training. (11)

By providing continuous guidance through various training opportunities and enhanced supervision, the RCMP will supply members with the tools to appropriately navigate the numerous decisions that they will be facing. The need for training as a support mechanism and guide to reduce "wrong" choices is also stipulated by Wood (1997):

Without real support in these areas, it is hardly surprising if members drift into corrupt practices, lack the pride and professionalism to maintain individual standards and lack sufficient concern or interest in the job to discourage and report misconduct by fellow officers. (33)

The training should be progressive to cover relevant material geared to what an individual could be facing at the appropriate time in their service.

Recommendation 8:

All RCMP supervisors, managers and new supervisors be required to successfully complete an RCMP tailored ethics course for supervisors.

Recommendation 9:

All regular members be required to successfully complete RCMP tailored ethics training. After Depot and the Field Coaching Program, the member should receive in-service progressive ethics training at 3 years of service, 5 years of service and then in 5 year intervals thereafter.

Staffing

The misalignment of information contained in the various RCMP files on the same individual was disconcerting at best. This is an issue about systems and about accurate evaluations. The former will be addressed in this segment.

In the event that a member wins a grievance regarding an evaluation, it has been the common practice to remove the entire evaluation from the personnel file. There were a number of situations where this was the case. The absence of the other information contained in the evaluation, not relevant to the grievance, creates an information vacuum. The possibility of vetting an evaluation, removing only the specific comments that were the subject of the grievance, should be reviewed. If the entire evaluation is subject to the grievance, it should be replaced by a new, accurate evaluation. This would provide a more accurate profile of members.

Another issue that was identified is the lack of connection between the discipline, conduct, internal investigation and security files and the personnel file. Although members' performance should be captured in the performance evaluations and retained in their respective personnel files, there is a need to explore a means to link the other types of files with the personnel files to inform staffing personnel and managers of conduct issues. Understandably, there are legislative ramifications that must be examined. However, in order to make informed decisions regarding the postings

and transfers of members, and given their significant responsibilities, it is essential that employees making such decisions possess a complete and accurate member profile.

Recommendation 10:

Professional Standards and External Review Directorate develop a mechanism to permit the vetting of evaluations in the event of a successful grievance. In the event that the entire evaluation is grieved, it should be replaced by a new, accurate one.

Recommendation 11:

HR explore a means to associate the different files, including the personnel, internal investigations, discipline and security files.

Postings

Although there is no significant difference with respect to the regular members being posted to their home communities and the incidence of corruption, it was established that those involved in corrupt activities were experiencing a greater sense of vulnerability/greater pressure from family and friends, than the control group. Cadets and new members should be sensitized through training at Depot and during their field coaching program about the particular pressures and challenges that they could face regarding family and friends. Training for new supervisors should incorporate the potential pressures that employees may face, complete with available approaches and solutions. Regular members who are posted to their home communities should be monitored by both staffing offices and supervisors alike. Those experiencing difficulty of this nature should be provided the necessary assistance and guidance and, upon evaluation, be considered for a transfer on a priority basis if necessary.

Recommendation 12:

Regular members serving in their home communities be monitored/assessed by both staffing and supervisors. Training, guidance, assistance and transfers should be considered in addressing members experiencing difficulties.

It should be noted that the diverse mandate of the RCMP, general career progression and various opportunities on a national scope encourage and invite a rotation of members throughout the organization. An accurate Human Resources Management Information System (HRMIS) report was not feasible in determining the average length of time that a regular member remains in a unit due to the recency of the HRMIS implementation. This being said, it is the perception that most members are posted in either multiple detachments or units throughout their career. The departures of members and the new arrivals within detachments/units contribute to the general overall team rotation on a continuous basis. It is interesting to note that there were very few instances of clusters of members involved in a same corruption scheme, unlike the experiences of the larger United States urban city police forces, such as the New York and the Los Angeles Police Departments. The above noted may provide a plausible explanation for this phenomenon. One of the recommendations in the Mollen Commission Report (1994) was as follows:

Implement a rotating tour of duty system to reduce the insularity that fosters corruption. (124)

Promotion

The importance of the supervisor's role cannot be understated given their direct responsibility not only as a supervisor but as a coach, counselor and trainer. The supervisors are models for the subordinates and they set the stage as to what is and is not acceptable practice. This notion is clearly reflected by Tully (2000) in the following:

[...] sergeants should know they are the most influential leaders within a department. Every comment, gesture, or non verbal communication is interpreted by their subordinates as either support for, or rejection of, a management position. (11)

There were first-hand examples in this study, which involved two detachments where there were corruption activities condoned by the supervisors. The role of the supervisors most definitely set the tone with respect to the level of expected behaviour.

The merits of the conscientiousness measure were explored in recruiting recommendations, however the organisational benefits are not immediate. It would be beneficial to also make selections at all ranks, not only based on job knowledge, but also based on those who would be more likely to model the desired behaviour. As with the recruiting phase, a defensible, acceptable ratio should be developed between the Job Simulation Exercise (JSE) and the conscientiousness measure, and it should be used as a combined tool in conjunction with the current practices in identifying the most suitable supervisors.

Recommendation 13:

The RCMP develop a process providing for the integration of the conscientiousness measure into the promotion process.

Supervision/Management

Over the past decade, with the implementation of significant changes to the promotion system, there has been a lack of consistent and accurate completion of regular members' performance evaluations. When evaluations were used as a component to the promotion system, there was a mechanism in place to ensure that they were completed annually. There are a significant number of members who do not receive their performance evaluations, at times bridging two and three years. In reference to the 2005 RCMP Employee

Opinion Survey, 59% of the employees indicated that they did not receive their performance evaluations in a timely manner.

A mechanism should be re-implemented to ensure that the performance evaluations are completed within a prescribed time frame. Supervisors are responsible for the completion of the written assessments of their subordinates, though they have not been used in a meaningful way since the commencement of new promotion process in the 1990s. As a consequence, the evaluation contents cannot identify employees experiencing serious performance issues or the continuation of performance problems. This is relevant to this study's findings, given that although the effect size was small to medium, the corrupt group had significantly more performance issues identified than the control group. The importance of tracking and monitoring members may assist in identifying those at risk.

In order to implement this, a better assessment tool should be developed for the purposes of gleaning more meaningful information regarding an employee. A possibility exists to align the performance evaluation tool with the existing benchmarks and scoring keys established by the Competency Based Management Team. The identification of competency deficiencies through this means is non-confrontational yet likely more accurate and accepted by all, given that the behaviours are clearly identified in the competency dictionary. The opportunity and necessity to clearly articulate performance, specific strengths and "areas requiring further development" is essential for the RCMP in understanding the extent of the knowledge, skills and abilities that each of the employees possess at a given time. One of the significant challenges with this option would be the issue of evaluation versus promotion process and how and if these processes should overlap.

On another note, although the focus of these recommendations tends to revolve around detection of

those at risk of corrupt behaviour, another component that should not be overlooked is preventative measures. There is an importance assigned to the acknowledgement of those exhibiting the desired behaviours within any organization.

By not acknowledging the positive actions of police officers, there is a potential to send a wrong message. According to Wood (1997):

Several other organisational factors emerged as contributory factors. They included: [...]

-the absence of recognition and support for ethical conduct and the repression of individual initiative; [...]. (157)

The need for positive reinforcement and recognition for members exemplifying ethical behaviour should begin at the supervisor's level. Forums, both formal and informal, currently exist within the RCMP, including but not limited to daily interactions, performance evaluations and Honours and Recognition.

Recommendation 14:

Develop a mechanism to ensure that performance evaluations are completed within a prescribed time frame.

Recommendation 15:

Develop a new performance evaluation tool that provides consistent, meaningful assessment information, using accepted benchmarks and scoring keys.

Recommendation 16:

The RCMP recognize and reinforce the members who are exemplifying ethical behaviour, including but not limited to daily interactions, performance evaluations and through Honours and Recognition.

Security

As previously mentioned, one of the general observations that was made during the data collection phase of this study was the lack of meaningful information obtained for the purposes of a security clearance update. This is an opportune time for the RCMP to identify particular issues contributing to a member's risk of corrupt behaviour. Issues such as vulnerabilities and pressures identified in the project, including a member's financial situation, should be explored in greater detail. Specific details related to assets, revenues and debts should be collected in order to identify members experiencing financial pressure as well as those who have no apparent explanation for their increased standard of living. Furthermore, clarification and defined standards should be developed with respect to employee associations and potential risks.

Although the Government Security Policy prescribes the time frame in which the security clearance updates are to occur (10 years for Top Secret security clearance and 5 years for Secret security clearance), the RCMP should examine the possibility of increasing the frequency of these updates. The rationale for this approach is directly tied to the study's findings with respect to the vulnerabilities and pressures that a member may be experiencing. A member's personal situation may change dramatically and it may place them at risk. It is obvious that a 10 year or even 5 year update does not permit adequate monitoring of these issues and determination of if and when a member may be at risk. It is necessary to emphasise that the ultimate goal is to intervene prior to the occurrence of an incident.

The ability to obtain the identified security clearances and to retain them is essential for RCMP employees to carry out their job responsibilities. Employees identified to work in areas of higher risk, such as in National Security, Drugs and Organized Crime, should be required to undergo an updated security clearance even although the prescribed period may not be expiring.

Recommendation 17:

Security clearance update forms be reviewed and enhanced to include information pertaining to vulnerabilities and pressures that RCMP employees may be experiencing. Specific details regarding finances should be captured within this form.

Recommendation 18:

The frequency of the RCMP security clearance updates be reviewed in order to determine the possibility of increasing them. Employees transferring into high risk areas should undergo a security clearance update, prior.

Professional Standards

From the outset of this project, it was apparent that the RCMP lacked a centralized system to adequately track, monitor and integrate all of the operational and discipline files relating to misconduct, corruption and discipline. This study experienced difficulty in obtaining a national compilation of cases. It required three separate sources as well as verifications of both hard copies and HRMIS discipline files in order to proceed.

The RCMP should be able to monitor this program nationally and conduct various necessary evaluations of it, including its weaknesses and progress. The ability to track and monitor members with numerous complaints, including the different types of complaints, particularly with transferring regular members who may be at risk or identifying clusters of corruption or misconduct, would be key to an early intervention model. Such systems are commonly referred to as "early warning" systems.

The findings of this study may be used to assist in the creation of threshold levels for an "early warning" centralized system to identify members at risk. Furthermore, a centralized system would enable the RCMP to begin to capture data systematically,

providing a clearer and more accurate account of the overall national picture as well as of particular issues facing specific units, detachments, divisions and/or regions. With a national system, the possibility for identification of other patterns and trends is feasible with a larger data set than this study had. Consequently, it would allow for better ongoing evaluation, validation and analysis from which modifications to processes can be identified, explored and implemented in order to address the incidents not only of corruption but also misconduct and malfeasance. This proactive approach in identifying and addressing potential problems early may reduce the incidence of civil litigation, contribute to addressing the issue of public trust and more importantly positively impact on the effectiveness of service delivery.

Access to the "early warning" system should be restricted to the National Headquarters Policy Centre and the relevant Divisional Professional Standards/Anti-corruption Units, with generated messages to supervisors in the event of an identified issue. This would limit the information distribution to those who need to be kept informed allowing for thorough monitoring. Furthermore, it gives supervisors the initial responsibility and accountability for addressing problems in a timely manner.

The subsequent natural question involves the manner in which individual identified cases would be treated. Although a member may be at risk, it does not mean that a corrupt incident will potentially occur. It will be necessary to evaluate the situation, the environment in which the member is working, the potential need to reassess the member's health profile, and, if necessary, ensure either the availability of the necessary support or the need for redeployment. A working group consisting of the appropriate policy centres should be established in order to develop a defensible process.

Recommendation 19:

The RCMP implement a centralized information system (Early Warning System) to monitor, track and evaluate the incidents of corruption, misconduct and malfeasance; to identify members at risk of corrupt behaviour; and, to obtain ongoing information for subsequent future analysis.

Recommendation 20:

The RCMP develop and implement a process to assist employees who are identified as being at risk.

General Recommendation

Recommendation 21:

The RCMP follow through with the implementation of the aforementioned recommendations, and conduct subsequent periodic evaluations of their effectiveness and make necessary adjustments.



CONCLUSION

The methodology used in this study encompassed different approaches including general observations, descriptive and comparative analysis, and a literature review. This study determined that there were 322 incidents of known corruption that occurred between 1995 and 2005 involving 204 regular members. From the literature review, in comparison to the experiences of other police services that have been spotlighted in the past decade or more, the nature and gravity of the incidents that were found in the RCMP context were relatively moderate. This may be as a result of the environment in which the RCMP polices, existing legislation, and internal processes and decisions, deliberate or otherwise. On the other hand, the scope of this study does not consider the cases of corruption that have gone unreported or not responded to. Given this reality, it should be noted that the incidents reviewed for this report are but a portion of the total number of actual incidents.

The RCMP has a number of processes in place that likely contribute to the study's findings. As with recommendations by Mollen (1994), Stana (1998) and Wood (1997), the RCMP has had a rigorous screening process in place at least as far back as the 1960s. This was validated during the course of this study. It was also apparent that background checks were conducted prior to hiring on a systematic basis. Furthermore, RCMP regular members, by the sheer nature of the organization's policing mandate, change responsibilities fairly regularly. In the event that a member remains in a unit for an extended period of time, the team changes with the new arrivals filling the vacancies left by former colleagues. The notion of a regular rotation of personnel is considered to break down the insularity that can exist on special teams or units. The independent review body for the RCMP, the Commission for Public Complaints against the RCMP, acts as an oversight body, ensuring the fair and transparent process regarding investigations of public complaints. Unlike the police services that were subject to the above noted investigations, the RCMP is in a unique situation given that it is not unionized.

It was also apparent that as this report was being prepared, steps were being taken to make changes that will reduce the risk of corruption. Clear guidelines pertaining to the use of police information was disseminated to all employees with their pay stubs in 2006. Furthermore, in the same year, there was a Commissioner's Broadcast with respect to clarifying the

use of government credit cards. Another important improvement was made at Depot regarding the ethics component of the CTP curriculum.

The RCMP can and should be doing more in terms of a risk reduction strategy. The incidence of corruption within the RCMP impacts all levels, ranging from the organization's overall effectiveness in meeting its policing mandate to the individual police officer's ability to carry out operational responsibilities. On a broad level the impact is multifaceted, affecting the organization's credibility including the existing and potentially new partnerships, both within Canada and internationally. The resulting negative public perception has the potential to further sabotage legitimate efforts. Left unaddressed, corruption can fester and affect the vast majority of honest employees, in that there is a potential for less public cooperation on an operational level. Furthermore, employees may perceive a lack of action as a sign that the corrupt behaviours are not taken seriously by management. It is clear that the risk of not making proactive changes to address the incidence of corruption can have grave consequences.

It was apparent that many of the incidents identified in this study were as a result of poor guidance, lack of adequate supervision or a combination of life pressures that culminated in a desperate decision. The recommendations proposed in this report do not seek to address transgressions, but to identify ways to prevent them in a proactive manner.

The vast majority of the cases within this study could have been mitigated through effective supervision, training, consistent and accurate evaluations and better collection, coordination and collation of information. Furthermore, it is suggested that the effective use of screening tools currently at the RCMP's disposal will ultimately result in the selection not only of more suitable individuals for the organization, but also for supervisory positions. Lastly, by implementing an early intervention system the RCMP will be in the position to monitor, track and manage its response to public complaints and internal investigations, providing for the RCMP an opportunity to be proactive in identifying and responding to employees at risk.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Acosta, Fernando, Canada and the New Challenges Posed by Corruption in the New World Order: A Literature Review. Research and Evaluation Branch Community, Contract and Aboriginal Policing Services Directorate. Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Ottawa, 2003.
- Bolton, Kenneth Jr., Historical Perspectives of Police Misconduct, p. 27-53, in *Policing and Misconduct*, Edited by Michelle Lersch, Kim, University of South Florida, 2002, 242 p.
- California Law Enforcement Image, Police Deviance & Ethics, [on line], September 2001, 11 p., (consulted 2005-02-15), http://www.calpoliceimage.org/police_deviance.htm
- Christopher Commission Report (1991), in *Shielded from Justice: Police Brutality and Accountability in the United States*, Human Rights Watch [on line], June 1998, in Los Angeles chapter, (consulted on 2006-12-12), <http://www.hrw.org/reports98/police/uspo73.htm>
- Claussen-Rogers, Natalie L. and Arrigo, Bruce A., Police Corruption and Psychological Testing: A Strategy for Pre-Employment Screening, Carolina Academic Press, Durham North Carolina, 2005, 200 p.
- Cohen, Patricia, Cohen, Jacob, Aiken, Leona S. and West, Stephen G., Applied Multiple Regression/Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences, 3rd Ed., Mahwah, New Jersey, USA, 2003.
- Cullen, M.J., Ones, D.S., The Role of Conscientiousness and Neuroticism in Predicting Police Corruption, (paper presented at the 16th annual conference of the Society for Industrial and Organisational Psychology), San Diego, USA, 2001. 52 p.
- Delattre, Edwin J., Character and Cops: Ethics in Policing (3rd Ed.), American Enterprise Institute, The AEI Press, Washington, D.C., 1996 , 376p.
- Ferguson, George (The Hon.), Review and Recommendations Concerning Various Aspects of Police Misconduct V. 1, [on line], January 2003, 64 p., (consulted 2006-12-12), <http://www.torontopolice.on.ca/publications/files/reports/ferguson1.pdf>
- Gilmartin, Kevin M., Harris, John J., Law Enforcement Ethics, The Continuum of Compromise, Police Chief Magazine, [on line], January 1998, 64 p., (Consulted 2006-11-07), <http://www.rcmp-learning.org/docs/ecdd1222.htm>
- Gilmartin, Kevin M., Harris, John J., and Associates, Ethics-Based Policing... Undoing Entitlement, [online], (consulted 2006-12-07), <http://www.rcmp-learning.org/docs/ecdd1220.htm>
- Goldstein, H., Police Corruption: A perspective on its nature and control, Police Foundation, Washington DC, 1975, 64 p.

- Guiliani Rudolph W., and Bratton, William J., Police Strategy No. 7: Rooting Out Corruption; Building Organizational Integrity in the New York Police Department. New York Police Department, New York, July 1995, 92 p.
- INTERPOL, The Fight Against Corruption; "Library of Best Practices", Manual of Standards and Procedures, CD Version, 2005
- Klockars, Carls, Kutnjak Ivkoich, Sanja, and Haberfeld, Maria R., Research for Practice; Enhancing Police Integrity, National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, Research in Brief, [online], December 2005, 16 p., (consulted 2006-11-07) <http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/209269.pdf>
- Carl B. Klockars, Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovich, William E. Harver, and Maria R. Haberfeld, The Measurement of Police Integrity, National Institute of Justice; Research in Brief, [on line], May 2000, 11 p., (consulted 2006-11-07), <http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181465.pdf>
- Knapp, Whitman (the Hon.), The Knapp Commission, 1970, Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia [online], (Consulted 2006-12-12), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Knapp_Commission
- Manning P.K. and Redlinger, L.J., Thinking about Police. Invitational edges in Klockars, 1977, p. 27 in *Thinking About Police: Contemporary Readings*, Edited by Klockars, Carl B and Mastrofski, Stephen D, McGraw-Hill, NY, USA, 1991, 551 p.
- Michelle Lersch, Kim, All is Fair in Love and War, p. 55-84, in *Policing and Misconduct*, Edited by Michelle Lersch, Kim, University of South Florida, 2002, 242 p.
- Milazzo, Carl Esq., The Untruthful Officer: A Proactive Management Approach, 2000 Conference Materials, Legal Officers Section, International Association of Chiefs of Police, <http://www.aele.org/lostruth2000.html>, Pg 6
- Miller, Joel, Police Corruption in England and Wales: An assessment of current evidence, Home Office Online Report 11/03, [on line], November 2003, 57 p., (consulted 2006-12-07), <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/rdsolr1103.pdf>
- Mollen, M., Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the Anti-Corruption Procedures of the Police Department Commission Report, New York, New York, 1994, 278 p.
- Newburn, Tim. Understanding and preventing police corruption: lessons from the literature. Edited by Barry Webb, Policing and Reducing Crime Unit: Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, London, England, 1999, 65 p.
- Perry, Frank L., Repairing Broken Windows: Preventing Corruption within Our Ranks, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, [on line], February 2001, pp. 23-26, (Consulted 2006-11-07), <http://www.fbi.gov/publications/feb/2001/feb01leb.pdf>
- Project Squeeze — Intelligence Report on Police Corruption, Prepared for the RCMP Headquarters Criminal Intelligence Management Steering Committee, January 1996, 26 p.

- Punch, Maurice, From "Rotten Apple" to "Rotten Orchards": Individual, Micro and Macro System Police Corruption, p. 305-334, in *Police Corruption: Paradigms, Models and Concepts — Challenges for Developing Countries*, Edited by Einstein, Stanley and Amir, Menachem, Office of International Criminal Justice (OICJ), Inc, 2003, 720 p.
- Rampart Reconsidered, The Search for Real Reform Seven Years Later, Blue Ribbon Rampart Review Panel chaired by Constance L. Rice, [on line], 2006, 101 p. (Consulted 2007-02-05) http://www.advanceproj.com/doc/rampart_full.pdf
- Rannie, Michael, Conscientiousness Testing Pilot Study, HR Research and Intelligence Directorate, RCMP, December 2003, 19 p.
- Sarchione, Charles D., Cuttler, Michael J., Muchinsky, Paul M., and Nelson-Gray, Rosemary O., Prediction of Dysfunctional Job Behaviors Among Law Enforcement Officers, Journal of Applied Psychology, American Psychological Association Inc., v. 83, no 6, 1998, pp. 904-912
- Schmidt, Frank L., Hunter, John E., The Validity and Utility of Selection Methods in Personnel Psychology: Practical and Theoretical Implications of 85 Research Findings, Psychological Bulletin, American Psychological Association Inc., v. 124, no 2, 1998, pp. 262-274
- Stana, Richard M., et al., Law Enforcement, Information on Drug-Related Police Corruption, Report to the Honorable Charles B. Rangel, House of Representatives, United States General Accounting Office (GAO), GAO/GGD-98-111, U. S., May 1998, 47 p.
- Tully, Edward J. The Slippery Slope, National Executive Institute Associates, Major Cities Chiefs Association and Major County Sheriff's Association, [on line], May 2000, (consulted 2007-02-06), <http://www.neiassociates.org/slippery.htm>
- Tully, Edward J., Misconduct, Corruption, Abuse of Power — What Can the Chief Do?, National Executive Institute Associates, Major Cities Chiefs Association and Major County Sheriff's Association, [on line], December 1997, (consulted 2007-02-06), <http://www.neiassociates.org/mis2.htm>
- Walker, S., Alpert, G., and Kenney, D., Early Warning Systems: Responding to the Problem Police Officer, National Institute of Justice, Research in Brief, [on line], July 2001, 8 p., (consulted 2006-12-07), <http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/188565.pdf>
- Wood, J. R. T., Final Report of the Royal Commission into New South Wales Police Service, V. 1, New South Wales, Aust, May 1997, 7, 180 p.



APPENDICES



APPENDIX A

General Hypotheses

Consultations were conducted via video and telephone conferences, e-mail, and general meetings with representatives from the following areas:

- > *Criminal Intelligence*
- > *Office of the Ethics Advisor*
- > *HR Research and Intelligence*
- > *Anti-Corruption Units*
- > *Internal Investigation Units*
- > *Legal Services*
- > *RCMP, Access to Information and Privacy (ATIP)*
- > *National Staffing Policy Directorate (NSPD)*
- > *Human Resources Management Information Policy Centre (HRMIC)*

The consultation identified a number of hypotheses to be verified relating both to the individual and to the systems that are in place within the organization.

Issues were further broken down to reflect the progression of an individual from the moment they apply to the RCMP, through the established screening of the recruiting process, to their basic training experience at Depot, followed by the Field Coaching Program and their general service. Matters related to performance, conduct and complaints are specifically topics of interest to be explored.

The subjects related to the RCMP are related to those variables not controlled by or influenced by the individual. They are related to either systems, mechanisms, or essentially the realities of the environment. The hypotheses covered in this section include the recruiting tests, screening formats, service of individuals selected to screen and train the individuals, locations and units of work and types of supervision.

The following chart depicts the general areas discussed, and will be used as a guide when developing the template that will be used to consistently collect the data during the data collection phase:

Individual

Recruiting (personal characteristics)

- 1) *Applicants who had associations with criminals prior to joining the RCMP may continue associations after employment*
- 2) *Prior drug use (illegal / prescription)*
- 3) *Prior financial management difficulties*
- 4) *Too young an age at hiring*
- 5) *Poor prior employment record*
- 6) *Lack of integrity of the individual*
- 7) *Prior traumatic experiences (dysfunction) physical; emotional; sexual abuse*
- 8) *Traumatic experience not adequately addressed*
- 9) *Prior rejection during an application for another police department*
- 10) *Prior offences and involvement in criminal activity*
- 11) *Recruit Test assessment results*

Depot

- 1) *Poor deportment/comportment at Depot*
- 2) *Poor performance/attitude at Depot*
- 3) *Poor peer reviews*
- 4) *If the recruit/cadet was back trooped*
- 5) *Negative rapport with instructors*
- 6) *If weaknesses were addressed while at Depot*

Organization

Recruiting

- 1) *Recruiting spikes in hiring / special training programs (Resourcing/legislative limitations)*
- 2) *Alternate recruiting programs (ie. promotion of S/ Cst. to Cst. rank. Lateral Entries, Amalgamations)*
- 3) *Inexperienced or junior interviewers*
- 4) *Incomplete field investigations regarding background checks*
- 5) *Possible interference by senior management with hiring of individuals*
- 6) *Experienced interviewers too complacent — not following interview guidelines*

Depot

- 1) *Did the changes at Depot in recruit/ cadet training program impact on the individuals ie:*
 - *length of training*
 - *whether they received a salary, allowance or nothing*
 - *whether they were able to be back trooped/ reinserted or if their contract was simply terminated*
 - *if there was pressure to pass individuals, due to the number of troops being training*
 - *if the change in the training program from recruits to cadets decreased the instance of frequency*
- 2) *Possible interference from senior management and other members with pass/fail of recruit/cadet*

Individual

Field Coach

- 1) *Need to have extended training beyond 6 months*
- 2) *Performance problems identified during field coaching*
- 3) *Public complaints/comportment issue during field coaching*

Supervision

- 1) *Performance problems identified*
 - *by type*
- 2) *Presence of behavioural problems*
- 3) *Changes in behaviour*
- 4) *Poor rapport with colleagues*
- 5) *Poor performance noted in other processes such as internal investigations, discipline*

Service

- 1) *Posted to home community province/city*
- 2) *Worked in a unit considered as high risk / sensitive*
- 3) *Posted to an area with a high cost of living*
- 4) *Indications of pressures/vulnerabilities such as substance abuse; financial problems; gambling; lifestyle issues; marital problems at time or prior to incident; life dysfunction*
- 6) *rank / age / years of service at time of incident*

Organization

Field Coach

- 1) *Selection process for the field coaches*
- 2) *Training process for the field coaches*
- 3) *Inexperienced (service) of field coach*
- 4) *Field coaching delivered by RCMP or externally*
- 5) *Increase in hiring and training numbers*

Supervision

- 1) *Inconsistent submission of performance evaluations*
- 2) *Lack of adequate supervisor training*
- 3) *Lack of supervisory experience*
- 4) *Selection tools to identify supervisors*
- 5) *Policy regarding performance assessment:*
 - *frequency*
 - *content*
 - *consistency between divisions*
- 6) *Lack of frequent staffing interviews*

Service

- 1) *Policies regarding posting to home communities*
- 2) *Lack of mechanisms to track employees at risk for vulnerabilities/pressures*
- 3) *Frequency of security clearance updates*
- 4) *Programs to address specific pressures experienced by members (ie. posted to areas with high costs of living)*

Proposed Analysis**Recruiting:**

Is there a correlation between corrupt behaviour and:

- > *age at the time of hiring*
- > *education at the time of hiring*
- > *those with exhibited negative behaviours/experiences prior to their hiring into the RCMP. It can be broken down into:*
 - *those who had been fired prior to being hired into the RCMP*
 - *those who had been refused by other police services*
 - *prior debt/bankruptcy (it is likely that the data collected on this and on bankruptcy is insufficient to draw any meaningful conclusions)*

To be analyzed separately and together:

- *prior offences (frequency and type/overall total)*
- *prior drug use (frequency and type/overall total)*

For those with previous employment with the RCMP

- *prior comportment/behavioural issues (to be broken down by type depending on the number of cases)*

Selection test results:

- > *lower scores on the education test*
- > *lower scores on the psychometric test*
- > *lower RRS/RRPAT (written test) scores*
- > *lower AIG/RMSMIG (interview) scores*
- > *those with unsuccessful suitability interviews*
- > *those interviewed by members with "less" service*
- > *those hired through an alternative recruiting program (breakdown with S/Csts. based on previous descriptive analysis)*
- > *those hired with prior policing service with another police agency*

Field Investigations:

- > *those who have not had full indices checks (CPIC/ Local/Credit)*
- > *those who had family members involved in criminal activity*
- > *those who had discrepancies or issues that arose during the field investigation (ie discrepancies between the field investigation, data bank checks, and interviews or issues of concern raised during the field investigation)*
- > *those who had issues flagged from the interview (may be broken down if the numbers are significant enough)*
- > *those who did not have as many sources (employers, neighbours, references, associates etc.) interviewed. (this will be questionable given that the numbers will be automatically elevated for someone who has lived in multiple locations or held multiple jobs)*
- > *those with issues raised during the field investigation (may be broken down if the numbers are significant enough)*

Depot (Training):

Is there a correlation between corrupt behaviour and:

- > *members age when they began training*
- > *those who received a shorter training period*
- > *those who had performance problems (may be broken down if the numbers are significant enough)*
- > *those who had comportment/conduct problems at Depot*
- > *those who were back trooped*
- > *those who were recommended for close supervision*

Field Coaching:

Is there a correlation between corrupt behaviour and:

- > *those who had public complaints, internal investigations or conduct issues during their field coaching (both founded and unfounded breakdown)*
- > *those with a field coach with "less" service*

Staffing (including postings):

Is there a correlation between corrupt behaviour and:

- > *those who were residing in their province/region/city centre of origin.*

Service:

Is there a correlation between corrupt behaviour and:

- > *age at the time of incident*
- > *education at the time of incident*
- > *service at the time of incident*
- > *the number of years in a unit prior to the 1st incident*
- > *marital status at the time of incident (I do believe that our information may not be reliable on this one)*

- > *those who had combined 1/ issues raised during the field investigation 2/conduct issues at Depot 3/ conduct/public complaints/ internal investigations*
- > *those whose supervisors/colleagues/subordinates felt threatened by them*
- > *those who had previously raised concerns (breakdown of financial, drugs, gambling, peers/ health/ marital and Total)*
- > *those who did not receive any assistance or action by the RCMP*
- > *those who exhibited personality or behavioural changes (with a breakdown of withdrawn, short tempered, moody, unmotivated, other, aggressive, substance abuse, absenteeism, distracted and insomnia and Total)*
- > *those indicating dissatisfaction with the RCMP*
- > *those who had been involved in secondary employment*
- > *those who indicated financial difficulty during their service*
- > *those whose family members were involved in criminal activity during their service*
- > *those who experienced vulnerabilities and/or pressures (breakdown, combinations and totals)*
- > *those who have worked in "high risk areas" ie drugs, undercover, limited duration postings*
- > *those with a higher number of public complaints and internal investigations (founded and unfounded)*
- > *Those with greater excessive force complaints (founded and unfounded) prior to corrupt behaviour*

Performance and Rank

- > *those who are below average employees*
- > *those who are high potential candidates*
- > *those who did not receive promotions as quickly as their counterparts.*
-comparison of years at the different ranks and the final ranks
- > *those with a greater number of performance problems (breakdown of types if the numbers are significant enough)*

General:

- > *Breakdown by divisions.*
- > *For the sample group, incident on the job and both — were the hire dates corresponding to the increase in recruiting.*
- > *What were the sanctions given for repeat corruption incidents? What were the sanctions given for the combined corruption incidents and all public complaints and internal investigations?*
- > *As discussed, it will be necessary to examine the sample group data more closely and flush out details such as the drug related activities, a breakdown excluding the S/Cst. conversions (ie demographic details).*
- > *Necessary to identify the number of current RM's who were S/Cst conversions and the number of existing S/Cst.*
- > *A breakdown of the "Incidents on the job" - demographics, (service, age, rank) and the types, as well as frequency, performance issues and public complaints founded and unfounded.*
- > *Types of corrupt activities with respect to different issues ie vulnerabilities (financial) vs frauds, postings and ranks vs unauthorized use of government equipment, etc.*
- > *The variations of the types resolutions/sanctions for the same type of conduct issue.*

APPENDIX B

Appendix B Project SANCTION Questionnaire

CASE

ID# _____

Definition of corruption:

Police corruption is any illegal activity or misconduct involving the use of occupational power for personal, group, or organizational gain.

(Sayed, Taleh and David Bruce. 1998, pg 8. "Police Corruption: Towards a Working Definition." *African Security Review*. 7(1): 3-14).

Criteria: The use or abuse of power and/or position

Bribery, Extortion, Fraud, Embezzlement, Obtaining Money, Articles or Sexual Favour, Theft, Undermining Investigations, Kickbacks, Protection of Illegal Activities, Breach of Trust, Misuse or Leaking of Police Data/Information, Obstruction of Justice, Dereliction or Neglect of Duties, Drug-related Activities, Falsifying Evidence, Planting Evidence, Perjury, Protection of Corrupt Activities by other Officers or Officials

(Note: The above criteria could be for personal or organizational gain)

"Noble Cause" corruption (for neither personal nor organizational gain). Noble cause corruption can be described as behaviour where the rationalization used is that "the end justifies the means". The gain is for society or the community, rather than personal or organizational.

Please circle the Division: A B C D E F G H J K L M O V HQ Depot

No.	Date of Corrupt Incident (yyyy/mm/dd)	Type of unit/detachment or municipality where the individual was working at time of incident	Nature of Corrupt Incident (Criteria & Description)
1			
2			
3			
4			
5			

DEMOGRAPHICS

- Is the individual
male () female ()
- What is the individual's date of birth? (yyyy/mm/dd)

- What was the employee's service at the time of the corrupt behaviour? (years)

Demographics 1

4. How much **total** policing service (including with other policing services) did the employee have when the corrupt behaviour was noted? _____ (years)

5. What was the rank and job title of the individual at the time of the corrupt behaviour?

_____ *Rank* _____ *Job Title*

6. How long had the individual been working in the unit/detachment prior to the corrupt behaviour? (years)

7. Where was the individual working (province/city) at the time of the corrupt behaviour?

8. Indicate the member's marital status at time of corrupt incident(s):

- | | |
|------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Single | <input type="checkbox"/> Separated |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Married | <input type="checkbox"/> Divorced |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cohabiting/Common-law | <input type="checkbox"/> Widowed |

9. Age at time of corrupt incident(s): _____ (years)

RECRUITING

10. What was the individual's province and city of origin at time of recruitment?

11. When was the individual last hired as an employee (Regular Member)? (yyyy/mm/dd)

12. Was the individual ever fired from employment, prior to application? Yes [] No [] Unknown []

13. Was the individual processed or hired through an alternative program?

Yes [] No []

a. If yes, please indicate which one.

- | | |
|-------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Lateral Entry | <input type="checkbox"/> Aboriginal Cadet Development Program (ACDP) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Amalgamation | <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> S/Cst Conversion | |

14. At the time of hire, did the individual have prior policing service with another police agency?

Yes [] No []

a. If yes, please indicate the number of years: _____

Recruiting 2

15. Has the individual ever been refused employment with another police service?

Yes [] No []

16. What was the individual's highest level of formal education at the time of last hire?

- | | |
|------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> high school | <input type="checkbox"/> university degree |
| <input type="checkbox"/> some college/cegep | <input type="checkbox"/> some postgraduate university |
| <input type="checkbox"/> college/cegep diploma | <input type="checkbox"/> postgraduate university degree |
| <input type="checkbox"/> some university | |

17. What was the individual's highest level of formal education at the time of the incident?

- | | |
|------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> high school | <input type="checkbox"/> university degree |
| <input type="checkbox"/> some college/cegep | <input type="checkbox"/> some postgraduate university |
| <input type="checkbox"/> college/cegep diploma | <input type="checkbox"/> postgraduate university degree |
| <input type="checkbox"/> some university | |

18. If the individual applied as a Regular Member, what results were obtained on

a. the written test? : *(include all written test results)* b. the interview?

Date of written test or interview	Name of written test or interview (if applicable)	Test Score (if applicable)	Comments
			Successful <input type="checkbox"/> Unsuccessful <input type="checkbox"/>
			Successful <input type="checkbox"/> Unsuccessful <input type="checkbox"/>
			Successful <input type="checkbox"/> Unsuccessful <input type="checkbox"/>
			Successful <input type="checkbox"/> Unsuccessful <input type="checkbox"/>
			Successful <input type="checkbox"/> Unsuccessful <input type="checkbox"/>
			Successful <input type="checkbox"/> Unsuccessful <input type="checkbox"/>
			Successful <input type="checkbox"/> Unsuccessful <input type="checkbox"/>
			Successful <input type="checkbox"/> Unsuccessful <input type="checkbox"/>

Recruiting 3

19. Who conducted the suitability interview?

Name: _____
 Regimental#: _____
 Rank: _____
 Position/title: _____
 Location: _____
 Date of engagement of interviewer: _____

20. Was the individual employed by the RCMP prior to becoming a Regular Member applicant? (i.e. auxiliary, guard, volunteer, OCC operator, S/Cst, etc.)

Yes [] No []

If no, proceed to question #21.

a. If yes, indicate the appropriate category.

- | | |
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Auxiliary | <input type="checkbox"/> CM |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Guard / matron | <input type="checkbox"/> Municipal Employee |
| <input type="checkbox"/> TCE OCC Operator | <input type="checkbox"/> Volunteer |
| <input type="checkbox"/> TCE Other | <input type="checkbox"/> S/Cst. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> PSE | <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____ |

b. Were there any behavioural issues raised or of concern when the applicant was in his/her previous position with the Force?

Yes [] No []

c. If yes, indicate what the concern(s) were.

- ☐ Reliability
- ☐ Integrity
- ☐ Judgement
- ☐ Interpersonal skills
- ☐ Leadership
- ☐ Prior drug use

21. At time of application, did the applicant have any outstanding debt?

Yes [] No []

a. If yes, indicate the reason for the debt.

- | | |
|-------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mortgage | <input type="checkbox"/> Living Expenses |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Student Loan | <input type="checkbox"/> Gambling |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Business Venture | <input type="checkbox"/> Other _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Car Loan | <input type="checkbox"/> Not Specified |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Support Payments | |

22. Had the individual declared bankruptcy at time of application?

Yes [] No []

a. If yes, indicate the reason for the bankruptcy.

- | | |
|-------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mortgage | <input type="checkbox"/> Living Expenses |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Student Loan | <input type="checkbox"/> Gambling |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Business Venture | <input type="checkbox"/> Other _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Car Loan | <input type="checkbox"/> Not Specified |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Support Payments | |

23. Were CPIC, local indices, credit or other police data bank checks pertaining to the applicant conducted?

CPIC	Yes []	No []
Local Indices	Yes []	No []
Credit	Yes []	No []
Other _____	Yes []	No []

a. Were there any hits?

Yes [] No []

If no hits, proceed to question # 24

b. Indicate the nature of the occurrence.

Type of Occurrence	# of occurrences	Suspect	Witness	Complainant	Victim	Other	Charged/ Convicted
<u>Alcohol</u>							
<u>Theft</u>							
<u>Assault</u>							
<u>Property</u>							
<u>Firearms</u>							
<u>Weapons</u>							
<u>Traffic Violations (speeding, permits/licenses)</u>							
<u>Parking</u>							
<u>Disturbing the Peace</u>							
<u>Permits/Licenses</u>							
<u>Impaired Driving</u>							
<u>Other</u>							

24. Were CPIC, local indices, credit or other police data bank checks pertaining to the applicant's family members conducted?

CPIC	Yes []	No []
Local Indices	Yes []	No []
Credit	Yes []	No []
Other _____	Yes []	No []

a. If yes, were the family members involved in any criminal activity?

Yes [] No []

25. Were there any discrepancies between CPIC, local indices, credit or other police data bank checks and his/her response during the suitability interview (RMSIG) and the Security/Reliability interview?

Yes [] No []

If no or unknown, proceed to question #26.

a. If yes, was the applicant asked about the discrepancies

Yes [] No []

b. If the applicant was not asked about the discrepancies, indicate why not.

- ☐ Insignificant
- ☐ Other verifications provided clarification
- ☐ Applicant was not required to respond (pardon)
- ☐ Other _____
- ☐ Unknown

26. Were any issues that arose from the interview flagged or identified?

Yes [] No []

If no or unknown, proceed to question #27.

If yes, were they sent to:

a) the field investigators for additional follow up?

Yes [] No []

b) Health Services for additional follow up?

Yes [] No [] Unknown []

27. Were work colleagues, supervisors, friends and neighbours interviewed?

Yes [] No [] Unknown []

a. If no one was interviewed, indicate why not:

- ☐ Not required according to policy
- ☐ Could not be located
- ☐ Information unavailable
- ☐ Other _____

b. If some were interviewed, indicate which ones and how many of each of the following?

Person Interviewed	Total Number Interviewed	# Interviewed by Phone	# Interviewed in Person
Friends/Associates			
Work Colleagues			
Employer			
Supervisor			
Teachers/Professors			
Neighbours			
References			

28. Extent of alcohol consumption upon hiring: *(from Security Reliability Interview and field investigation)*

- ☐ non-drinker
- ☐ occasional drinker (4 or less occasions weekly; typically one or two drinks)
- ☐ regular drinker (5-7 times weekly; 1 or 2 drinks per occasion)
- ☐ heavy drinker (3+ drinks on more than two occasions weekly)
- ☐ unknown

Please refer to the following definitions when responding to question 29:

1. Experimental Use - refers to a situation where a drug was used a few times and use was subsequently terminated.
2. Occasional Use - refers to cases where individuals take a drug when offered, but does not go out of their way to procure it, nor attempt to ensure a regular supply. The occasional user is defined as one who consumes a drug less than once a month.
3. Regular Use - refers to a frequency of use of once a month or more.
4. Abuse - refers to the intentional use of any drug or illicit substance, by voluntary administration and/or use of a drug combined with another substance, illicit or otherwise that produces a stronger effect.

Recruiting 7

5. Dependency - refers to a pattern of regular use of a drug which indicates a physical or emotional need to experience its effect or to avoid the discomfort of its absence.

6. Excessive Use - Use is considered excessive when it adversely affects the individual's behavior and social adaptation or integration.

29. Prior drug use at time of hiring: (check all that apply)

- ☐ None admitted
- ☐ Experimental use of illegal drugs
Which drug (s) and # of times? _____
- ☐ Occasional use of illegal drugs
Which drug(s) and # of times? _____
- ☐ Regular use of illegal drugs
Which drug(s) and # of times? _____
- ☐ Abuse of illegal drugs
Which drug(s) and # of times? _____
- ☐ Dependence on substance
Which substance(s) and # of times? _____
- ☐ Excessive Use of illegal drugs
Which drug(s) and # of times? _____

30. Were there any issues that arose in the field investigation?

Yes [] No []

If no or unknown, proceed to question # 31

a. If yes, indicate all that apply.

- ☐ Absenteeism
- ☐ Financial problems
- ☐ Prior drug use not declared
- ☐ Not reliable
- ☐ Anger issues
- ☐ Difficulty dealing with others
- ☐ Contradictory information to that provided during the interviews
- ☐ Honesty or integrity issues other than mentioned above
- ☐ Unsatisfactory performance
- ☐ Other _____

DEPOT

31. Age when entered Depot Training: _____ (years)

32. Was the member's length of training at Depot shorter than the standard training of 22-26 weeks?

Yes [] No []

a. If yes, indicate the length of the training at Depot.(weeks) _____

33. While at Depot, did any performance issues surface?

Yes [] No [] Unknown []

If no or unknown, proceed to question 34

a. If yes, indicate the performance issue that surfaced.

- ☐ Firearms
- ☐ Police Defense Tactics/Self Defense
- ☐ Physical Training
- ☐ Swimming
- ☐ Driving
- ☐ Applied Police Science/Law, Human Relations, Federal Statutes
- ☐ Other _____

34. While at Depot, did any documented comportment issues surface?(Attitude, deportment)

Yes [] No []

If no, proceed to question #35

a. If yes indicate all that apply.

- ☐ Negative attitude towards those in authority
- ☐ Lack of maturity
- ☐ Inability to work well with others
- ☐ Negative reaction to negative feedback
- ☐ Disrespectful of rules
- ☐ Lack of integrity
- ☐ Laziness
- ☐ Disrespectful of others
- ☐ Other _____

35. Was the member "backtrooped" or "re-inserted" as a cadet?

Yes [] No []

Depot 9

a. If yes, indicate the reason(s) why.

- ☐ Firearms
- ☐ Police Defense Tactics/Self Defense
- ☐ Physical Training
- ☐ Swimming
- ☐ Driving
- ☐ Applied Police Science/Law, Human Relations, Federal Statutes
- ☐ Physical injury
- ☐ Other _____

36. Was the member recommended for close supervision upon graduation from Depot?

Yes []

No []

FIELD COACHING

37. How long was the field coaching program?(weeks)_____

38. Were there any public complaints/code of conduct issues against the employee during the field coaching?

Yes []

No []

Unknown []

If no or unknown, continue to question #39

a. If yes, indicate all that apply, the outcome of the investigations and measures taken where applicable.

Using the following codes:

A-Unfounded complaint

B-Founded complaint

C-Informal measures taken

D-Formal measures taken

E-Suspended

- ☐ Abuse of authority _____
- ☐ Dealing with the public or with colleagues in an unprofessional manner
(ie. lacking self control, disrespectful) _____
- ☐ Inappropriate behaviour (ie. making inappropriate comments or
gestures) _____
- ☐ Poor judgement _____
- ☐ Excessive Use of force _____
- ☐ Tampering with or fabricating evidence _____
- ☐ Not following orders _____
- ☐ Intimidation _____
- ☐ Harrassment _____
- ☐ Assault _____
- ☐ Substance abuse problem _____
- ☐ Gambling _____
- ☐ Other _____

Field Coaching 10

39. Was there any documented concerns or inappropriate behavior identified during the field coaching?

Yes [] No []

If no or unknown, continue to question #40

a. If yes, indicate all that apply

- ☐ Disobeying an order
- ☐ Disrespectful behaviour
- ☐ Lack of initiative
- ☐ Lack of planning and organization
- ☐ Harassment
- ☐ Lack of attention to detail
- ☐ Tardy
- ☐ Other _____

b. Indicate how the behaviour was handled.

- ☐ Informal verbal counsel
- ☐ Formally recorded and counseled
- ☐ Internal Investigation

c. If the behaviour was handled by an internal investigation, was the behaviour:

- ☐ Founded _____
- ☐ Unfounded _____

40. Who was the member's field coach?

Name: _____
Regimental#: _____
Rank: _____
Position/title: _____
Location: _____
Date of engagement: _____

41. Field Coach's service at the time of coaching this member?(years) _____

SUPERVISION

42. Who was the member's immediate supervisor at the time of the corrupt incident?

Date of Incident(yyyy/mm/dd): _____
Name: _____
Regimental#: _____
Rank: _____
Position/title : _____
Location: _____
Date of Engagement: _____
Years of service at time of incident: _____

43. How long had the supervisor been supervising the employee in question?

_____ (years) Unknown []

44. Did the supervisor ever receive disciplinary measures?

Yes [] No []

45. a. Is there any indication in the documentation that the supervisor felt threatened or intimidated by the employee?

Yes [] No []

b. Is there any indication in the documentation that co-workers felt threatened or intimidated by the employee?

Yes [] No []

c. Is there any indication in the documentation that there were subordinates, who felt threatened or intimidated by the employee?

Yes [] No []

46. Is there anything in the file to indicate that at any time, the employee previously raised concerns or identified difficulties related to family/peer pressure?

Yes [] No []

a. If yes, what was/were the problem(s) raised?

- ☐ Financial
- ☐ Drugs
- ☐ Gambling
- ☐ Peers

- ☐ Health
- ☐ Marital
- ☐ Other _____

b. If there was/were problem(s) raised, how was the matter dealt with?

- ☐ Documented and no further action
- ☐ MEAP
- ☐ Directed to Health Services
- ☐ Support Group (ie. AA)
- ☐ Stress Leave
- ☐ Other _____

47. Did the supervisor or **anyone else** document that he/she noticed any personality or behavioural changes regarding the employee? (For example, changes due to stress, family problems, or financial problems.)

Yes [] No []

If no, proceed to question #48

a. If yes, indicate any personality issue that was observed.

- ☐ Withdrawn
☐ Short tempered

- ☐ Moody
☐ Unmotivated
☐ Other _____

b. If yes, indicate any behavioural issue that was observed.

- ☐ Aggressive
☐ Substance abuse
☐ Absenteeism
☐ Distracted
☐ Insomnia
☐ Other _____

c. Is there any documentation indicating that someone tried to assist the employee?

Yes () No () Unknown()

48. Were there other documented recent changes in the member's department at the time of the incident?

a. diminished attention in their uniform and appearance

Yes [] No []

b. diminished participation in the activities/functions in their unit/detachment

Yes [] No []

c. dissatisfaction with the RCMP

Yes [] No []

SECONDARY EMPLOYMENT/ACTIVITY

49. Within 2 years prior to the detected corrupt behaviour, was the member involved in a secondary employment/activity?

Yes [] No []

If no or unknown, proceed to question #53

a. If yes, indicate the type of secondary employment/activity.

TYPE	REMUNERATED	NON REMUNERATED
Self employed _____	_____	_____
Employed by another _____	_____	_____

Secondary Employment/Activity 13

50. Did the member advise the RCMP of an intention to pursue the **above noted** secondary employment/activity prior to the detected corrupt behaviour?

Yes [] No []

If no, proceed to question #53

a. If yes, what action did the RCMP take?

- ☐ Authorization granted
☐ Authorization not granted

51. Was the proposed secondary employment/activity an actual conflict of interest?

Yes [] No []

52. Was the proposed secondary employment/activity deemed to have a potential for conflict of interest?

Yes [] No []

53. How many times did the member submit requests for authorization to pursue secondary employment/activities within the last 2 years, prior to the detected, corrupt behaviour?

BEHAVIOURAL AND WORK ETHIC

54. Within the previous 10 years of the incident, indicate any documented performance problems, public complaints, or code of conduct investigations as well as the measures taken, in the employee's files?

Please Complete Table on page 22-25

55. From the most recent performance evaluations (within the previous ten years of the incident) and documentation in the employee file, how was the employee's performance noted?

- ☐ As a below average employee
☐ As an average employee
☐ As an above average employee
☐ Information too variable to summarize

56. What was the number of performance reviews that were completed in the previous 10 years, preceding the detected corrupt behaviour? _____

57. Was the member identified by the RCMP as a candidate for high potential development?

Yes [] No [] Unknown []

58. Complete the following table indicating all ranks attained by the member and the service in each rank.

Rank	Service in the Rank (years)

59. During the member's service, were there any family members or relatives identified in the CPIC, local indices checks, or other police data bank checks?

Yes [] No []

a. If yes, were the family members involved in any criminal activity?

Yes [] No []

60. Throughout the member's service, were there any documented financial problems?

Yes [] No []

a. If yes, what were they?

- ☐ bankruptcy
- ☐ poor credit rating
- ☐ outstanding debt
- ☐ support paychild care

- ☐ loans
- ☐ living expenses
- ☐ other _____
- ☐ not specified

61. In what **3 (three)** areas had the employee worked in prior to the corrupt behaviour Rank from the time of the incident (1) to the least recent (3).

- ☐ municipal / provincial detachment _____
- ☐ federal (specify) _____
- ☐ drugs _____
- ☐ protective _____
- ☐ major crimes _____
- ☐ fraud _____
- ☐ organized crime _____
- ☐ undercover _____
- ☐ isolated or limited duration post _____
- ☐ international posting _____
- ☐ provincial or federal admin _____
- ☐ Other please specify: _____

62. From the documentation, **and using the corruption definition (page 1)**, which best describes the key activities/element(s) of the corruption incident(s). If multiple activities/elements are present in the file, please rank in order of occurrence from past (1) to present (5)

- | | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Bribery _____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Drug-related Activities _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Extortion _____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Perjury _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Fraud _____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Falsifying or Planting Evidence _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Theft _____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Protection of corrupt activities by other Officers or Officials _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Obtaining Money, Articles or Sexual Favours _____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Other (specify) _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Dereliction or Neglect of Duty _____ | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Protection of Illegal Activities _____ | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Misuse or Leaking of Police Data/Information _____ | |

63. Based on the documentation in the file(s) **and using the corruption definition (page 1)**, which best describes the individual's prime motivation. If multiple corruption incidents, refer to each incident as indicated on page 1.

- ☐ Personal Gain _____
- ☐ Organizational Gain _____
- ☐ Both Personal and Organizational _____
- ☐ Noble Cause _____
- ☐ Unknown _____

64. Based on the documentation, what was/were the reason(s) for the individual's corrupt behaviour? If multiple corruption incidents, refer to each incident as indicated on page 1.

- | | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> To protect key individuals from arrest/prosecution_____ | <input type="checkbox"/> To provide information on police activities_____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> To facilitate illicit enterprise_____ | <input type="checkbox"/> To act as protection for illegal activities_____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> To shield the crime group from police scrutiny_____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown_____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> To influence the course of police investigations_____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Other_____ |

65. How was the corrupt activity initially brought to the attention of the RCMP? If multiple corruption incidents, refer to each incident as indicated on page 1.

- | | |
|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Public complaint_____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Municipal/Provincial/Federal government officials_____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Supervisor_____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Source information (human/technical)_____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Subordinate_____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown/unavailable_____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Other RCMP employee_____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify)_____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Another police department_____ | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative review_____ | |

66. Around the time of the incident, with whom did the employee most frequently associate? Choose three of the most frequent associates, and rank them in order of importance from 1 (most important) to 3 (less important) If multiple corruption incidents, refer to each incident as indicated on page 1.

- | | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Other RCMP employees_____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Known drug dealers/criminals_____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Employees of other police force/law enforcement agency_____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Organized crime group_____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Employees of municipal government_____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Family/friends_____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> _____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Community leaders_____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Employees of provincial/territorial government_____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown_____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Employees of federal government_____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Other (specify)_____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Business or private industry_____ | |

67. From the documentation, were any other individuals or organizations involved with the employee in the incident?

Yes [] No [] Unknown []

If no or unknown, go to question #71

Corrupt Incident 17

- a. If yes, please indicate the appropriate category. If multiple corruption incidents, refer to each incident as indicated on page 1.

- | | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Other RCMP employees _____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Known drug dealers/criminals _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Employees of other police force/law enforcement agency _____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Organized crime group _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Employees of municipal government _____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Family/friends _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Employees of provincial/territorial government _____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Community leaders _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Employees of federal government _____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Business or private industry _____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Other (specify) _____ |

68. As it relates to the incident, which individual exerted the most control or influence in the relationship? If multiple corruption incidents, refer to each incident as indicated on page 1.

- | | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Employee _____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Business or private industry _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Other RCMP employees _____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Known drug dealers/criminals _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Employees of other police force/law enforcement agency _____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Organized crime group _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Employees of municipal government _____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Family/friends _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Employees of provincial/territorial government _____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Community leaders _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Employees of federal government _____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown _____ |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> Other (specify) _____ |

69. If the incident(s) involved another individual or group, how did they meet? If multiple corruption incidents, refer to each incident as indicated on page 1.

- | | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Special interest groups (e.g. car club, motorcycle club) _____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Family/extended family relationship _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Community Events _____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Through mutual friends/acquaintances _____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Other _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Secondary Employment _____ | <input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Licenced Establishments (Bars, Clubs) _____ | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Through course of employee's work duties _____ | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Sports Activities (either that of the employee or their children) _____ | |

70. Was there documentation in the file that the employee was targeted by organized crime? If multiple corruption incidents, refer to each incident as indicated on page 1.

Yes.....[] No.....[] Unknown[]

If yes, please elaborate and include an overview of the means used to target/recruit the employee

Please refer to the following definitions when responding to question 72.

1. Vulnerability - is the capacity to be harmed and refers to the likelihood that an individual or group will be exposed to and adversely affected by harm.

2. Pressure - is an attempt to persuade or coerce someone into doing something.

71. Within the two years prior to the corruption incident, please identify the source(s) of any vulnerabilities or pressures on the individual that were identified in the documentation. There is one column to identify a Vulnerability and one column to identify a Pressure. Please check all that apply.

	V	P		V	P
Immediate family	[]	[]	Addiction (e.g. drugs / alcohol/		
Extended family or kin group	[]	[]	gambling / sex, etc)	[]	[]
Community	[]	[]	Work/peer pressures	[]	[]
Friends	[]	[]	Organized crime group(s)	[]	[]
Medical	[]	[]	Unknown	[]	[]
Financial	[]	[]	Other (specify).....	[]	[]
Marital	[]	[]	Not applicable.....	[]	[]

Please elaborate.

72. What was the length of time from when the corrupt behaviour started and when it became known by the RCMP?

_____ (years) Unknown []

73. What did the supervisor do when he or she learned about the allegation of corruption?

- | | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Nothing | <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Tried to deal with it by him/herself | <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify) _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Contacted his/her supervisor | <input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Contacted appropriate investigative personnel | |

Corrupt Incident 19

74. Complete the following table for each of the corrupt incidents as indicated on page 1.

Incident #	Criminal Investigation Conducted	Criminal Charges Laid	If No Charges Laid-Indicate Why Not	If Charges Laid Indicate the Result	Was a Code of Conduct Investigation Conducted	Result of Code of Conduct Investigation	Sanction given
	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Insuffic. Evidence <input type="checkbox"/> Detrimental to Invest. <input type="checkbox"/> Limitation of Action Expired <input type="checkbox"/> Other	<input type="checkbox"/> Conviction <input type="checkbox"/> No Conviction <input type="checkbox"/> Stay of Proceedings <input type="checkbox"/> Withdrawn	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Unsubstantiated <input type="checkbox"/> Substantiated <input type="checkbox"/> Unfounded	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> No because member retired
	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Insuffic. Evidence <input type="checkbox"/> Detrimental to Invest. <input type="checkbox"/> Limitation of Action Expired <input type="checkbox"/> Other	<input type="checkbox"/> Conviction <input type="checkbox"/> No Conviction <input type="checkbox"/> Stay of Proceedings <input type="checkbox"/> Withdrawn	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Unsubstantiated <input type="checkbox"/> Substantiated <input type="checkbox"/> Unfounded	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> No because member retired
	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Insuffic. Evidence <input type="checkbox"/> Detrimental to Invest. <input type="checkbox"/> Limitation of Action Expired <input type="checkbox"/> Other	<input type="checkbox"/> Conviction <input type="checkbox"/> No Conviction <input type="checkbox"/> Stay of Proceedings <input type="checkbox"/> Withdrawn	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Unsubstantiated <input type="checkbox"/> Substantiated <input type="checkbox"/> Unfounded	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> No because member retired
	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Insuffic. Evidence <input type="checkbox"/> Detrimental to Invest. <input type="checkbox"/> Limitation of Action Expired <input type="checkbox"/> Other	<input type="checkbox"/> Conviction <input type="checkbox"/> No Conviction <input type="checkbox"/> Stay of Proceedings <input type="checkbox"/> Withdrawn	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Unsubstantiated <input type="checkbox"/> Substantiated <input type="checkbox"/> Unfounded	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> No because member retired
	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Insuffic. Evidence <input type="checkbox"/> Detrimental to Invest. <input type="checkbox"/> Limitation of Action Expired <input type="checkbox"/> Other	<input type="checkbox"/> Conviction <input type="checkbox"/> No Conviction <input type="checkbox"/> Stay of Proceedings <input type="checkbox"/> Withdrawn	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Unsubstantiated <input type="checkbox"/> Substantiated <input type="checkbox"/> Unfounded	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> No because member retired

Corrupt Incident 20

75. Was an Administrative Review Conducted?

Yes.....[] No[] Unknown[]

1. If **YES**, what were the findings

- ☐ No issue
- ☐ Lack of supervision
- ☐ need for specified training
- ☐ Lack of resources/manpower
- ☐ Policy not followed
- ☐ Other _____

Date (yyyy/mm/dd)	Performance Problems	Public Complaints / Internal Investigations (Founded/Unfounded)	Did the complaint involve a criminal activity	Posting at time of complaint	On or Off Duty	Measures Taken
		<input type="checkbox"/> neglect of duty <input type="checkbox"/> harassment <input type="checkbox"/> abuse of authority <input type="checkbox"/> excessive use of force <input type="checkbox"/> abusive language <input type="checkbox"/> misuse of police equipment <input type="checkbox"/> disclosure of police information <input type="checkbox"/> misuse of police data <input type="checkbox"/> information <input type="checkbox"/> assault <input type="checkbox"/> intimidation <input type="checkbox"/> lack of self control/anger <input type="checkbox"/> management problems <input type="checkbox"/> inappropriate conduct off duty <input type="checkbox"/> substance abuse <input type="checkbox"/> gambling <input type="checkbox"/> disobeying an order <input type="checkbox"/> Founded <input type="checkbox"/> Unfounded	<input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable <input type="checkbox"/> Theft <input type="checkbox"/> Fraud <input type="checkbox"/> Assault <input type="checkbox"/> Sexual Assault <input type="checkbox"/> Impaired Driving <input type="checkbox"/> Robbery <input type="checkbox"/> Drugs <input type="checkbox"/> Spousal Assault			Informal: <input type="checkbox"/> Reprimand <input type="checkbox"/> Counselling <input type="checkbox"/> Close Supervision <input type="checkbox"/> Transfer Formal: <input type="checkbox"/> Dismissal <input type="checkbox"/> Directed to Resign <input type="checkbox"/> Demotion <input type="checkbox"/> Forfeiture of Pay <input type="checkbox"/> N/A

Date (yyyy/mm/dd)	Performance Problems	Public Complaints / Internal Investigations (Founded/Unfounded)	Did the complaint involve a criminal activity	Posting at time of complaint	On or Off Duty	Measures Taken
		<input type="checkbox"/> neglect of duty <input type="checkbox"/> harassment <input type="checkbox"/> abuse of authority <input type="checkbox"/> excessive use of force <input type="checkbox"/> abusive language <input type="checkbox"/> misuse of police equipment <input type="checkbox"/> disclosure of police information <input type="checkbox"/> misuse of police data <input type="checkbox"/> information assault <input type="checkbox"/> intimidation <input type="checkbox"/> lack of self control/anger <input type="checkbox"/> management problems <input type="checkbox"/> inappropriate conduct off duty <input type="checkbox"/> substance abuse <input type="checkbox"/> gambling <input type="checkbox"/> disobeying an order <input type="checkbox"/> Founded <input type="checkbox"/> Unfounded	<input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable <input type="checkbox"/> Theft <input type="checkbox"/> Fraud <input type="checkbox"/> Assault <input type="checkbox"/> Sexual Assault <input type="checkbox"/> Impaired Driving <input type="checkbox"/> Robbery <input type="checkbox"/> Drugs <input type="checkbox"/> Spousal Assault			Informal: <input type="checkbox"/> Reprimand <input type="checkbox"/> Counselling <input type="checkbox"/> Close Supervision <input type="checkbox"/> Transfer Formal: <input type="checkbox"/> Dismissal <input type="checkbox"/> Directed to Resign <input type="checkbox"/> Demotion <input type="checkbox"/> Forfeiture of Pay <input type="checkbox"/> N/A

Date (yyyy/mm/dd)	Performance Problems	Public Complaints / Internal Investigations (Founded/Unfounded)	Did the complaint involve a criminal activity	Posting at time of complaint	On or Off Duty	Measures Taken
		<input type="checkbox"/> neglect of duty <input type="checkbox"/> harassment <input type="checkbox"/> abuse of authority <input type="checkbox"/> excessive use of force <input type="checkbox"/> abusive language <input type="checkbox"/> misuse of police equipment <input type="checkbox"/> disclosure of police information <input type="checkbox"/> misuse of police data <input type="checkbox"/> information <input type="checkbox"/> assault <input type="checkbox"/> intimidation <input type="checkbox"/> lack of self control/anger <input type="checkbox"/> management problems <input type="checkbox"/> inappropriate conduct off duty <input type="checkbox"/> substance abuse <input type="checkbox"/> gambling <input type="checkbox"/> disobeying an order <input type="checkbox"/> Founded <input type="checkbox"/> Unfounded	<input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable <input type="checkbox"/> Theft <input type="checkbox"/> Fraud <input type="checkbox"/> Assault <input type="checkbox"/> Sexual Assault <input type="checkbox"/> Impaired Driving <input type="checkbox"/> Robbery <input type="checkbox"/> Drugs <input type="checkbox"/> Spousal Assault			Informal: <input type="checkbox"/> Reprimand <input type="checkbox"/> Counselling <input type="checkbox"/> Close Supervision <input type="checkbox"/> Transfer Formal: <input type="checkbox"/> Dismissal <input type="checkbox"/> Directed to Resign <input type="checkbox"/> Demotion <input type="checkbox"/> Forfeiture of Pay <input type="checkbox"/> N/A

Date (yyyy/mm/dd)	Performance Problems	Public Complaints / Internal Investigations (Founded/ Unfounded)	Did the complaint involve a criminal activity	Posting at time of complaint	On or Off Duty	Measures Taken
		<input type="checkbox"/> neglect of duty <input type="checkbox"/> harassment <input type="checkbox"/> abuse of authority <input type="checkbox"/> excessive use of force <input type="checkbox"/> abusive language <input type="checkbox"/> misuse of police equipment <input type="checkbox"/> disclosure of police information <input type="checkbox"/> misuse of police data information <input type="checkbox"/> assault intimidation <input type="checkbox"/> lack of self control/anger management problems <input type="checkbox"/> inappropriate conduct off duty substance abuse <input type="checkbox"/> gambling <input type="checkbox"/> disobeying an order <input type="checkbox"/> Founded <input type="checkbox"/> Unfounded	<input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable <input type="checkbox"/> Theft <input type="checkbox"/> Fraud <input type="checkbox"/> Assault <input type="checkbox"/> Sexual Assault <input type="checkbox"/> Impaired Driving <input type="checkbox"/> Robbery <input type="checkbox"/> Drugs <input type="checkbox"/> Spousal Assault			Informal: <input type="checkbox"/> Reprimand <input type="checkbox"/> Counselling <input type="checkbox"/> Close Supervision <input type="checkbox"/> Transfer Formal: <input type="checkbox"/> Dismissal <input type="checkbox"/> Directed to Resign <input type="checkbox"/> Demotion <input type="checkbox"/> Forfeiture of Pay <input type="checkbox"/> N/A

Date (yyyy/mm/dd)	Performance Problems	Public Complaints / Internal Investigations (Founded/Unfounded)	Did the complaint involve a criminal activity	Posting at time of complaint	On or Off Duty	Measures Taken
		<input type="checkbox"/> neglect of duty <input type="checkbox"/> harassment <input type="checkbox"/> abuse of authority <input type="checkbox"/> excessive use of force <input type="checkbox"/> abusive language <input type="checkbox"/> misuse of police equipment <input type="checkbox"/> disclosure of police information <input type="checkbox"/> misuse of police data information <input type="checkbox"/> assault <input type="checkbox"/> intimidation <input type="checkbox"/> lack of self control/anger management problems <input type="checkbox"/> inappropriate conduct off duty substance abuse <input type="checkbox"/> gambling <input type="checkbox"/> disobeying an order <input type="checkbox"/> Founded <input type="checkbox"/> Unfounded	<input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable <input type="checkbox"/> Theft <input type="checkbox"/> Fraud <input type="checkbox"/> Assault <input type="checkbox"/> Sexual Assault <input type="checkbox"/> Impaired Driving <input type="checkbox"/> Robbery <input type="checkbox"/> Drugs <input type="checkbox"/> Spousal Assault			Informal: <input type="checkbox"/> Reprimand <input type="checkbox"/> Counselling <input type="checkbox"/> Close Supervision <input type="checkbox"/> Transfer Formal: <input type="checkbox"/> Dismissal <input type="checkbox"/> Directed to Resign <input type="checkbox"/> Demotion <input type="checkbox"/> Forfeiture of Pay <input type="checkbox"/> N/A

Date (yyyy/mm/dd)	Performance Problems	Public Complaints / Internal Investigations (Founded/Unfounded)	Did the complaint involve a criminal activity	Posting at time of complaint	On or Off Duty	Measures Taken
		<input type="checkbox"/> neglect of duty <input type="checkbox"/> harassment <input type="checkbox"/> abuse of authority <input type="checkbox"/> excessive use of force <input type="checkbox"/> abusive language <input type="checkbox"/> misuse of police equipment <input type="checkbox"/> disclosure of police information <input type="checkbox"/> misuse of police data information <input type="checkbox"/> assault intimidation <input type="checkbox"/> lack of self control/anger management problems <input type="checkbox"/> inappropriate conduct off duty substance abuse <input type="checkbox"/> gambling <input type="checkbox"/> disobeying an order <input type="checkbox"/> Founded <input type="checkbox"/> Unfounded	<input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable <input type="checkbox"/> Theft <input type="checkbox"/> Fraud <input type="checkbox"/> Assault <input type="checkbox"/> Sexual Assault <input type="checkbox"/> Impaired Driving <input type="checkbox"/> Robbery <input type="checkbox"/> Drugs <input type="checkbox"/> Spousal Assault			Informal: <input type="checkbox"/> Reprimand <input type="checkbox"/> Counselling <input type="checkbox"/> Close Supervision <input type="checkbox"/> Transfer Formal: <input type="checkbox"/> Dismissal <input type="checkbox"/> Directed to Resign <input type="checkbox"/> Demotion <input type="checkbox"/> Forfeiture of Pay <input type="checkbox"/> N/A

Date (yyyy/mm/dd)	Performance Problems	Public Complaints / Internal Investigations (Founded/Unfounded)	Did the complaint involve a criminal activity	Posting at time of complaint	On or Off Duty	Measures Taken
		<input type="checkbox"/> neglect of duty <input type="checkbox"/> harassment <input type="checkbox"/> abuse of authority <input type="checkbox"/> excessive use of force <input type="checkbox"/> abusive language <input type="checkbox"/> misuse of police equipment <input type="checkbox"/> disclosure of police information <input type="checkbox"/> misuse of police data <input type="checkbox"/> information <input type="checkbox"/> assault <input type="checkbox"/> intimidation <input type="checkbox"/> lack of self control/anger <input type="checkbox"/> management problems <input type="checkbox"/> inappropriate conduct off duty <input type="checkbox"/> substance abuse <input type="checkbox"/> gambling <input type="checkbox"/> disobeying an order <input type="checkbox"/> Founded <input type="checkbox"/> Unfounded	<input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable <input type="checkbox"/> Theft <input type="checkbox"/> Fraud <input type="checkbox"/> Assault <input type="checkbox"/> Sexual Assault <input type="checkbox"/> Impaired Driving <input type="checkbox"/> Robbery <input type="checkbox"/> Drugs <input type="checkbox"/> Spousal Assault			Informal: <input type="checkbox"/> Reprimand <input type="checkbox"/> Counselling <input type="checkbox"/> Close Supervision <input type="checkbox"/> Transfer Formal: <input type="checkbox"/> Dismissal <input type="checkbox"/> Directed to Resign <input type="checkbox"/> Demotion <input type="checkbox"/> Forfeiture of Pay <input type="checkbox"/> N/A

Date (yyyy/mm/dd)	Performance Problems	Public Complaints / Internal Investigations (Founded / Unfounded)	Did the complaint involve a criminal activity	Posting at time of complaint	On or Off Duty	Measures Taken
		<input type="checkbox"/> neglect of duty <input type="checkbox"/> harassment <input type="checkbox"/> abuse of authority <input type="checkbox"/> excessive use of force <input type="checkbox"/> abusive language <input type="checkbox"/> misuse of police equipment <input type="checkbox"/> disclosure of police information <input type="checkbox"/> misuse of police data information <input type="checkbox"/> assault <input type="checkbox"/> intimidation <input type="checkbox"/> lack of self control/anger management problems <input type="checkbox"/> inappropriate conduct off duty <input type="checkbox"/> substance abuse <input type="checkbox"/> gambling <input type="checkbox"/> disobeying an order <input type="checkbox"/> Founded <input type="checkbox"/> Unfounded	<input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable <input type="checkbox"/> Theft <input type="checkbox"/> Fraud <input type="checkbox"/> Assault <input type="checkbox"/> Sexual Assault <input type="checkbox"/> Impaired Driving <input type="checkbox"/> Robbery <input type="checkbox"/> Drugs <input type="checkbox"/> Spousal Assault			Informal: <input type="checkbox"/> Reprimand <input type="checkbox"/> Counselling <input type="checkbox"/> Close Supervision <input type="checkbox"/> Transfer Formal: <input type="checkbox"/> Dismissal <input type="checkbox"/> Directed to Resign <input type="checkbox"/> Demotion <input type="checkbox"/> Forfeiture of Pay <input type="checkbox"/> N/A

Date (yyyy/mm/dd)	Performance Problems	Public Complaints / Internal Investigations (Founded/Unfounded)	Did the complaint involve a criminal activity	Posting at time of complaint	On or Off Duty	Measures Taken
		<input type="checkbox"/> neglect of duty <input type="checkbox"/> harassment <input type="checkbox"/> abuse of authority <input type="checkbox"/> excessive use of force <input type="checkbox"/> abusive language <input type="checkbox"/> misuse of police equipment <input type="checkbox"/> disclosure of police information <input type="checkbox"/> misuse of police data <input type="checkbox"/> information <input type="checkbox"/> assault <input type="checkbox"/> intimidation <input type="checkbox"/> lack of self control/anger <input type="checkbox"/> management problems <input type="checkbox"/> inappropriate conduct off duty <input type="checkbox"/> substance abuse <input type="checkbox"/> gambling <input type="checkbox"/> disobeying an order <input type="checkbox"/> Founded <input type="checkbox"/> Unfounded	<input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable <input type="checkbox"/> Theft <input type="checkbox"/> Fraud <input type="checkbox"/> Assault <input type="checkbox"/> Sexual Assault <input type="checkbox"/> Impaired Driving <input type="checkbox"/> Robbery <input type="checkbox"/> Drugs <input type="checkbox"/> Spousal Assault			Informal: <input type="checkbox"/> Reprimand <input type="checkbox"/> Counselling <input type="checkbox"/> Close Supervision <input type="checkbox"/> Transfer Formal: <input type="checkbox"/> Dismissal <input type="checkbox"/> Directed to Resign <input type="checkbox"/> Demotion <input type="checkbox"/> Forfeiture of Pay <input type="checkbox"/> N/A

Date (yyyy/mm/dd)	Performance Problems	Public Complaints / Internal Investigations (Founded/Unfounded)	Did the complaint involve a criminal activity	Posting at time of complaint	On or Off Duty	Measures Taken
		<input type="checkbox"/> neglect of duty <input type="checkbox"/> harassment <input type="checkbox"/> abuse of authority <input type="checkbox"/> excessive use of force <input type="checkbox"/> abusive language <input type="checkbox"/> misuse of police equipment <input type="checkbox"/> disclosure of police information <input type="checkbox"/> misuse of police data information <input type="checkbox"/> assault intimidation <input type="checkbox"/> lack of self control/anger management problems <input type="checkbox"/> inappropriate conduct off duty substance abuse <input type="checkbox"/> gambling <input type="checkbox"/> disobeying an order <input type="checkbox"/> Founded <input type="checkbox"/> Unfounded	<input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable <input type="checkbox"/> Theft <input type="checkbox"/> Fraud <input type="checkbox"/> Assault <input type="checkbox"/> Sexual Assault <input type="checkbox"/> Impaired Driving <input type="checkbox"/> Robbery <input type="checkbox"/> Drugs <input type="checkbox"/> Spousal Assault			Informal: <input type="checkbox"/> Reprimand <input type="checkbox"/> Counselling <input type="checkbox"/> Close Supervision <input type="checkbox"/> Transfer Formal: <input type="checkbox"/> Dismissal <input type="checkbox"/> Directed to Resign <input type="checkbox"/> Demotion <input type="checkbox"/> Forfeiture of Pay <input type="checkbox"/> N/A

Date (yyy/mm/dd)	Performance Problems	Public Complaints / Internal Investigations (Founded/Unfounded)	Did the complaint involve a criminal activity	Posting at time of complaint	On or Off Duty	Measures Taken
		<input type="checkbox"/> neglect of duty <input type="checkbox"/> harassment <input type="checkbox"/> abuse of authority <input type="checkbox"/> excessive use of force <input type="checkbox"/> abusive language <input type="checkbox"/> misuse of police equipment <input type="checkbox"/> disclosure of police information <input type="checkbox"/> misuse of police data information <input type="checkbox"/> assault <input type="checkbox"/> intimidation <input type="checkbox"/> lack of self control/anger management problems <input type="checkbox"/> inappropriate conduct off duty <input type="checkbox"/> substance abuse <input type="checkbox"/> gambling <input type="checkbox"/> disobeying an order <input type="checkbox"/> Founded <input type="checkbox"/> Unfounded	<input type="checkbox"/> Theft <input type="checkbox"/> Fraud <input type="checkbox"/> Assault <input type="checkbox"/> Sexual Assault <input type="checkbox"/> Impaired Driving <input type="checkbox"/> Robbery <input type="checkbox"/> Drugs <input type="checkbox"/> Spousal Assault			Informal: <input type="checkbox"/> Reprimand <input type="checkbox"/> Counselling <input type="checkbox"/> Close Supervision <input type="checkbox"/> Transfer Formal: <input type="checkbox"/> Dismissal <input type="checkbox"/> Directed to Resign <input type="checkbox"/> Demotion <input type="checkbox"/> Forfeiture of Pay <input type="checkbox"/> N/A

APPENDIX C

APPENDIX C PROJECT SANCTION BRIEFING PACKAGE FOR REVIEWERS

Project Sanction is a research project involving known cases of corrupt behaviour that have occurred between 1995 and 2005. This study includes only the cases that have been concluded, both internally and criminally, including appeal periods.

The cases have been identified through three sources:

- Corruption cases identified by divisions
- Centralized HRMIS list of formal and informal discipline cases
- Centralized historical suspension list which includes both with and without pay

A control group of cases of equal size of the sample group, has been included in this study. The same information collected from the sample group (with the exception of the anti-corruption investigations and/or operational files) will be collected from the control group.

All of the selected files within the sample group must meet the definition of corruption:

Definition of Corruption:

Police corruption is any illegal activity or misconduct involving the use of occupational power for personal, group, or organizational gain.

(Sayed, Taleh and David Bruce. 1998, pg 8. "Police Corruption: Towards a Working Definition." *African Security Review*. 7(1): 3-14).

Criteria: The use or abuse of power and/or position

Bribery, Extortion, Fraud, Embezzlement, Obtaining Money, Articles or Sexual Favour, Theft, Undermining Investigations, Kickbacks, Protection of Illegal Activities, Breach of Trust, Misuse or Leaking of Police Data/Information, Obstruction of Justice, Dereliction or Neglect of Duties, Drug-related Activities, Falsifying Evidence, Planting Evidence, Perjury, Protection of Corrupt Activities by other Officers or Officials

(Note: The above criteria could be for personal or organizational gain)

"Noble Cause" corruption (for neither personal nor organizational gain). Noble cause corruption can be described as behaviour where the rationalization used is that "the end justifies the means". The gain is for society or the community, rather than personal or organizational.

Files located at HQ, including Service, Personnel, Security, Discipline, Spent Discipline and any files in the archives, will be verified in Ottawa, prior to going to the divisions/regions.

For the actual review, divisions/regions will be receiving their respective lists prior, in order to provide them sufficient time in which to compile all of the relevant files.

For the sample group of cases of corruption, if there are multiple incidences, the first one is to be used as the "marker" for other collected data. All of the other cases are captured on the first page and will be referred to in the last section of the template.

All information gathered, is to be based on documentation found in the existing files. It should not include any personal deductions or conclusions that you may have drawn. When deciding when to indicate **No** or **Unknown** - "**No**" will be used when there is no documentation that indicates otherwise. Use "**Unknown**" when there is an indication that a document that you know would normally be in a file and is not, or that within a document itself that certain information is not filled out completely.

Template

Specific details and explanations for the various questions will be found in the following:

In the initial **Incident Text Box** pertaining to the Corrupt Incident, please specify the nature of the **Corrupt Incident** using the pre-established criteria and provide additional details including: unauthorized use of government credit card, false statements on expense claim, theft of an exhibit, use of police status for non-police related situations.

Control Group - Half of the cases being reviewed are being used as a control group. There will not likely be any corrupt incidents associated with this group. For this group use the current date or the struck off strength date to provide information in the questions relating to a corrupt incident.

-Questions relating to a corrupt incident for the control group that must be completed with available information are: 1-9, 62-71, and 75.

Q #

3. **Employee's service at the time of the corrupt behaviour** - Refers to the RCMP regular member policing service. It does not include the prior service in another capacity. In the event that there are multiple corrupt incidents, use the service of the employee at the time of the first corrupt incident. Please be precise to the year.

-For cases where there are no corrupt incidents, use either the current service or the service at the time of resignation.

4. **Total policing service** refers to any prior policing service that a member had before joining

the RCMP in addition to any RCMP regular member service. Information pertaining to the prior work history will be found in the Personnel file in the initial Treasury Board Security forms. Service as a S/Cst. is not considered in the calculation of total policing service.

6. **Length of time in the position** - May be gleaned from either the personnel or service file.
10. **Member's province and city of origin** - Generally refer to the place that the individual was hired from. If it differs from where the applicant has spent the majority of the last 10 years prior to making application, default to where the applicant had spent the most time. Again the information should be located in the Personnel file.
11. **Hired date** - Refers to the date that the member was signed in as a regular member of the RCMP. In the event that the member had a prior status such as S/Cst, the hired date will refer to when the member converted to a regular member. This information should be located in the Personnel file, within the first 20 - 30 pages of the file. In the case of a rehired member, indicate the most recent hire date.
13. **Alternative programs** that are being captured are as follows:
 - **Lateral Entry** - Refers to members who had their prior policing service recognized, did not compete with the regular applicant pool and were given a modified training.
 - **Amalgamation** - Refers to the members of other police services, which were discontinued and the municipality has opted to contract the RCMP for policing services. Examples include Moncton, and Wolfville.
 - **S/Cst. conversion** - refers to the members who were originally hired to take on specific S/Cst. duties such as Special "O", Airport, or Protective duties. In the 1980's they were given a modified training in order to convert to RM status. Other S/Cst.'s who have been converted since that time, although they are required to meet the entrance requirements, are not required to compete with the regular applicant pool.
 - **Aboriginal Cadet Development Program** - refers to the aboriginal applicants who were initially unable to meet the original entrance requirements. They were provided additional time and assistance in order to meet the aforementioned.
- This information should be indicated in the Personnel file, within the first 10-20 pages.
14. **Prior Policing Service** refers to the number of years that an individual has worked in a full policing capacity, before joining the RCMP.
16. **Education** - Only the formal education is being captured.
18. **Written tests for the Regular Members** of the RCMP have changes over the years. This may include:

1. RCMP Educational Test plus the Psychometric Test - Also include the aggregate of the two tests
2. RCMP Recruit Selection Test (RRST) (1990's - 1999)
3. RCMP Police Aptitude Test (RPAT) (from 1999 to present)

-For those who have applied more than once, indicate all of the scores on the written tests complete with dates.

- **Multiple test scores and multiple interviews** - Will be the indication that the member was not initially successful at achieving a high enough score on the test, or that there was a perceived problem during an interview.

- Do not include interview results or scores if they are not full suitability interviews (ie. Some divisions conducted preliminary interviews with candidates in the 1970's and 1980's to establish if the applicants met the basic entrance criteria.)

19. **Suitability Interviewer** - Indicate the member who conducted the suitability interview that resulted in a successful outcome. In order to determine the interviewer, the name may appear on the bottom of an actual structured interview scoring sheet of a Regular Member Selection Interview Guide Assessment (RMSIG), and Applicant Interview Guide (AIG), and A323A form, or a multi-paged, yellow document used to capture the applicant's information. All of the above information should be available in the personnel file.
20. **Prior RCMP service** - For those members with 'split service' indicate yes for prior service and use 'other' explaining that the individual had prior RM service.
21. **Security/Reliability Interview** -Information pertaining to an applicant's financial situation, travel, prior drug use, unsuccessful applications to another police service or the military, prior infractions or offences, will in most cases be found in this interview document - It has also evolved over the years, however similar information has been gathered and prior to the mid 1980's may be found in the suitability interview. The current form is referred to as the 1020.
23. **Type of Occurrence positive hits** - It is important to indicate the number of times there were positive hits, ie. parking. This information should be compared to that declared by the applicant during the security interview, if it was conducted in the 1980's to the present date. There is a possibility that the information may be found in the suitability interview prior.
24. **CPIC checks and other indices checks** - Family includes parents, siblings, children, spouse, spouse's parents and spouse's siblings. The different divisions/regions may reflect the indices checks differently. There may simply be a stamp indicating that they were made with a neg/pos box, or there may actually be formal documents which are checked off.
25. **Discrepancies** - Also include discrepancies between the field investigations and the prior interviews.

26. **Following Security/Reliability Interview** - Issues that were flagged for further follow up would usually appear in the form of a memorandum or an A-5 with the specific area to be examined.
27. **Field investigations** in the past six years have been conducted not only by serving members but also by former members who were contracted by the RCMP.
- 28/29 **Alcohol consumption and prior drug use** - May have been captured in the initial applicant interview if the member applied in the seventies or early eighties. Later, this information has been captured in the Security/Reliability Interview. For substance use, please indicate the number of times tried as well as the type of substance.
31. **Age at Depot** - Indicate the age of the recruit/cadet when entered depot to begin the Basic Recruit Training or the Cadet Training Program. This does not include those who attended Depot prior, to complete another program such as a language training program.
32. **Depot** - The regular Basic Recruit Training and Cadet Training Programs have been between 22 - 26 weeks. The purpose of this question is to ascertain if the member's training was less than the standard length. Another question (#35) will capture if the training was longer than the standard.
33. **Depot performance** - Issues are relatively clearly captured in the Depot mid and final training report. Performance refers to the various skills and subjects. Comportment issues, refers more specifically to attitude or behaviour.
38. **Field Coaching** - If there were any complaints or code of conduct investigations, indicate not only the applicable conduct issue, but also include the outcome.
40. **Field coach information** - The field coach is identified as the member who was directly training the new recruit, and is often at the constable rank. The name of the field coach is often found in the first evaluation of the member, following Depot. The information relating to the service of the Field coach, will be established with HRMIS data. The name, regimental number, etc. will be required to further establish service at the time of the field coaching
42. **Supervisor at the time of the corrupt incident** - Refers to the first identified corrupt incident of the specific case, in the event that there are multiple corrupt incidents. The supervisor refers to the direct report of the member at the time of the corrupt incident.
- 46/48 **Department changes prior to corrupt behaviour** - May be established during personnel interviews (form A323), during performance evaluations, during the internal investigations or other operational investigations.
49. **Secondary employment** - When identifying whether a secondary employment was an actual

conflict of interest, it will be documented in the final decision.

54. **Behaviour and Work Ethic Table -**

Note: Contrary to instructions in the Template, this table will include all performance issues, public complaints, internal investigations from the beginning of the member's career to the last corrupt incident. For the control group (no detected corrupt incident), this table should reflect anything from the beginning of the member's career to present day.

- For "**Performance Problems**", there will likely not be any other fields filled other than date, actual problem and posting. The performance problems will be captured in the annual performance evaluations. Please indicate N/A in measures taken in the event that there were no formal or informal measures related to the performance problems. Where the need for close supervision was documented, please indicate in the measures taken.
- For Public Complaints, please specify the type:
 - neglect of duty
 - harassment
 - abuse of authority
 - excessive use of force
 - abusive language
 - misuse of police equipment
 - disclosure of police information
 - misuse of police data information
 - assault
 - intimidation
 - lack of self control/anger management problems
 - inappropriate conduct off duty
 - substance abuse
 - gambling
 - disobeying an order

-Please indicate if the complaints were either founded or unfounded.

- For those incidents that are not included in the corruption incidents but are criminal activities, please specify the offence:
 - theft
 - fraud
 - assault
 - spousal assault
 - sexual assault
 - drugs
 - impaired driving

- robbery

- For those incidents where measures were taken, please indicate the appropriate informal, or formal measures taken that apply.

55. **Performance Evaluations** - Average out the most recent ten years. In many cases there may be need to refer to the supervisor's comments to identify how the member was described. If there are indications that the member experienced persistent problems, indicate below average.
57. **High Potential Development Candidate** - This may be reflected in their entry into the OCDP, Full Potential Program, or any other program that had existed at the time to provide developmental opportunities.
58. **Ranks and Service** - Indicate all of the ranks and years of service in each rank.
61. **Postings prior to corrupt behaviour** - This refers to postings in reference to the first corrupt behaviour. Posting " 1" would be the area worked at the time of the incident, " 2" would be the posting prior to " 1", and "3" would be the posting prior to posting " 2". Federal refers to areas responsible for investigations relating to federal statutes not specified in the question. If a member worked in a detachment in a non-contract division, specify the detachment and if applicable their specific responsibility. ie. Sherbrooke-Integrated Proceeds of Crime (IPOC).

Corrupt Incidents - In the event that the member has been involved in multiple behaviours, use the incident number from page 1 of the template, to identify the responses to the series of questions related to the corrupt behaviours.

- ie. #1 - Theft of money from an exhibit locker
- #2 - Fraud - Use of government credit card to purchase gas for personal vehicle
 - When describing the type of corrupt behaviour indicate theft for #1, and fraud for #2
 - When describing the individual's prime motivation, if would be personal gain for #1 and for #2.

-Refer to each incident throughout.

62. **Key elements of the corrupt behaviour** - Identify the areas that most closely describe the corrupt behaviour. In the event that a member stole an exhibit, it should be captured as a theft and not falsifying or planting evidence. Use of government credit cards for personal use or gain would be considered fraud.
63. **Motivation** - Organizational gain refers to the RCMP and not an external organization.

66. **Employee's most frequent associates** - May only be available in the event that the member has been under surveillance or if it is clearly specified in evaluations or in interviews with members including the member investigated.
72. **Length of time** from when the corrupt behaviour started and when it became known by the RCMP.
74. **Table capturing Corruption incidents** - For each incident indicate the follow up and results as indicated in the table. **Code of Conduct/Public Complaints** - When the evidence clearly exonerates the member, the complaint is considered unfounded. If the evidence is insufficient to clearly support a substantiated conclusion, however there are inconsistencies that exist, it will be considered unsubstantiated.



Project **SANCTION**

Examining Corruption within the RCMP